

---

This is an electronic reprint of the original article.  
This reprint may differ from the original in pagination and typographic detail.

Snellman, Jan; Iniguez Gonzalez, Gerardo; Kertesz, Janos; Barrio, Rafael; Kaski, Kimmo  
**Status maximization as a source of fairness in a networked dictator game**

*Published in:*  
Journal of Complex Networks

*DOI:*  
[10.1093/comnet/cny022](https://doi.org/10.1093/comnet/cny022)

Published: 24/08/2018

*Document Version*  
Peer reviewed version

*Please cite the original version:*  
Snellman, J., Iniguez Gonzalez, G., Kertesz, J., Barrio, R., & Kaski, K. (2018). Status maximization as a source of fairness in a networked dictator game. *Journal of Complex Networks*, 7(2), 281-305. [cny022].  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/comnet/cny022>

---

This material is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, and duplication or sale of all or part of any of the repository collections is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for your research use or educational purposes in electronic or print form. You must obtain permission for any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or otherwise to anyone who is not an authorised user.

## Corrigendum

Due to an oversight by the corresponding author, the paragraph describing the formation of relations between the agents on page 6 is incomplete. The paragraph in question,

“After each cycle of the game, the agents form connections with the agents that have benefited them and cut connections with agents that have not, in other words the agent  $i$  will form a connection with the agent  $j$  if such a link is not already present and  $U_{ij} \geq 0$ , and cut an existing link with the agent  $j$  if  $U_{ij} < 0$ .”,

should read as

“After each cycle of the game, the agents form connections with the agents that have benefited them and cut connections with agents that have not. When forming connections they also give some benefit of doubt to other agents, measured by parameter  $\beta$ . Thus, agent  $i$  will form a connection with agent  $j$  if the link is not already present and  $\min(U_{ij} + \beta, U_{ji} + \beta) > 0$ , and cut an existing link with agent  $j$  if  $U_{ij} < 0$ . In this study parameter  $\beta$  is treated as a constant with value of 1.”