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Habermas revisited: Resurrecting the contested roots of communicative planning theory

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Abstract:

Communicative planning made its breakthrough in the late 1980s and 1990s, and has remained one of most discussed topics in the field of planning theory ever since. Seen against the notable popularity of communicative planning in the field of planning practice, it is striking how much criticism the theory of communicative planning has attracted during the past two decades. A fair share of this criticism has been levelled against the main theoretical source of inspiration of the theory, the philosopher Jürgen Habermas. This study revisits the Habermasian roots of communicative planning. It aims at resurrecting and recasting the Habermasian roots of communicative planning theory not only by replying to criticisms encountered by the theory but also suggesting some novel uses for Habermas’s philosophy in the field of planning.

Keywords:

Communicative planning, Communicative action, Habermas, Planning theory

1 Introduction

Communicative planning has been one of the most discussed topics in planning research of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Planning systems have evolved to include communicative practices and public participation in many parts of the world, especially the Western world, during recent decades. Moreover, vast numbers of individual planners have discovered the utility of communicating and collaborating with stakeholders, regardless of the requirements coming from the planning systems. Juxtaposed against this enthusiasm for institutionalizing communicative planning practices, it is striking how much criticism communicative planning theory (CPT) has attracted over the years. A fair share of this criticism has been leveled against German critical theorist Jürgen Habermas, who has been held to be the primary source of inspiration for CPT when it emerged in the 1980s and 1990s.

The point of departure for this monograph is the long-lasting and still ongoing controversy over the Habermasian roots of communicative planning theory. Given that the debates on Habermasian communicative planning theory have been largely based on fragmentary reading of Habermas’s original works, and on Habermasian viewpoints and arguments that have been detached from their original philosophical contexts, this monograph revisits the Habermasian roots of the communicative planning theory first via Habermas’s own works, and second, via commentaries of Habermas’s theory in the field of philosophy. The context of the study remains the one of planning theory, though.

This monograph not only assesses the contribution that Habermas’s works have had to the CPT, but also asks what this contribution might have been had the proponents and opponents of CPT read his works more carefully and comprehensively. In posing this question, this monograph aims at resurrecting the Habermasian roots of CPT, and also reconstructing and recasting these roots at some points. Part of the motivation for this project stems from the fact that Habermas’s 90th birthday in year 2019 has triggered new retrospective research on his works and their significance for contemporary debates in many fields of
social and political thought. As argued in this monograph, planning is one of those fields that would still today have something to learn from a revisit to Habermas’s vast body of works.

Given the multifaceted, complex, and heterogeneous nature of Habermas’s works, the monograph at hand does not aim at providing a comprehensive picture of Habermas’s philosophy. Instead of such a picture, this work shall present a selection of themes from Habermas’s philosophy, some of which have been discussed frequently in the field of planning theory but still call for further examination, while others have received only scant attention but could contribute fruitfully to certain specific contemporary planning-theoretical debates.

The purpose of this project is to reflect on and reply to some of the recent criticisms of Habermasian theory, and also to propose some novel uses of Habermas’s theory in planning research. The overall argument is that while there might be much to criticize, firstly, in Habermas’s theory, and secondly, in the applications of his theory in the context of planning, Habermasian approaches prove still useful in many respects in analyzing, understanding, and developing urban and regional planning practice and planning systems that set the framework for practice. Furthermore, this monograph argues that, on closer inspection, Habermasian approaches are often not so far from the views of the critics. The debates between Habermas and Habermasian planning theorists, on one hand, and their critics, on the other hand, have been somewhat unbalanced, however: the development of constructive and applicable solutions has largely been the task of Habermasian theorists, whereas the critics have typically concentrated on refuting their views without providing any alternative solutions to the problems they are pointing at.

1.1 Background

Communicative planning theory made its breakthrough during the late 1980s and 1990s, soon after the publication of the English translation of Jürgen Habermas’s colossal two-volume work *The Theory of Communicative Action* (Habermas 1984; 1987a). Habermas’s work laid out a theory of “communicative rationality”, a form of rationality that is inherent in our language use and that “carries with it connotations based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech” (Habermas 1984, 10). The foundation for this theory was laid already in some of Habermas’s earlier works from the 1970s, works where he had introduced his method of rational reconstruction of unavoidable presuppositions of argumentative speech (see especially Habermas 1979). In Habermas’s theory, communicative rationality is connected to the concept of “communicative action”, a concept referring to a form of collective action that is coordinated rationally through speech, and more precisely, through harmonization of our action plans on the basis of normative agreement and shared definition of the situation at hand (Habermas 1984, 86, 101). Habermas (1990; 1993) has discussed further the notion of rationally motivated, argumentation-based normative agreement or consensus in his moral theory called “discourse ethics”, a theory that has been designed to complement the theory of communicative action and to present the implications that communicative rationality has in the field of moral theory. Discourse ethics can be described as a theory of “universally applicable standards for making moral judgments” (Kettner 2006, 300), and as such, it is a procedural theory concerning the argumentative processes – practical discourses, in Habermas’s vocabulary – from which valid norms could be expected to result. The rules or ideals that Habermas derives through his reconstructive method – the ideals guiding practical discourses – include inclusive and open nature of argumentative processes, the requirement that
participants mean what they say, and the absence of external and internal compulsion, which means that the participants are oriented only towards reaching an agreement (Habermas 1990, 89).

Given that Habermas gives to both communicative rationality and rationally motivated normative agreement or consensus such a central role in the coordination of our collective actions, it is not surprising that both of his key theories – the theory of communicative action and discourse ethics – have gained considerable popularity among planning theorists during the recent decades. The project of making Habermas’s theories to serve planning thought has not been without problems, though. Habermasian philosophical ideals – ones resulting from a project of sketching out the rational foundations of our morality, collective action-coordination, and democratic institutions – have proved to be extremely difficult to understand in a practice-oriented field such as planning. There has hardly been any agreement on the practical relevance of Habermasian ideals. These ideals are necessary presuppositions in argumentative processes, but still typically counterfactual presuppositions, ones that we can at most approximate in real discussions. There is a notable variety in the ways in which both the proponents and the critics of communicative planning have interpreted and misinterpreted these ideals.

Furthermore, difficulties in understanding and applying Habermasian theory do not only stem from his philosophical method of rational reconstruction; they also result from the fact that as a living philosopher, Habermas has actively developed his theories and concepts concurrently with the application of his theories and concepts in practice-oriented disciplines such as planning. This being the case, the monograph at hand proceeds chronologically for the most part, discussing simultaneously the evolution of Habermas’s concepts and the development of the planning-theoretical applications of these concepts. The key concepts of Habermas’s theory are therefore only briefly introduced in this introductory section, and further clarifications of the meanings of these concepts will follow in section 2.

1.1.1 The pioneers of communicative planning

Even though communicative planning theory has been often referred to as a single family of theories, the pioneers of CPT – and even more so its contemporary representatives – have differed among themselves greatly as regards to their interpretations of the meaning, significance and usefulness of Habermasian theory. Most of the pioneers, however, relied on Habermasian thought in one way or another. John Forester had applied Habermas’s philosophy in the context of U.S. planning already in the early 1980s, before the publication of the English translation of Habermas’s *Theory of Communicative Action* (see e.g. Forester 1982a; 1982b; 1985). He continued to develop his version of communicative planning theory – “critical pragmatism” – through the 1980s and 1990s (see e.g. Forester 1989; 1993; 1999). Similarly, Judith Innes and David Booher developed communicative planning in the U.S. context, following at least partly Habermas’s thoughts, though focusing on practice-oriented models of communicating and building consensus rather than on the philosophical grounds of the theory (Innes 1995; 1996; 1998; Innes and Booher 1999; 2010). Concurrently, Patsy Healey (see e.g. 1992; 1996; 1997) built her Habermasian-inspired theory of “collaborative planning” in the U.K. context, and Tore Sager (1992, 1994) employed Habermas’s theories in the Nordic framework of planning, calling his versions of communicative planning theory “dialogical incrementalism” (Sager 1994) and later more broadly “critical planning theory” (Sager 2013).
All the theorists of communicative planning were arguing, to put it in a nutshell, that planning could be made more democratic, more legitimate, more just and more responsive to the needs of the people by enhancing the quality and quantity of communication between different groups of actors in planning: public planning officials, political decision-makers, citizen-stakeholders and the representatives of private businesses (Forester 1989; 1993; Healey 1992; 1997; Innes 1996; 1998; Sager 1994). In this view, planning would not only be a strategic game where participants pursue their pre-established interests; it could also be a project of searching for consensus through communication and “making sense together in a politically complex world” (Forester 1993, ix). In this kind of project of deliberation, the interests of different stakeholders are supposed to evolve and converge towards shared interpretations of the contexts of planning and of the visions needed for the planning of the future of cities and regions (Healey 1997; see also Forester 1989; 1993).

It ought to be noted, however, that none of the theorists of communicative planning has followed Habermas’s thoughts comprehensively. That of course would not even have been a prudent strategy, given that Habermas’s project is abstract and philosophical, whereas planning remains a practical and situated endeavor. Habermasian theories and concepts have, thus, been utilized selectively, and some theorists of communicative planning have even explicitly rejected certain particular elements of Habermas’s theory. Here I have in mind Healey (1992; 1997) in particular, who has reported that she has problems especially with Habermas’s universalizing arguments concerning the existence of a shared background horizon for communication. Healey, by contrast, starts by assuming that planning always occurs within the framework of a certain specific place and culture, which leads her to devote more attention than Habermas to the local contexts of interpretation. In addition, she has wished to promote a greater variety of modes of discourse than does Habermas (Healey 1992, 151–152; 1997). Habermas, as already noted, typically uses the concept of discourse to denote argumentative processes, and even though he analyzes also various other forms of discourse in his works, he seems to prioritize the argumentative mode of discourse. In recent years, Healey has also cast doubts over the usefulness of the Habermasian concept of consensus in the field of planning (see Hillier and Metzger 2015, 11).

Forester has not directly questioned the key concepts of Habermasian theory, and at least in his works from the early 1990s, he still also accepts the universalizing aspects in Habermas’s theory. His relation to Habermasian discourse ethics and ideals it includes is ambiguous, however. He has made efforts to explain the philosophical status of Habermasian ideals of rational discourse, arguing that these ideals should not be primarily taken as “prescriptions”, but as characterizations of the “conditions under which we might justifiably (in principle) believe claims to be true or legitimate” (Forester 1990, 53; see also Forester 1993). As such, they qualify better as instruments for analysis than as instruments for guiding planning. In his more recent writings, Forester seems to be distancing himself from discourse ethics and the ideals underlying it altogether. He has stated, for instance, that he wishes to focus on Habermas’s accounts of communicative action, and only so far as these accounts provide the grounds for applied studies investigating the communicative aspects of real-life planning practices (Forester 2003, 47). It is true that there is a difference between the approaches of the theories of communicative action and discourse ethics, and that this difference is reflected in the practical relevance of the respective approaches. Whereas the theory of communicative action provides a framework for analyzing everyday communicative interactions, discourse ethics assesses situations wherein everyday communication breaks down, and universal principles as well as contrafactual ideals for reconciling moral problems enter into the picture (see e.g.
Hannan 2016, 25). Both approaches can still have relevance for planning practice, as argued in this monograph, and maintained at least in Forester’s early works.

Sager has remained exceptionally faithful to Habermasian concepts through the years, despite all the criticisms that the theory has encountered (see e.g. Sager 2009; 2012; 2013; 2018). He has also been perhaps the most strident of all the pioneers of Habermasian CPT to defend the Habermasian approach against various types of criticisms and to “revive” critical planning theory after all the attacks directed against it (Sager 2013). Nonetheless, Sager has also admitted that Habermas’s stringent and demanding ideals of communication and consensus-seeking should not be the only guiding light in planning contexts, where more pragmatic approaches should also have their place (see e.g. Sager 2013, 6).

In addition to the fact that communicative planning theorists have not followed all the threads of Habermas’s thought, it should be noted that Habermas’s philosophy was not the only source to draw from for communicative planning theorists. All the theorists of communicative planning have been quite eclectic with regard to their sources of inspiration. Forester, for example, has adopted elements from the pragmatist tradition and the tradition of ordinary language philosophy – especially the works of J.L. Austin and John Searle – inspired by Wittgenstein’s later works (see e.g. Forester 1989; 1993). These traditions have been important also for Habermas though. Furthermore, Forester has emphasised that alongside of philosophy of language, he has drawn on various strands of social and political theory, and that especially Paolo Freire’s book Pedagogy of the oppressed has substantially influenced his understanding of power, expertise and communication in planning (Forester 2009a; Ilmonen and Peltonen 2004).

Healey has drawn, in addition to Habermasian philosophy, especially from the Giddensian theory of structuration, urban political economy, and studies in cultural anthropology (see e.g. Healey 1997; 1999; 2003). Healey’s background in cultural anthropology, in particular, has led her to emphasise – in her own words – the “embedded nature of concepts and ‘rationalities’” (Healey 2003, 105), the fact of which might partly explain her problems with the universalising and abstract nature of Habermasian thought.

Innes and Booher, in turn, have focused largely on consensus-building practices, making use of complexity studies, Fisher and Ury’s practice-oriented techniques of negotiation (Innes 1996; Innes and Booher 2010) and Lawrence Susskind’s work on public dispute mediation (Innes 2004), to mention a few of their sources of inspiration. In elaborating her relation to Habermas, Innes has explicitly pointed out that even though she has sought for “illumination” from Habermas’s theory, her own work is mostly grounded on interest-based negotiation and mediation, which differs from Habermasian approach in various important respects (Innes 2004, 5). In particular, the term “consensus” in Innes’s theory of consensus-building does not refer only to Habermasian rationally motivated consensus, but also to such an agreement where interests are balanced without attempts to go beyond interest-based positions through argumentative processes.

Furthermore, there have been some prominent theorists of communicative planning for whom Habermas’s theory has not had any major significance. For example, Charles Hoch (see e.g. 1984; 1996) has developed CPT building mainly on the tradition of pragmatism, though not rejecting Habermasian theory altogether (Hoch 2007). Thomas Harper and Stanley Stein (e.g. 2006), in turn, have been inspired for instance by John Rawls’s philosophy in their theory of dialogical planning, Rawls’s deontological theory having been often viewed as paralleling Habermas’s theory in many, though not all of its key aspects (see e.g. Campbell and Marshall 2002; Campbell 2006).
This monograph, nonetheless, focuses on the Habermasian grounds and dimensions of CPT. It starts from the fact that Habermas’s philosophy was “a common point of reference” (Fischler 2000, 360) or even “the principal framework” (Innes 1995, 186) for CPT, when the theory emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the point of departure for this study is that this shared framework made communicative planning appear as a coherent “planning paradigm” in the 1990s (Innes 1995). Some theorists have even argued that the communicative paradigm had gained the position of the “dominant planning paradigm” by the end of the 1990s (Innes 1995; see also Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones 2002), while other theorists have claimed that, in reality, the field of planning theory was all the time much more heterogeneous and that there was plenty of theorizing that contested Habermasian approaches right from the beginning of the so-called “communicative turn” (Healey 1996) of planning theory (Yiftachel and Huxley 2000).

Nevertheless, the critics of communicative planning still often start from the hypothesis that “communicative and collaborative planning occupy an extremely hegemonic position in planning theory” and that the “alternatives remain mostly on the fringes” (Purcell 2009, 148). When at issue is specifically the Habermasian communicative planning paradigm, this probably does not hold true anymore, given that there are very few theorists who still advocate Habermasian approaches in planning theory (these exceptions include especially March 2012 and Sager 2009; 2013). Yet, the paradigm of communicative planning – if we can speak about paradigms in the multifaceted field of planning – is still strong in the sense that the critical alternatives have not been able to influence planning practice as efficiently as has the CPT.

1.1.2 The main criticisms of Habermasian communicative planning

The criticisms that communicative planning theory has encountered during the past decades have been variegated. Sometimes the criticisms have been targeted to the planning-theoretical applications of Habermas’s philosophical concepts rather than to Habermas’s theory itself; in other times, the criticisms have challenged Habermas’s theory directly. Often the critics have not specified whether the target of their criticism is Habermas or rather the planning theorists who draw on his thoughts (Harris 2002, 29).

One of the most relevant criticisms leveled specifically at the planning-theoretical applications of Habermasian philosophy has been that Habermas’s abstract and broad theories are not designed to be applied in the micro-scale contexts of everyday planning practice, but in the macro-scale context of renewing institutional structures in society and drawing up legislation (Campbell 2006; Campbell and Marshall 2006). However, according to the critics, the theorists of communicative planning have been predominately concerned with the micro-scaled local and daily communicative practices of planners, often failing to make a connection with the macro-scale structures and processes in society (see e.g. Fischler 2000, 360; Huxley 2000, 374–375; Fainstein 2000, 455–457). Habermas has himself recommended in some of his earlier works the use of communicative practices in the context of everyday administrative work, such as the context of urban planning (see e.g. Habermas 1985); however, in his works published after The Theory of Communicative Action, especially in his most recent major work Between Facts and Norms, his ideas concerning the proper scale and place of deliberative practices seem to have changed considerably (see Habermas 1996). In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas no longer supports the notion of direct political participation of citizens, as he did in many of his earlier works (Bohman 1994; Forbath 1998). Nor does he seem to advocate citizen participation in administrative practices, although he is not entirely clear
regarding this issue (Kelly 2004; see also Grodnick 2005). Hence, the question ultimately is whether Habermas’s works even support the idea of communicative planning and participatory administrative practices in general (cf. Kelly 2004). As I argue in this study, his multifaceted and heterogeneous works throughout his career seem to imply arguments for and against the different versions of communicative planning theory.

Many criticisms, however, seem to be targeted to both Habermas’s philosophy and the applications of his theory. These criticisms have concerned, for example, the relevance of Habermasian ideals of open and consensus-oriented communication for real-life planning practice, planning practice being always infused with complex power-relations that distort communications and frustrate the search of mutual agreement (Richardson 1996; Flyvbjerg 1998a; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998; Yiftachel 1998; Fainstein 2000, 455; Fischler 2000; Hillier 2000; 2002; 2003; Huxley 2000; McGuirk 2001; Pløger 2001). Sometimes it has been even argued that the Habermasian reliance on counterfactual ideals is not only useless for practice but also harmful for progressive planning goals as it may lead attention away from the fact that planning communication is, in reality, exclusive and dominated by those whose interests are already well-represented in society (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998, 1980–81; Fainstein 2000, 455; Hillier 2000; 2003, 43; Purcell 2009, 150). This, however, cannot perhaps be taken as a direct criticism of Habermas’s theory, but rather just as a view prioritizing sociological or historical power analysis over philosophical research.

Yet, the theme of power in planning is not unknown to the theorists of communicative planning either; many of them have utilized Habermas’s theory not only as a source of ideals but also as a framework with which to analyze how or why power impedes the realization of communicative ideals (see especially Forester 1985; 1989; 1990; March 2012). Of course, the mere fact that Habermas’s theory has been utilized in analyzing power and distortions in communication does not yet help communicative planning theorists to refute the criticism concerning the uselessness of Habermasian ideals for planning practice. Furthermore, the criticism concerning the gap between ideals and reality does not only concern Habermasian planning theory but also Habermas’s theory as a philosophical theory, since – as many critics argue – power is always present in the context of collective action, whatever might be the context of the action (see e.g. Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998, 1980). Hence, one of the key questions of the critics has been: what might motivate the powerful actors to withdraw from the utilization of power and adhere to the force of arguments only (see e.g. Flyvbjerg 1998a; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998; Hillier 2003, 41)? This question is especially pressing in the field of planning where private economic interests, in particular, are often directly involved in the planning and development projects.

One of those contemporary criticisms that has been targeted not only at Habermasian planning theorists but directly to Habermas is the accusation that the argumentative style of discourse and consensus-orientation, even as a counterfactual ideal, violate the pluralism typical to contemporary societies (Richardson 1996; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998; Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones 2002; Bond 2011). The argumentative mode of discourse has surely been the main focus area of Habermas’s theory, but he has also assessed a variety of other modes of communication. The reasons that Habermas provides for prioritizing argumentative modes of discussion have not been thoroughly discussed by the critics, though. Furthermore, the critics typically have not elaborately examined the nature of Habermasian argumentative discussion. Moreover, it ought to be noted that Habermasian planning theorists have surely tolerated a greater variety of modes of communication than has Habermas. Hence, objections to the
Habermasian prioritization of the argumentative mode of discussion do not necessarily apply to Habermasian planning theorists’ views concerning desirable features of planning discourses.

Yet, the criticism concerning the inability of Habermasian approaches to deal with pluralism not only extends to the plurality of the modes of discourse but also to the pluralism of subjective and collective identities (see e.g. Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2002, 49; Hillier 2002, 39; Bond 2011, 165). Therefore, this study also discusses the concepts of the subject and of identity put forward by Habermas. The plurality of identities is a theme that Habermas assesses particularly in his works published after *The Theory of Communicative Action*, such as *Between Facts and Norms* (Habermas 1996; see also Habermas 1998a; Hillier 2002, 39–42).

Finally, the procedural orientation that is typical to both Habermas’s theory and communicative planning theory has been reproached by some urban and planning theorists. Some planning scholars have argued that Habermasian proceduralism and formalism shift our attention away from the particular contexts where planning and reasoning take place, thus creating a view of the possibility or desirability of unsituated or placeless planning communication (Campbell 2006, 98; Hillier 2002, 44). Furthermore, some urban scholars have argued that the process-oriented planning scholars such as the proponents of the CPT have not made efforts to clarify what is the connection between processes and outcomes in planning, and that they have failed to prove that the procedural models they promote lead towards good and just cities (Richardson 1996; Fainstein 2000; 2005; 2009; Purcell 2008). Some critics view the procedural tradition in planning thought as an ally to neoliberalist planning policies within which – as the critics argue – procedural efficiency is emphasised at the expense of the outcomes of planning (Albrechts and Denayer 2001, 370). However, the proponents of CPT largely agree with this analysis of proceduralism, and use it as a justification for their own endeavor to make planning processes more just and more democratic (see e.g. Sager 2009).

Nonetheless, there is more to the criticism concerning proceduralism of CPT. The critics of procedural approach are also concerned with the fact that planning processes typically start from a condition of inequality. Critical geographers and sociologists, in particular, have argued that currently growing material inequalities in western urban contexts, having been shaped by neoliberal policies, have consequences as regards political equality and the opportunities to participate (Purcell 2009). Susan Fainstein, for instance, has argued that fair processes simply do not suffice if we wish to bring about just cities; what is needed in her view are processes that give the priority to the needs of the under-privileged, processes that “favour the low-income and minority groups” (Fainstein 2014, 10; see also Fainstein 2010; Purcell 2009). Habermas also recognizes that the possibilities for citizens to participate depend to some extent on their material conditions of living, but being also committed to liberal project and to the freedom of the citizens, he wishes to avoid the potential pitfalls of paternalism in the distributive conception of justice (Habermas 1996, 418; see also Munro 2007).

The debate between the proponents of procedural justice and distributive justice has existed, of course, also in the field of philosophy, where the criticism of Habermas’s proceduralism and formalism is also connected to broader and older discussions, such as the debate between the proponents of deontological formalism and consequentialism, this debate having been ongoing affair for centuries. Habermas represents a modern form of deontological thought, a strand of thought that refers back to Immanuel Kant. Historically, the Kantian approach has been challenged in particular by utilitarian consequentialism and the
Hegelian notion of “ethical life”, the concrete system of mores or ethical meanings and practices within which individuals are embedded. Today, opponents of Habermasian thought, however, hail also from various other theoretical positions, as we shall see.

While some of the criticisms targeted to Habermasian planning approaches are arguably justified, the hypothesis in this monograph still is that Habermasian theory has been put aside too hastily in the planning theoretical discourse of recent decades. The point of departure then is that the picture of Habermasian theory that emerges from contemporary planning-theoretical discourse does not do justice to all of the nuances of Habermasian theory and that his philosophical project deserves a more multifaceted treatment in the field of planning theory. Furthermore, this monograph proceeds from the assumption that Habermas’s philosophy includes dimensions that have so far remained largely unexplored in the field of planning theory, dimensions that might contribute in fruitful ways to some of the current planning-theoretical debates and enrich the picture of Habermas’s theory as a ground for planning theory.

1.2 Research questions and the outline of the argument

1.2.1 Research questions

The research questions in this monograph are: First, could Habermas’s philosophy respond at least to some of the criticisms that the planning-theoretical applications of his philosophy have given rise to, and furthermore, could a revisit to Habermas’s works – rather than abandonment of the Habermasian approach – make the theory of communicative planning more robust at some of those points that have attracted criticism recently? Second, could one find from Habermas’s philosophy some replies as well to those charges that have originated from the planning theoretical field and that have been leveled directly against Habermas’s work? In other words, I am asking whether the interpretations of Habermas put forward by the critics of Habermasian planning are plausible. Both of these questions are answered, first, by reading the works of Habermas and his commentaries in the field of philosophy, and secondly, by analyzing and exploring the interpretations that the proponents and the critics of communicative planning have afforded to Habermas’s works.

In answering these questions, it is obviously necessary to look not only at The Theory of Communicative Action but also at Habermas’s works published before and after his famous and much-cited major work. However, when we broaden our gaze to the broad spectrum of his works, it soon becomes clear that assessing the interpretations of Habermas’s works in the field of planning theory – interpretations by proponents and critics of Habermasian planning alike – is a challenging task. There are various reasons for this. Firstly, Habermas’s philosophical project is highly complex and abstract, and as such highly likely to give rise to misinterpretations (Harris 2002, 25). Secondly, his views concerning public participation and deliberative democracy – including some of the key concepts related to these themes – have changed considerably over time, which is why there might be several valid interpretations of his views (cf. Bohman 1994; Benhabib 1997; Kelly 2004). Thirdly, even single works by Habermas often lend themselves to different kinds of interpretations even with regard to the basic question as to whether or not Habermas supports the concept of communicative planning and finds emancipatory potential in opening up administrative practices to public participation (see e.g. Kelly 2004).
1.2.2 Recasting the challenges of the Habermasian theory: power and pluralism

The critics of the CPT have argued that the theory of communicative action, not to mention discourse ethics, rely on the emancipatory potential of communicative reason to the extent that Habermas’s theory can be taken to represent “utopianism”, naive optimism and negligence of the power-infused reality within which communication takes place (see e.g. Fischler 2000). Habermas himself would not be offended by the fact that he has been aligned with utopianism, given that at least still in the 1980s, he refuted the pessimistic arguments about “the exhaustion of utopian energies” of the modern project (Habermas 1989). However, unlike those believers in the modern project who locate the utopian energies in modern rationalisation that takes the form of human mastery of nature, Habermas finds the utopian energies solely from the communicative form of rationality (Habermas 1989; see also Johnson 2004). This kind of utopianism, expressed in the form of a refutation of the biased interpretations of modern rationalisation, should not be interpreted to be utopianism in the meaning of simple “wilful optimism” (Johnson 2004, 270), as the critics often seem to interpret it.

As regards the accusations of negligence of power in CPT, the critics of CPT contend that Habermasian theory does not recognise the reality of planning practices where power frustrates communicative rationality – a reality that is far away from the ideals and the utopianism provided by Habermas’s central works (Flyvbjerg 1998a; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998; Yiftachel 1998; Fischler 2000; Hillier 2000; 2002; 2003; Huxley 2000; McGuirk 2001; Pløger 2001). However, if one begins to read Habermas starting from his early works published in the 1960s and 1970s, it becomes clear that his works are not only of “anticipatory-utopian” nature, but they also contain a strong “explanatory-diagnostic” dimension, to borrow the terms of Seyla Benhabib (1986), one of the sympathetic critics of Habermas. Unlike the claims of some critics, Habermas does not provide only counterfactual or utopian ideals of undistorted communication, but offers also a series of explanations for systematically distorted communications emerging in late-capitalist societies. He traces these distortions back to the intertwinement of the systems of economy, on one hand, and politics and administration on the other hand. This explanatory-diagnostic approach is strongly present especially in Forester’s early works on Habermasian communicative planning (see e.g. Forester 1985, 1989; 1993) and Sager’s accounts on critical planning theory (see e.g. Sager 1994; 2013).

Whereas many critics of Habermasian planning theory have turned to Michel Foucault’s works to make sense of power in planning (see e.g. Richardson 1996; Flyvbjerg 1998a; Yiftachel 1998; Fischler 2000; Pløger 2001; Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2002; Huxley 2002), it can also be argued that the Habermasian theory is a theory of power in its own right, even though the macro-scale perspective it provides to power in late-capitalist societies differs considerably from the currently popular Foucauldian micro-analysis of power. In this study, the argument is that instead of viewing Habermasian and Foucauldian approaches as mutually exclusive, it would be fruitful to let them complement each other. This is actually what they sometimes do in the works of the theorists of communicative planning, and even in the works of some Foucauldian critics of communicative planning (Fischler 2000, 360; see also Harris 2002, 30). Moreover, some proponents of Foucauldian approach have complemented their ideas with elements coming from the Habermasian theory (see especially Hillier 1993; 2002). As is argued in this study, Habermas’s theory has explanatory potential regarding the origins of distortions in communication, even though admittedly – as Forester phrases it – it
“provides a framework rather than a series of explanations”, leaving thus the detailed analyses of power for applied research (Forester 1993, 13; see also Parkin 1996).

The relevance of the Habermasian approach for power research lies, above all, in its potential in differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate power – a potential that should be relevant from the perspective of planning theory. “Legitimacy”, of course, is a complex and contested concept. In his philosophical project, Habermas discusses the multiple facets of legitimacy ranging from empirical acceptance of certain distributions of power (Habermas 1974; see also section 2.3.2) to discursive justifiability of the exercise of power (Habermas 1979), or from the legality of the use of power to the questions related to normative justifiability of legal norms and of the institution of law in general (Habermas 1984; 1987a; 1996; see also section 2.7).

In contrast to the Habermasian approach, Foucault’s philosophy, with which Habermasian approaches have been so often challenged, largely “brackets out” the question concerning legitimacy (Fraser 1989; see also Habermas 1986). This position, on the one hand, may be argued to make Foucault able to unfold some ways in which power works behind the veil of legitimacy (Fraser 1989, 19; see also Villa 1992, 714–715). On the other hand, this bracketing out of the question of legitimacy – and oftentimes the bracketing out of normative questions altogether – has also raised a question as to whether we should even consider Foucault’s works to have practical and political implications (Habermas 1986, 5; Fraser 1989, 19; see also Fischler 2000, 361). Hence, it is far from being clear that the Foucauldian theory could provide a foundation for a politically progressive theory of planning in a similar fashion as Habermas’s theory.

Most generally, the debate between Foucauldians and Habermasians originates from differences in the respective parties’ understanding of the concept of power (see e.g. Flyvbjerg 1998b; Fischler 2000, 360; Pløger 2001; Hillier 2002). Foucauldians argue that power is not only something that should or could be erased from communicative interactions, as Habermas seems to wish to erase it; power, being ever-present in the various “micro-practices” of our everyday-lives, is also “productive” and constitutive of our identities (Fraser 1989, 18; see also Pløger 2001; Huxley 2002; Hillier 2002). However, it ought to be noted that it is not power that Habermas typically wishes to erase, but rather coercion (Dahlberg 2005). One of the difficulties in Habermas’s theory of power is that he uses the term in different meanings at different times. Even though Habermas starts with a Marxist-inspired view of power conceived as domination and coercion, he later employs the concept of power also as a positive concept (Payrow Shabani 2003, 107). Yet, the positive or “productive” aspects of Habermasian power are surely different from those of Foucauldian power, and this is for the very reason that Habermas is interested precisely in legitimate power.

Habermas’s theory of positive, enabling, and legitimate power is based, for instance, on Talcott Parsons’s systems-functionalism, where power has a role as a general media for achieving collective goals, and even more importantly, it builds on Hannah Arendt’s (1998) contention that power is something that people gain only together when acting consensually (Payrow Shabani 2003, 107, 109; Niederberger 2017). In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas calls this kind of Arendtian-influenced power “communicative power” (see section 2.7.1).

Foucault’s theory of power builds on the concept of communicative production of power, too, but Foucault does not share Habermas’s view that anything like communicative rationality could shape the formation and maintenance of power. For Foucault, power is always constitutive to communicative processes, it is not in need of a normative basis, and it is subjectless in the sense that it is the actors themselves who learn to
“discipline” themselves – to subjugate themselves to dominance – through communicative processes (Foucault 1994; Habermas 1986, 6; Niederberger 2017, 114–115).

While Habermas surely agrees with Foucault on the fact that emphasis should be put on the conditions of communicative production of power, he reproaches Foucault for his cynicism and relativism, which culminate in Foucault’s description of the endless process of dominant power being challenged by counter-power, and counter-power being then transformed into dominant power. Although Foucault’s theory has a normative aspect in the sense that he encourages projects that strive for freedom (see e.g. Foucault 1984b), in Habermas’s words, Foucault eventually settles with neutrally describing how “[e]ach counter-power moves in the horizon of the power which it attacks, and transforms itself as soon as it is victorious into a complex of power which provokes a new counter-power” (Habermas 1986, 4–5).

While touching upon the issue of power in many places, this monograph aims at moving forward from the question of differing interpretations of “power” that has been elaborated extensively by Habermas and Foucault themselves (see e.g. Habermas 1986, 1987b; Foucault 1984a; 1984b; 1994), their commentators in the field of philosophy (see e.g. Fraser 1989; Honneth 1991; Kelly 1994), and by both the critics and the proponents of Habermasian CPT (see e.g. Forester 1990; Flyvbjerg 1998b; Fischler 2000; Hillier 2002; Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2002). In this study, emphasis will be rather given to the currently topical discourse of pluralism and diversity of identities, a discourse that has partly emerged from the grounds of Foucauldian criticisms of Habermasian theory, though. The main argument in this Foucauldian strand of criticism has been that the Habermasian theory, with its orientation to consensus, tends to “normalize” subjects and violate the heterogeneity typical to contemporary societies (see e.g. Richardson 1996; Hillier 2002; Huxley 2002; Bond 2011).

Today, the charges of the Habermasian planning theory – or the Habermasian philosophy in general – of not being able to do justice to pluralism are increasingly based on the theory of “agonistic pluralism” advanced by political theorists, such as Chantal Mouffe (see e.g. 2005, 2013, 2018) and Jacques Rancière (see e.g. 2010; 2014). Mouffe’s theory, in particular, has been adopted by planning theorists, such as Jean Hillier (2002; 2003), John Pløger (2004; 2018) and Michael Gunder (2003). Mouffean agonistic theory has been argued to align with the Foucauldian project in many respects (Bond 2011; Pløger 2018). For instance, it shares with Foucault the appreciation of conflicts (cf. Flyvbjerg 1998b; Pløger 2018) and also the view of power being an essential part of identity formation (Bond 2011). Agonistic criticisms differ from the Foucauldian analysis of power, however, as they go far beyond the empirical limitations of consensus-oriented speech.

Yet, in engaging themselves with highly abstract and theoretical debates concerning the nature of communicative ideals, agonistic planning theorists have exposed themselves to a similar type of criticism that the theorists of communicative planning have encountered; that is, the criticism that their philosophical sophistications, plausible as they might be in theory, lack practical relevance (Bond 2011; see also Longo 2018). Just as there are problems with the view of rational consensus as a goal for planning processes, there are certainly difficulties in the notion of making the agonistic “dissensus” the goal of planning in practice. Given that planning is not only a political activity, but also an administrative endeavor, the agonistic planning theorists have recently had to redirect their attention from conflicts to their resolution and to the project of building of “conflictual consensuses” (Pløger 2018). In so doing, they have moved close to CPT at many points (ibid.).
Many of the proponents of Habermasian planning theory have engaged in the discourse concerning pluralism, Healey with her *Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies* (1997) having been among the first ones, and Forester having explored the topic extensively especially in his relatively recent *Dealing with Differences: Dramas of Mediating Public Disputes* (2009b). In Healey’s case, the recognition of the condition of pluralism has even made her eventually reject some of Habermas’s universalizing positions and to move towards the agonistic position (Hillier and Metzger 2015; see also Pløger 2018). On a closer inspection, however, it might turn out that Habermas’s recent accounts on pluralism come close to Healey’s planning-theoretical aims and ideals. Habermas’s works published from the 1990s onwards prove especially useful in finding answers to questions posed by both proponents of pluralistically oriented CPT like Healey and the critics of Habermasian CPT. The charges that have recently come from the agonistic positions reflect many of those criticisms that some feminist philosophers have leveled against Habermas over the years – criticisms that, might have been behind Healey’s uneasy relationship with Habermas (Mattila 2016). Habermas has been active in responding to these criticisms, and revising his views on the issue of pluralism. This is what he does for instance in his most recent major work *Between Facts and Norms* (Habermas 1996) and in *The Inclusion of the Other* (Habermas 1998a). Furthermore, Habermas’s relatively unknown, heterogeneous and scattered writings about aesthetics have touched upon questions related to the plurality of identities and values all through the decades. The currently heated debates between the Habermasians and agonists or other identity questions-oriented theorists in are discussed especially in sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2, the conclusion being that the division lines between agonistic and Habermasian positions in planning theory are not as sharp as the current controversy might suggest.

2 Habermas’s philosophical project and its relation to the theory of communicative planning

This chapter discusses those central elements of Habermas’s philosophy that have been utilized in CPT, and respectively, those features of CPT that could be described as “Habermasian”, or at least “critical”, in the sense that critical social theorists – not only Habermas but also his predecessors representing the first generation of critical theory – have used the term. In the field of planning, Forester and Sager in particular, have been active in arguing for the need of specifically “critical” communicative planning theory. They have built their critical-communicative planning theories not only on *The Theory of Communicative Action* but also on Habermas’s earlier works, wherein considerable emphasis is put on the ways in which communication is inclined to become systematically distorted in late-capitalist welfare states (see e.g. Forester 1985; 1993; Sager 1994). This thread of thought is, however, present in all of Habermas’s works in some form or another. As has already become clear, Habermas’s philosophy never purported to be only a source of utopian ideals, but also of such theoretical constellations that would be helpful in analyzing biased power relations and distortions in communication.

Even though attention is directed here to explanatory-diagnostic aspects in Habermas’s works, the anticipatory-utopian aspects of Habermas’s theory are introduced in this chapter as well, the focus being on the oft-criticized contrafactual ideals presented especially in those Habermas works that have emerged out of his linguistic turn culminating in *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984; 1987a) as well as in the works dealing with discourse ethics (see e.g. Habermas 1990; 1993). This discussion leads to the key
criticisms that the Habermasian features of communicative planning have given rise to, criticisms to which Habermas’s own works often provide at least tentative replies.

In the end of the chapter, the discussion turns to those dimensions of Habermasian theory that have so far gained very little attention from communicative planning theorists and their critics alike, but that could still contribute to contemporary debates over communicative planning in fruitful ways and respond to the criticisms put forward by the opponents of Habermasian communicative planning theory. These themes are mainly related to the issue of pluralism, an issue that has given rise to heated debates between the proponents and critics of Habermasian approach. Habermas himself has seriously engaged in the topic of pluralism only after the publication of The Theory of Communicative Action, partly because feminist theorists had challenged Habermas on the theme of pluralism frequently. His later works, such as Between Facts and Norms (1996), deal extensively with the relation between consensus and pluralism. Unfortunately, these works have not so far received much attention in planning theory.

### 2.1 Communicative planning theory as a critical planning theory

Communicative planning theory has emerged from various theoretical and practical grounds. Thus, the proponents of communicative planning theory have presented a vast array of reasons for communicative planning practices over the years. In this monograph, the focus is in particular on those arguments for communicative planning practices that are based on the view of communicative planning theory as a critical planning theory. “Critical theory” is understood here mostly in the sense that Habermas understands it, but at points also referring to notions that the representatives of the first generation of critical theorists had about the concept of critical theory. Following Max Horkheimer (1986, 246) – one of the most prominent representatives of the first generation of critical social theorists – the aim of critical theory is no less than emancipation, that is, “man’s liberation from slavery” caused by the repressive structures of modern capitalist society. He contrasts critical theory with traditional social theory, the latter being based on the model of natural sciences, which were considered seemingly neutral and utilized typically for the attainment of technical mastery of the world (Horkheimer 1986). Behind this seemingly neutral façade, they often end up affirming the repression of not only external nature but also of the inner nature of human beings (ibid.).

Traditional theory, in Horkheimer’s (1986) analysis, aims at finding solutions that increase the functionality of the elements of the existing system, solutions that are related for instance to the goal of increasing efficiency in production. Traditional theory, then, moves in the framework of the status quo. Critical theory, by contrast, aims to change this framework.

The first generation of critical theorists – especially Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse – were generally quite pessimistic about the possibilities of emancipation. In particular, the concept of rationality had been drained of its emancipatory potential for them, because it seemed to have lost its connections to normative questions in modern capitalist societies, leaving rationality only with the meaning of instrumental rationality. Critical potential had to be situated elsewhere, for instance, in the case of Adorno, in modern avant-garde art. Hence, the first generation of critical theorists appear to provide a challenge to planning rather than theoretical instruments with which to develop a more emancipatory but still a rational way to plan cities and societies (cf. Healey 1992, 145–146).
Habermas, who represents the second generation of critical theory, continues the project started by Horkheimer and others, but Habermas does not conceive of societies as “totalities” that could enslave people; he regards societies as complex and multi-leveled wholes where there is still space remaining for the agency of citizens (Bohman 1996, 202). Furthermore, Habermas does not greet rationality with distrust, as the first generation of critical theorists do, but he wishes to restore the emancipatory potential of reason (Habermas 1987b). Habermas aims to achieve this through the introduction of the concept of “communicative reason” or “communicative rationality”. With this concept, Habermas aims to indicate that reason is intersubjective and cannot be located in the subject’s consciousness, as philosophers – including the first generation of critical theorists – have traditionally located it (Habermas 1987b). Habermas (1984; 1987a) argues that this “communicative” and emancipatory form of rationality exists in modern capitalist societies, even though its realization is often severely hindered because of the intrusion of the strategic and instrumental rationalities of the systems of economy and bureaucracy to the lifeworld, lifeworld being the context of communicative rationality in Habermas’s theory.

Habermas’s position as a critical theorist has been questioned for many reasons, however. To start with, the connection between theory and practice is only indirect in Habermas’s theory. Theory does not steer action directly in Habermas’s model, but it only provides “knowledge upon which the participants in discourse can draw to assist them in the process of reaching understandings among themselves about their common situation” (Parkin 1996, 419). Furthermore, even though Habermas argues that there is a place of agency and change, he does not specify who exactly would be the actors bringing about change (Held 1982, 195; Parkin 1996). This charge has not been raised against the proponents of CPT, however, given that for them, the main agents of change seem to be the planners (see e.g. Huxley 2000). Even though the theorists of communicative planning recognise a variety or potential agents of change, they emphasise the role of planners as catalysts and facilitators who then empower the citizens to deliberate and to work for the change.

Moreover, Habermas has been criticized for compromising the critical potential of his theory as he relies extensively on the systems-theoretical approach (McCarthy 1985; Fraser 1995; Forbath 1998; Scheuerman 1999). According to some critics of Habermas, this reliance results ultimately in a view that given the current conditions of complexity, economy and administration must remain partly immune to democratic processes or controls (Forbath 1998). Consequently, this study will focus on the question concerning administration in particular, but Habermas’s alleged insistence on the relative independence of the economic system is undoubtedly of interest as well, especially given his overall critical standing towards the effects of economic rationalities in the realm of the lifeworld. In the field of planning theory, there are competing interpretations concerning Habermas’s relation to the economic system, and of course also differing answers to the question as to what should be the relation between deliberative democracy and the economy. While some planning theorists argue that Habermas and his followers fail to take into account the value of market mechanism in action coordination, trying to replace price mechanism-based coordination by deliberation in places where it cannot be replaced without losses in rationality (see e.g. Pennington 2004), others argue that Habermasian planning theorists not only provide too much leeway to the markets but also allow market actors a central place in political deliberation and decision-making (see e.g. Purcell 2008; 2009).
Be that as it may, for many theorists of communicative planning, Habermas’s moderately critical approach – the approach leaving room for example for the markets in action-coordination – has come in handy, because the expectation usually is that planning theories are utilizable for planning and designing better environments in the real-world contexts even in the case where those contexts would leave much to hope for, like they often do in modern capitalist societies. Decisions must be taken, but in such a way that gradually the world changes towards the better (cf. March 2010). As such, planning theories need to retain some of the aspects of “traditional” theory while maintaining a critical perspective of the existing conditions at the same time. Hence, Forester (1985, 203), for instance, defines his project to be about creating a “critical theory of planning practice” that would be “at once practical, factual, economical, and ethically instructive”.

The proponents of the Habermasian communicative planning approach have often contrasted their projects with the technical approach to planning, an approach that moves only in the framework of “traditional theory”. Forester (1993, 25) emphasizes that planning theory should be “practical” but not “technical”. Planning based on technical expertise and instrumental rationality may have held a promise of societal progress in the past, but in the latter half of the 20th century, the technical conception of planning has often been criticized for turning against its own ideals, for instance, by prioritizing the needs of the capital over the needs of the people (Healey 1992, 145; see also Forester 1985).

As it is argued by Forester (1985; 1993), critical planning theory is needed to expose the hidden agendas that planning systems have turned to serve. Critical theory, rather than being directly about solving problems, is about raising questions and making the problems visible and tangible (Forester 1993, 4). As such, planners have a central role in this process, since they have the power to “question” and “organize attention”. Only after the exposure of the previously veiled problems can the problem solving begin.

Habermasian critical theory can be employed, as Forester (1985, 205) argues, in analyzing the systematic but unnecessary distortions in planning communication, distortions such as “deceptive legitimation of great inequalities of income and wealth, the consumer ideologies inherited and generated from the organization of capitalist productive relations, the manipulation of public ignorance in the defense of professional power, and the oppressive racial, ethnic, and sexual type-casting”. The overall idea of Forester’s theory is that while it would be impossible to erase all distortions from planning communication, some of the “artificial” and “politically debilitating” distortions can be brought into the light if the attention is turned to language use in planning (Forester 1985, 205; see also Forester 1989; 1993). This notion is shared by Sager (1994), and also by Healey (1992, 155), who recognizes the need for planning and planners to “critique” and “demystify”. For Healey, however, the main contribution of Habermas’s theory seems to be the idea of planning as a constructive project of consensus-building rather than that of social critique (see also Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones 2002). Furthermore, Innes and Booher also make use of Habermasian concepts mainly in developing constructive and practical solutions that are based on the analysis of the daily work of planners and that are designed to help planners in their daily work; they do not dwell on Habermasian macro-scale social criticism that would fall into the category of “armchair theorizing”, a category from which they have wished to distance communicative planning theory (Innes 1995; see also Innes and Booher 2010).

To sum up, even though communicative planning is often today argued to compromise many of its progressive aims and to affirm the status quo (Purcell 2009; see also Hillier 2000), many proponents of CPT
have originally aimed to carefully balance between explanatory-diagnostic and anticipatory-utopian elements. The question has remained, however, whether the claims about compromised ideals of the CPT are targeted to the original ideals of communicative planning theory or to such “mainstreamed” versions of communicative planning that have moved away from the original ideals of the theory. As Sager (2013, xii) has admitted in his recent defense of Habermasian communicative planning theory, there are such versions of communicative planning that emphasize consensus-building to the extent that there is not much room for critical analysis for biased power relations, let alone for challenging those relations. “Engineered consent” that affirms the status quo is precisely what all the representatives of critical theory, including Habermas, have aimed to confront, however (see e.g. Calhoun 1992). Hence, if some of the formulations of communicative planning result in supporting such “engineering”, they should be subjected to criticism, but it should be noted that this type of consensus is far from the Habermasian ideal of rationally motivated consensus.

2.2 Critical-communicative approaches preceding Habermasian planning theory

Although Forester’s theory had a pioneering role in combining planning theory with the philosophical tradition of critical theory, his theory continued a longer “critical” tradition in American planning thought. Here I have in mind two U.S.-based predecessors of communicative planning theory from the 1960s and 1970s: Paul Davidoff’s (1965) theory of advocacy planning and John Friedmann’s (1973) theory of transactive planning. The focus is here on the similarities that these two classical and influential U.S.-based models have with the more contemporary Habermasian approaches, as well as on the impacts that these two openings have had on the later discussion on communicative planning. It should be acknowledged, though, that many other less widely known early concepts of communicative planning were also presented in the 1960s and 1970s on both sides of the Atlantic.

2.2.1 Anticipations of Habermasian approach in advocacy planning

Paul Davidoff’s and his advocacy planning’s position as a predecessor of communicative planning theory is perhaps more contestable than Friedmann’s transactive planning’s. Yet, in the U.S. context, Paul Davidoff was among the first theorists to react to the growing socio-economic differences – although reacting also to many other types of cultural differences – by introducing the theme of communication to planning theory (Heskin 1980). Davidoff, nonetheless, did not suppose that communication could lead to a convergence of plural views and interests. For him, interests remained many, which is why he thought that more adversarial ways of planning are required. In Davidoff’s (1965, 332) view, planning should be based on the policy of several competing plans rather than on the notion of searching for shared understandings through communication and working only with one “unitary plan”. For Davidoff, such “unitary plans” can no longer represent “the public interest”, since “the public interest” has been replaced by the plurality of interests (ibid.). Single plan-oriented policies no longer work, since they are likely to represent only some sectoral interests rather than the plurality of interests. According to Davidoff, who was not only a planner but also a lawyer, planners should be “advocates” who make choices as to which communities’ interests to represent and who openly report for whom they plan (ibid.). Davidoff, then was a predecessor of both communicative-consensual and agonistic-adversarial approaches to planning.
The partly communicative and partly adversarial position of Davidoff has given rise both to criticisms and approval. Forester (1994, 154), for instance, has been critical of Davidoff’s model because it lacked consensus-orientation and was somewhat vague as to whether anyone should have been responsible for the “work of reconciling [...] ‘plural plans’ into anything more coherent when actual decisions had to be made”. And yet, Davidoff’s theory has provided for Forester a model on which to build a “refinement of traditional advocacy planning”. This “refined” version of the theory, first, recognizes—just like Davidoff’s theory—the fact that public planning authorities’ views may be biased even if they appear to represent the public interest, and second, reveals systematically the sources of misinformation and distortions of communication in the planning processes (Forester 1989, 46; see also Sager 1994, 186; Campbell and Marshall 1999, 474).

Even though Davidoff refused to discuss how we might proceed from plural interests and values to one plan, he was not a relativist. He seemed to believe that argumentative speech offers us an instrument for weighing up rationally different interests and plans. In defending court-like settings of argumentation and decision-making over plans, Davidoff (1965, 332) anticipated some of the Habermasian ideals of rational, argumentative communication, though not the Habermasian ideal of consensus-orientation. Moreover, the reception of Davidoff’s theory anticipated some of the criticisms that the Habermasian approach has given rise to later. For instance, Davidoff was charged with directing the attention of deprived communities to such elitist expert discussions and modes of communication that departed from the forms of political action in which the under-privileged groups could have been expected to be efficient (Peattie 1994, 152).

2.2.2 Anticipations of Habermasian approach in transactive planning

Another important predecessor of communicative planning theory in the U.S. context was John Friedmann’s (1973) theory of transactive planning. Friedmann also set out to question the technical view of planning, a view that no longer seemed to serve societies characterized by increasing experiences of inequality and by plurality of values and interests. Friedmann’s (1973) theory of transactive planning was more open to the variety of ways in using language and other modes of expression than Davidoff’s theory. Friedmann was also more optimistic than Davidoff about the possibilities of communication in the building of shared understandings. As long as we think of planners not in terms of “institutions” but as “individual persons”, he argued, communication between planners and other people may become authentic and meanings can be shared (Friedmann 1973, 171–172). Hence, Friedmann also anticipated some Habermasian ideals of communication—especially the priority of open and understanding-oriented communication over communication as a means for pursuing fixed and pre-given interests (Sager 2013, 110). Friedmann has been credited for this by the contemporary theorists of communicative planning. Sager (1994, 5), in particular, has reported having built his ideas directly on “the communicative core element of transactive planning”, though in a way that strengthens its theoretical basis with Habermas’s theory (see also Sager 2018). Friedmann himself did not make references to critical theory in his theory of transactive planning. His source of inspiration was rather Karl Mannheim who was a contemporary of the first generation of critical theorists (see Friedmann 1973, 22–48). Mannheim was a great believer in planning. He also aimed to challenge the hegemony of the functional rationality in modern societies and to retrieve the utopian elements of modernity, just as the critical theorists did. The critical theorists, however, always remained critical of Mannheim’s contributions (Jay 1994).
Although Friedmann started from the viewpoint of a single planner who builds trust by communicating with people, he also purported to enhance learning and transformation of the whole planning institution, or even the whole society (Friedmann 1973, 190). In so doing, Friedmann set a goal that has remained central also for contemporary communicative planning theorists, such as Forester, Healey, and Sager. Habermasian theory, according to Forester, is useful for the theorists of communicative planning precisely because it has provided means for realizing the goal of transformative learning at all levels and scales, and more precisely, of bringing together “actor-focused” and “institution-focused” approaches (see e.g. Forester 1993, 2).

Whereas Friedmann simply bracketed out the constraints coming from the context of bureaucracy, constraints that frustrate authentic communication, Forester maintains that with the help of the Habermasian approach, it might be possible to overcome at least some of these constraints in practice. More precisely, in Forester’s view, the Habermasian theory is helpful in pinpointing the sources of harmful and “debilitating” distortions in planning bureaucracies and thus also for searching for ways to gradually lessen the amount of these distortions, though clearly not to erase them at once and for all (Forester 1989; 1993). Sager (1994) seems to share this idea of Forester’s.

Healey (1997) also concurs with the objective of building a bridge between actor-focused and institution-focused perspectives, placing more emphasis on the institutional part of the picture than Forester does. However, she does not rely on Habermas’s analyses of the systemic constraints of communicative rationality; her approach has been argued to be less critical than Forester’s, for instance, given that she refers mainly to institutional approaches and the Giddensian theory of structuration in the institution-focused part of her theory (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones 2002). Habermas is important, however, for the actor-focused part of her theory, and mainly as a source of constructive ideals (ibid.). Innes and Booher (2010, 9) also draw on Giddens when they discuss societal change on the macro-scale. Relying on Giddens’s thought, Innes and Booher, just like Healey, remain optimistic about the capacity of actors to change the structures that constrain them while they act.

To summarize, all the central theorists of communicative planning seem to have some trust on planners’ potential to become authentic Friedmannian communicators, and on their willingness and capability to overcome at least some of the constraints pertaining to their own organizational context, constraints that bring about distortions in communication. Habermas’s early works, in particular, are undoubtedly useful in analyzing the sources of distortions in the political-administrative system – the system that sets constraints to planners – as Forester’s early works prove (see e.g. Forester 1985; 1989; 1993). However, the question remains: do these works point to possible ways for a planner to overcome the constraints stemming from his or her own systemic context? Some critics have argued that even if they would, the theorists of communicative planning have not ultimately found such a way. The critics have contended that Forester and other theorists of communicative planning have remained captives to the actor-focused approach and thus have not been able to bridge the gap between actor-focused and institution-focused approaches (see e.g. Fischler 2000; Huxley 2000; Huxley and Yiftachel 2000). The point of the critics has been that the mere analysis of communication at the micro-level of everyday planning practice does not necessarily reveal the macro-level power structures that constrain the realization of progressive planning goals (Richardson 1996; Fainstein 2000, 457; Yiftachel and Huxley 2000).

This monograph aims to point out that the systems-theoretical side in Habermas’s project is especially useful for macro-level analysis of the forces that constrain the realization of progressive planning goals.
However, it also maintains that even though Habermas’s project undoubtedly provides tools for overcoming these kinds of constraints, Habermas seems to have more reservations than have the theorists of communicative planning about the emancipatory potential of participatory practices in the context of administration. This is the case especially in those works where the idea of communicative rationality has not yet fully developed (see especially Habermas 1974).

### 2.3 Analyses of distorted communication in Habermas’s early works

In this section, the point of departure is the seeming discrepancy between the communicative planning theorists’ trust on the possibility to overcome the systematic distortions in planning communication and Habermas’s reservations towards the emancipatory potential of participatory practices in the context of political-administrative systems. While the theorists of communicative planning have wished to make room for the emancipatory reason by introducing communicative and participatory practices into politics and administration, Habermas is highly critical of the progressive potential of communicative rationality in the specific context of state and its political-administrative system, including public planning (Huxley 2000, 370). Hence, although the critics of Habermasian planning theory have been arguing that Habermasian planning theorists are blind to the fact that planners are not necessarily committed to serving progressive ends (Hillier 1993, 93; Yiftachel 1998; Huxley 2000, 375; McGuirk 2001), this blindness should not be seen as stemming from Habermas’s works. Moreover, it should be clear from the discussion above that not all of the theorists of communicative planning have been blind to the fact that planners are not always advocating progressive goals, although it is true that communicative planning theorists have generally concentrated on providing remedies rather than on analyzing the macro-context that causes the illnesses and irrationalities in planning (cf. Yiftachel and Huxley 2000).

In this section, the pessimistic dimensions of Habermas’s works are explored by looking mainly at *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1991), published originally in 1962, and *Legitimation Crisis* (1974) published originally in 1973. These works analyze how and why political-administrative systems, rather than providing a context where communicative rationality could flourish, bring about systematic distortions in communication.

#### 2.3.1 The rise and fall of the public sphere

In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas (1991) approaches the rise and fall of the public spheres in European countries, such as Germany, France, and England, from a historico-sociological rather than philosophical perspective. This work includes an early ideal of a political system that is indirectly steered by communicative and deliberative practices. However, it also includes a highly interesting analysis of the reasons for the fact that late-capitalist welfare states have not been able to sustain the realization of this ideal in practice.

In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, the “public sphere” refers to the sphere that mediates between civil society and the state, a sphere within which citizens can transcend their roles as private people so as to be able to engage in rational, non-coercive discussion concerning the matters of their common interest or common concern. The bourgeois political public sphere that emerged in the 18th
century was not directly a sphere of decision-making, but rather a sphere that can inform public authorities and guard their use of power (Habermas 1991; see also Fraser 1992). This notion of indirect steering of decision-making is still echoed in Habermas’s more recent accounts of the public sphere, especially the one given in Between Facts and Norms (Habermas 1996).

It is somewhat unclear whether Habermas thinks that the ideal of the public sphere presented in the Structural Transformation was ever real (cf. Fraser 1992, 113). If it was, it was only for a sweeping moment in the early years of liberal capitalism. Soon thereafter, many lines of development led to the decline of the public sphere. Furthermore, the status of the early bourgeois public sphere as an ideal is also highly questionable, since the early public sphere was dominated by propertied men, excluding thus large sections of population (Habermas 1992a; see also Calhoun 1992, 2–3; Fraser 1992). Although the later expansion of the public sphere brought about greater inclusivity, it also contributed to the degeneration of the public sphere (Calhoun 1992, 2–3; Fraser 1992). Yet, a return to the early ideal of the public sphere is not, of course, an option for Habermas (Calhoun 1992, 2–3).

Most importantly, however, Habermas (1991) argues that the decline of the public sphere was due to the blurring of the lines between civil society and state. The foundation for the emergence of the civil society had been originally laid by the birth of the capitalist market economy, given that the increase in private economic activities enabled civil society to form a counterweight to the state’s authority. This era of liberal capitalism did not last long, however. The changes in the structure of the economy were also decisive for the nature of civil society and for the conditions under which the public sphere could appear as a sphere of unconstrained and free deliberation. Gradually, powerful interest groups arising from the civil society began to seek to influence decision-making in the context of the state, bypassing thus the mediation by the public sphere. Furthermore, the state also increasingly intervened in the very core of private economic activities. This was necessary for the reason that the presumptions concerning equilibrium in market processes turned out to be false. Liberal capitalism was transformed into “late capitalism”, “state capitalism” or “advanced capitalism”, as Habermas (1973; 1974; 1991) calls it. Although Habermas’s analysis of state interventions touches upon planning only in passing, his analysis is relevant for planning theory, given that planning is, of course, one of those branches of administration that intervenes in many ways to the private realm of economy.

Moreover, the state also needed to alleviate and compensate the unintended consequences that the market-led mechanism had brought to individual people, hence the birth of the welfare state. This, at the latest, led to a situation wherein the state was inclined to intervene not only to the private realm of the economy but also to the intimate spheres of the lives of citizens (Habermas 1991). Housing and planning are among those fields through which states have penetrated into the private spheres of life including the intimate sphere of family life. While these kinds of interventions have surely increased the social and financial well-being of people, they have also narrowed down the private autonomy of citizens and given rise to novel kinds of questions concerning the legitimacy of the state interventions (Mattila 2018).

Thus, the emergence of the welfare state further complicated the problem of legitimation of public authority, given that all of the new expansions of the state functions called for justification and legitimation (Habermas 1973; 1974). It is precisely this complex context of the late-capitalist welfare state that Habermas assesses in many of his subsequent works dealing with the prospects of communication-based steering of societies. This is the case especially in Legitimation Crisis, a work that dates back to the early
1970s and that continues the discussion on many of the central themes of The Structural Transformation. Although Habermas discusses in Legitimation Crisis only very briefly urban and regional planning, concentrating mainly on the larger picture where “planning” forms a part of the activities with which states aim at steering their economies, his discussions are interesting from the specific point of view of urban and regional planning precisely because of the reason that these fields have formed an important part of the steering of the economy in many western welfare states of the 20th century.

2.3.2 Legitimacy problems in late-capitalist welfare states

In Legitimation Crisis, Habermas criticizes and revises Marx’s theory of economic crises. In this work, Habermas also employs the framework of systems-theory – building in many respects on Parsons’s theory and turning against Luhmann’s – as he analyzes the relation between legitimacy of political-administrative systems and the deliberation carried out in the public sphere. The context that Habermas discusses here is that of the late-capitalist welfare state, a context where the political-administrative system is deeply intertwined with the economic system, and where the political-administrative system is also inclined to intrude into the core of the socio-cultural system (Habermas 1974; see also 1973; Held 1982).

Legitimation Crisis is a work of theoretical interest especially for the reason that it lays the grounds for Habermas’s later project of combining the normatively neutral systems-theoretical approach with the approach that is sensitive to normative orientation of the citizens. While in Legitimation Crisis systems theory still gains an upper hand, and the theory of communicative rationality with its implications for the theory of normativity is still under development, the role of systems theory diminishes in Habermas’s later works. Nonetheless, many critics have argued that in his later works Habermas continues to rely on systems theory to the extent that the critical potential of his theory becomes compromised (McCarthy 1985; Fraser 1995; Forbath 1998; Scheuerman 1999).

Legitimation Crisis is of interest from the planning-theoretical point of view as well. It has been one of those early works by Habermas that has been relatively often cited in planning-theoretical literature, even though this work has not contributed significantly to the theory of communicative planning, but rather to analyses of the fate of critical and progressive planning in the context of late capitalist welfare states (see e.g. Ambrose 1986; Hague 1984). Indeed, Legitimation Crisis does not seem to provide any solid basis for communicative or participatory planning, given that this work emphasizes the ways in which the very intertwining of the economic and political-administrative systems frustrates the potential of communicative steering of the political-administrative system (Mattila 2018).

In Legitimation Crisis, Habermas sketches a model of society that consists of three sub-systems: the economic system, the political-administrative system, and the socio-cultural system. The political-administrative system is deeply intertwined with the system of the economy. It adopts the task of steering the economy in order to avoid economic crises and to guarantee growth and stability in tax income. Planning, in a broad sense here, has a central role in this steering task (Habermas 1974).

Even though this steering role implies that many of the problems of the system of the economy become shouldered by the state, successes in steering enable the political-administrative system to produce
welfare services for citizens, thus contributing to the functioning of the socio-cultural system (Habermas 1974). Public planning, as a multifaceted discipline, has an important role in the welfare provision as well.

The socio-cultural system is of paramount importance for the political-administrative system given that it is a source of the legitimacy of the political-administrative system. Nonetheless, the political-administrative system cannot just simply purchase acceptance and recognition from the socio-cultural system by providing welfare services or other related benefits for citizens. In Habermas’s analysis, the socio-cultural system does not respond to the other systems only on the basis of those rewards that are based on the rationalities of economic and administrative systems; it builds – especially after the weakening of traditional values – also importantly on the independent logic of rational speech. This means that the other sub-systems cannot easily influence the meanings, values, and motivations generated in the socio-cultural system and make the socio-cultural system adapt to the needs of the other systems (Habermas 1974, 72–73). Most importantly, the discourses carried out in the socio-cultural system produce ideas of “generalizable interests”, the expectation of people being that generalizable interests are reflected in public policies and planning (Habermas 1974).

In reality, however, the political-administrative system is typically not able to serve such generalizable interests, because it also faces demands to serve different kinds or conflicting private interests stemming from the economic system (Habermas 1974; Held 1982). Given for instance that the demands faced by the political-administrative system are often fundamentally contradictory, such crises that have been avoided in the economic system – if they can be avoided – tend to be transformed into crisis tendencies in political-administrative systems (ibid.). However, that is not all there is to Habermas’s analysis of crisis displacement. In Habermas’s (1974) view, the political-administrative system might be eventually inclined to displace crisis tendencies from the political-administrative system to the realm of the socio-cultural system, where they might culminate into a “legitimation crisis”, a crisis resulting from the fact that the socio-cultural sphere no longer recognizes the political-administrative system as worthy of acceptance. Alternatively, or additionally, crisis displacement strategies may result as a “motivation crisis”, a crisis resulting from the unwillingness of people to contribute to the maintenance of the economic system.

Seen against the fact that many theorists have interpreted Habermas to strongly support participatory planning and administration, it is striking that Habermas does not put much trust on the progressive potential of public participation in Legitimation Crisis. In Habermas’s portrayal, the political system, rather than facilitating open communication and emancipation, is inclined to distance itself from the will-formation and the deliberative practices of the citizens (Habermas 1973, 655; 1974, 36). Formal, representative democracy is supportive of this inclination (ibid.). The political-administrative system, in general, is inclined to reject the demands for participatory practices, because in that way it could be able to conceal the contradictions it faces and maintain its legitimate appearance. Yet, the expansive ways in which the political-administrative system displaces crisis tendencies still creates constantly increasing demand for public participation (Habermas 1974). Hence, it is far from being clear that this kind of crisis management or crisis displacement would prevent the culmination of crisis tendencies into legitimation crises in the longer run.

From the planning-theoretical point of view, it may be concluded that Legitimation Crisis implies a view that opening up planning, as a single branch of administration, would, rather than enhance its legitimacy, erode its legitimacy, given that participation would bring to the fore the economic imperatives and non-
generalizable interests that planning has to prioritize if it wishes to steer the economy successfully. Nonetheless, *Legitimation Crisis* needs not be interpreted as a pessimistic prognosis of a totally administered society where politics is turned into a technical control of crisis tendencies circulating in the sub-systems of society (Held 1982, 187); rational communication and discursive will-formation, when located outside administrative systems, represent a potential for emancipation in this work, as throughout Habermas’s later works. In James Bohman’s (1996) words, the message of *Legitimation Crisis* is that “there is space for agency and deliberation of citizens, if only in the public sphere and in the social movements which contest the legitimacy of administrative decisions” (p. 202).

With respect to the evolution of the key theoretical terms of Habermas, one of the interesting parts of *Legitimation Crisis* is Habermas’s discussion on the discrepancy between the concept of crisis and the systems-theoretical framework that he utilizes in analyzing the origins of crises. While the systems-theoretical framework is based on the outsider’s perspective to the functioning of the system, legitimation crises or motivation crises are, by contrast, identity crises and, as such, something that can be fully understood only from the perspective of a subject immersed in the experience (Habermas 1974, 1–5). This provides Habermas a reason to introduce the concept of the “lifeworld”, a concept that is equipped to capture the perspective of the acting and experiencing subject. This concept gains a more central position in *The Theory of Communicative Action*, where it provides the context for “communicative rationality” (Habermas 1984; 1987a). In this work, communicative rationality becomes central for the steering of society, though not directly for action-steering in the context of the political-administrative system and the economic system, the two sub-systems that now form the action context of “the system” (ibid.).

Legitimation still remains a key theme for Habermas in *The Theory of Communicative Action*, and the interplay of the system and the lifeworld becomes now central for the analysis of legitimation problems. The Marxian-inspired prognosis of legitimation crisis, however, is no longer prominent in Habermas’s analysis, although he still analyzes the ways in which the late-capitalist welfare states manage legitimacy. The focus is now on the lifeworld crises or “pathologies”, especially on the “colonization of the lifeworld” that may result, for instance, from the crisis management strategies described in *Legitimation Crisis* (see e.g. Heath 2010). Yet, it is precisely this tendency towards colonization that leads Habermas to think also in his later works such as *Between Facts and Norms* that the possibility of crises cannot be precluded in late-capitalist welfare-states (Habermas 1996, 386–387; see also Grodnick 2005).

In what follows, the focus of discussion is turned to Habermas’s analysis of the interplay of the system and the lifeworld, the interplay that might lead into “colonization of lifeworld” by the system. Moreover, the bearings of this portrayal on the theory of communicative planning will be analyzed, focusing on the position of planning at the interface of these two domains of action. As we shall see, the analysis of the dialectics between the system and the lifeworld also brings to the fore the interplay between the explanatory-diagnostic and anticipatory-utopian aspects in Habermas’s philosophy.

### 2.4 The system and the lifeworld: planning at the interface of the two domains of action

As previously mentioned, in *The Theory of Communicative Action*, the concepts of the system and of the lifeworld refer to two different research approaches or two different perspectives to society. Systems theory views society from the outsider’s point of view, focusing on the functional aspects of actions with
regard to their contributions to the maintenance of the system. Lifeworld, as well, can be analyzed in terms of systems theory, but it also calls for an action-theoretical analysis that can adopt the actors’ point of view and capture the meanings of actions – including the value-orientations behind the actions (Habermas, 1987a, 117, 204; see also Sager 1994, 247). Therefore, the concept of the lifeworld largely replaces the concept of the socio-cultural system in *The Theory of Communicative Action*.

Lifeworld, for Habermas, is “a culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns” which forms the horizon within which communicative actors move and from which they cannot “step outside” (Habermas 1987a, 124–126). It is also “the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they reciprocally raise claims [...] settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements” (ibid., 126). Lifeworld cannot be put into question as a whole, but segments of it can be problematized and made thematic whenever they become a part of action-situation (ibid., 124). Lifeworld is maintained and reproduced through communicative action, and its structural components are culture (stock of knowledge), society (legitimate orders), and personality (competencies of speaking and acting subjects) (ibid., 125, 138). Habermas derives the structure of the lifeworld via his project of the reconstruction of the necessary presuppositions of understanding-oriented speech and action, a project discussed in the next section.

Habermas maintains that in the context of the lifeworld, action is coordinated either on the basis of pre-existing consensus or through consensus-oriented speech, whereas in the context of the system, coordination is based on non-communicative or non-linguistic steering media. These steering media are, in particular, money in the sub-system of the economy, and power in the sub-system of the administration (Habermas 1987a, 154, 171). For Habermas, the action context of the lifeworld is more fundamental than the system – and so is communicative rationality more fundamental than instrumental and strategic rationalities. One reason for this can be found from the historical development of societies. The system originates historically from the lifeworld: it has grown out from – or become “uncoupled” or decoupled from – its original context, the lifeworld, and more precisely, from its society component, in the process of modern rationalization of the lifeworld (Habermas 1987a, 113–197; see also 1996, 56). The term “uncoupling” means here that action coordination has come to be disconnected from the communicative steering mechanisms, mechanisms that are time-consuming and that increasingly involve risks of dissensus in post-traditional societies (ibid., 183). Modern societies gain a notable increase in efficiency of material reproduction by relying on steering media and by constituting areas of action where people may freely pursue their interests leaning on the logic of purposive rationality. For instance, urban and regional planning could hardly be organized in an efficient manner if the steering in these domains was based on consensus-oriented speech only. For the sake of efficiency, binding decisions are needed concerning, for instance, legislation that regulates private sector actions related to urban and regional development or that determines the powers of the public sector planning authorities. Actors may then pursue their interests in the framework of these decisions, or better, in the framework of planning systems that are built on such decisions.

Hence, the scope of communicatively steered action has been narrowing down in modern societies that are striving for efficiency. However, Habermas’s analysis of the action contexts of the lifeworld and the system not only indicates that the space for communicative steering has diminished, but it also begs the question as to whether there is any space for public participation and communicative steering of action in the field of planning. This question has often been presented by the critics of communicative planning theory, the reason behind the question being that both public administration and private developers seem to rely on
systemic logic rather than on communicative rationality (see e.g. Huxley 2000, 370; Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones 2000; Hillier 2002, 34; 2003, 41).

To respond to this criticism, one could begin by noting that in differentiating between the action contexts of the systems and the lifeworld, Habermas is not saying that people working in administration or private companies would not, for instance, discuss values and make ethical judgments; they certainly do. Furthermore, Habermas (1982, 236) admits that communicative and strategic interactions are often mixed together. Planners are probably among those professionals who typically hold high ethical standards in their work and who regard it as important to consult local communities whose future will be affected by such planning. As Forester and Sager have been arguing, modifying Davidoff’s notion of advocative planners, planners can even momentarily step out from the systemic contexts that restrain them and take the position of an “activist planner” (Sager 2013) or “activist planner-mediator” (Forester 1998). “Activist planners” are planners who look beyond their positions as bureaucrats, adopting also the role of a politically active and ethically responsible citizen (see e.g. Sager 2013; Forester 1998). Respectively, just as communicative action can exist in bureaucracies and private companies, so can strategic action exist in unorganized, everyday contexts of action – a phenomenon that is also all too well known for planners, who often encounter, for instance, strategic NIMBYism arising from informal neighborhood organizations. What, then, is Habermas claiming in making the differentiation between the action contexts of the system and the lifeworld? His argument is merely that the forms of rationality that the actors are ultimately expected to resort differ between the context of system and lifeworld (Habermas 1993, 166–7; see also Jütten 2013).

Hence, it is not a contradiction in terms to introduce communicative rationality and communicative action into planning bureaucracies, or strengthen their role there, as Forester, Sager and Healey have aimed to do. Indeed, as Forester often points out, communicative rationality exists in the context of planning bureaucracies whether we introduce it there or not, since planners communicate and search for agreement with each other and with stakeholders on a daily basis (see e.g. Forester 1989; 1993). Planning is not only about instrumental rationality. Nonetheless, it makes sense to analytically differentiate between communicative and strategic-instrumental modes of rationality. As Sager (1994, 7) has in particular emphasized, it is important to acknowledge that dialogue – as it is presented in the Habermasian theory of communicative rationality – is of unconstrained nature, and that any attempt to turn it into a technique of planning would be to introduce an element of compulsion into it, which, in turn, would destroy its nature as dialogue.

Now, if communicative rationality and communicative action are not compatible with means-ends rationality or with the notion of technique, the question arises as to how can they serve planning, a discipline from which it would be impossible to strip of goal-orientation. Sager (1994, 7) argues, following Habermas, that communicative action is not completely detached from ends but that all forms of action serve some kinds of ends. In the case of communicative action, the ends are just not something external to action but “embedded in the activity in itself” (Sager 1994, 7). For Habermas, the ends that communicative action serves in a broad sense are, first, renewal of cultural knowledge, second, social integration and, third, identity-forming socialization of individuals (Habermas 1987a, 137). As Sager (1994; 2018) argues, communicative action brings about benefits, such as the personal growth of planners and stakeholders or strengthening of local communities, that is, results that could not be expected from purposive action based on traditional means-ends rationality. While all this might be necessary for the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld, and ultimately also for the existence of planning, the critics have queried whether
communicative planning theory can be viewed specifically as a theory of urban and regional planning or of land-use planning (Huxley and Yiftachel 2000). Its scope seems to be too wide for a planning theory, and yet it does not seem to cover the dimensions of planning as a purposive form of action.

Another important question that still remains unanswered is the question as to whether the context of planning, as a systemic context, is still likely to frustrate communicative rationality, and whether the emancipatory potential of communicative rationality might be stronger outside planning bureaucracies (see e.g. Huxley 2000; Hillier 2002). That this might be the case, has been at least implicitly suggested by Sager (2013, 78–81), who highlights not only the progressive potential of activist planning, but also that of “radical planning” or “insurgent planning” that positions itself outside public planning organizations, though not necessarily outside the planning profession. The notion of radical planning has a central position already in Friedmann’s (1987) theory, within which it refers to planning that “stands in opposition to established powers, more particularly, the state” (p. 407). From the outsider’s position, radical planners are free to exploit the radical potential of the civil society without having to surrender to systemic constraints typical to planning bureaucracies.

The same problem of systemic and lifeworldly realms concerns also the citizens, who participate in planning. The critics of CPT have argued that the radical edge or participation becomes blunted when the citizens are drawn into systemic contexts, that is, in such forms of participation that are organized by state bureaucracies (Huxley 2000). Tore Sager (2018) has recently argued that even though CPT is about officially organized participation, it also has to acknowledge “the need that some protest groups and social movements have for standing outside the official planning process” (p. 95).

We might conclude at this point, on the one hand, that Habermas’s system-lifeworld differentiation casts some doubts over the assumption that communicative rationality could flourish and bring about transformation in planning bureaucracies. On the other hand, however, it can also be concluded that Habermas’s theory does not preclude the possibility that communicative rationality could have some kind of progressive role in bureaucracies or companies or other contexts related to strategic and instrumental rationalities.

Nonetheless, Habermas’s theory has still more to offer for the project of justifying communicative planning. Habermas’s (1987a, 266–282) view is that the system – or the subsystems of economy and administration – ultimately needs to be re-coupled with the lifeworld and anchored in its consensus-producing communicative processes, because the legitimacy of the system becomes otherwise threatened. The system is inclined to grow increasingly autonomous and to generate its goals independently of the lifeworld, which is why it needs to be connected back to the lifeworld. This kind of re-coupling or “anchoring” is necessary because the system may otherwise turn against the lifeworld from which it has originally emerged. In Habermas’s (1987a) terms, the system may “colonize” the lifeworld; it may “suppress forms of social integration even in those areas where consensus-dependent coordination of action cannot be replaced” (p. 196), frustrating thereby also symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld.

The threat of colonization arises, in particular, from the fact that the non-linguistic steering media do not only establish new contexts of action, but they introduce strategic rationality to the existing modes of everyday action and communication (cf. Deflem 2008, 276; Scheuerman 2013, 572). This is often the case in the field of planning. For instance, NIMBYist strategies arising from informal neighborhood organizations
might be a symptom of such colonization. While neighborhood organizations might have traditionally provided fora for understanding-oriented communication and for “making sense together”, planning bureaucracies and private developers may spread systemic rationality also to unorganized fora, such as neighborhood organizations, which then learn to respond to strategic action with strategic action (cf. Staffans 2004).

Hence, although it seems clear that colonization needs to be refuted, the question is whether it should be fought against through micro-scale interactions where planners and their systemic contexts encounter the lifeworlds of the citizens or through distancing oneself from the systemic contexts and planning practices and directing attention rather to the limits of the system. Habermas seems to suggest the latter option, referring especially to the processes of legislation whereby the system is brought into democratic control. This seems to be so even though The Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas 1984; 1987a) presents law not primarily as a means for protecting lifeworlds against systemic intrusions but rather as a source of juridification and colonization of the lifeworld, given that it spreads systemic rationality into the unorganized action contexts of everyday life (Deflem 2008; Scheuerman 2013). After The Theory of Communicative Action, however, Habermas revises his view on this issue and begins to assess law primarily as an institution belonging to the context of the lifeworld (section 2.7; see also Deflem 2008; 2013; Habermas 1996).

The threat of colonization has been discussed by both Forester and Healey, and they take the former path of trying to bring about change via everyday planning and administrative practices, though assuming that this is the way to bring about change also in the institutional level (Forester 1993, 4; Healey 1997). Given that planning is not a purely instrumental form of action (Forester 1993, 6) and as it moves at “the critical interface” of the system and the lifeworld (Healey 1997, 49–54), they argue that it should be capable of protecting our lifeworlds from the colonizing tendencies of the system.

Healey, in particular, utilizes the concept of the lifeworld and views planning in terms of defending our lifeworlds against the intrusions of a globalizing economy and sectoral administration (Healey 1997, 55, 207; see also 2003, 116) – a project that would surely be approved by Habermas as well. However, Healey conceives of “the lifeworld” in a decidedly different way than Habermas. For Healey, lifeworlds are always plural. Especially in Healey’s original formulations of collaborative planning theory, lifeworlds seem to be locally shared at best, and they do not seem to provide us a common background horizon of communication, as the lifeworld does in Habermas’s theory. Whereas for Healey, the common denominator for people discussing planning matters is their shared concern for a place at best, Habermas, by contrast, finds the unifying element in the universal structures of communication that, in turn, have implications for the structures of the lifeworld. Yet, Habermas does not deny the fact that our experiences and lifeworlds vary in practice (see e.g. Hillier 2002).

Healey’s struggles with the universalizing elements of the Habermasian theory seem to anticipate the more recent challenges that the issue of pluralism has posed for the Habermasian planning theory (see Hillier and Metzger 2015). However, before we can make sense of this challenge, further elaborations are needed on Habermas’s ideas concerning language as a unifying force. Let us now move on to discuss Habermas’s “linguistic turn” and the concept of communicative rationality that has followed from this turn. Only after this is it possible to assess the nature of Habermas’s universalism and the capacities of Habermasian theory to encounter the localized lifeworlds and the plurality of our experiences and identities in general.
2.5 Communicative rationality and discourse ethics in action-steering and planning

Thus far, the focus has been mainly on the explanatory-diagnostic dimensions of Habermas's philosophy, dimensions that are related to the project of tracking the origins of distortions in communication and colonization of the lifeworld. As is well known, however, Habermasian theory is not only about the analysis of distorted communications, but also about ideals related to undistorted, consensus-oriented speech. This becomes most evident in The Theory of Communicative Action (1984; 1987a). The critics of communicative planning theory have often questioned the basic assumptions of communicative planning theory on the basis that Habermasian ideals, such as undistorted speech or rationally motivated consensus, are mere contrafactual philosophical ideals, and their relevance for planning practice can therefore be called into question (see e.g. Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998; Fischler 2000; McGuirk 2001; Hillier 2003; Purcell 2008; 2009). The picture that the critics paint of these ideals has arguably not always been detailed enough, however. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine more closely the nature of Habermasian ideals, as well as of the philosophical contexts from which these ideals emerge in the cases of, first, the theory of communicative action, and second, discourse ethics.

2.5.1 Communicative rationality and orientation to consensus

The core element in The Theory of Communicative Action is the theory of communicative rationality, a theory containing the famous and much debated argument that consensus is the “inherent telos” of rational speech (Habermas 1984, 287). The point of departure for Habermas’s (1984) theory of communicative rationality is the observation that even though modern theories of rationality tend to highlight the prevalence of instrumental or strategic rationality, this means-ends type of rationality should not be thought of being the primary form of rationality. Although Habermas (1984) by no means denies the central role of strategic and instrumental rationality in contemporary societies, and although he well recognizes that we also often utilize language to pursue our goals strategically, he maintains that strategic language use is derivative of the original mode of language use, the mode that is based on giving reasons and oriented to reaching understanding.

In The Theory of Communicative Action, as with some of his preceding works, Habermas’s assessments of communicative rationality are based on a reconstructive method wherein the “presuppositions of speech acts oriented to understanding” and the “pre-theoretical knowledge” of competent speakers are given a form of explicit rules (Habermas 1984, 138). Habermas’s “hypothetical” reconstructive project has encountered criticism over the years. In defending his position against the critics, Habermas has argued that in denying the validity of these idealized rules, the critics end up in a condition of “performative contradiction”. This is to say that they must presuppose in their argumentation the very same principles that they are contesting (see e.g. Blaug 1999, 9; Thomassen 2008, 17–18).

In this reconstructive project known by the name of “universal pragmatics” or “formal pragmatics”, Habermas builds largely on the legacy of later Wittgenstein and the tradition of the philosophy of ordinary language in general. Habermas (2001, 53) starts from Wittgenstein’s notion of “language game”, a notion referring to a whole “consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven” (Wittgenstein 1958, 5).
Habermas argues that “[h]ad Wittgenstein developed a theory of language games, it would have had to take the form of universal pragmatics” (Habermas 2001, 53, emphasis added). Be that as it may, Wittgenstein did not consider the possibility of this kind of theory.

However, in search for elements for such universal pragmatics, Habermas turns to John Langshaw Austin’s philosophy of ordinary language, and more precisely, to his theory of speech acts, a theory systematized later by John Searle (Habermas 1979, 25–26). Austin’s theory views speaking not only as a way of conveying information but also as a way of acting, of “doing things with words”, as the title of Austin’s (1962) famous book suggests. Austin is known for his notion of performative utterances, utterances with which speakers bring something new into being. In introducing this notion, Austin originally wished to differentiate performatives from constatives with which speakers report already existing states of affairs (Austin 1961, 220–239). The sorts of deeds that can be accomplished by performatives can be, for instance, promising, apologizing, marrying or baptizing — all of these actions being about bringing into being new states of affairs (ibid.).

In his How to do Things with Words, Austin (1962) ultimately gave up on the differentiation between constatives and performatives, because it turned out to be difficult to distinguish between these two types of utterances. Instead, his question now was: “how many senses there are in which to say something is to do something”? (Austin 1962, 94, emphasis removed). He introduced a three-level classification of utterances, which are not merely utterances but different types of actions. Firstly, a mere utterance is already a deed, a “locutionary act”, in Austin’s terms (ibid.). Secondly, there are “illocutionary acts”, the concept of which refers to “the performance of an act in saying something as opposed to the performance of an act of saying something” (ibid., 99, emphasis original). For Austin, as well as for Habermas later, at issue in an illocutionary act is primarily the intention of the speaker and the sense in which he wishes the hearer to understand the locution — for instance, as informing the hearer of something or asking a question (ibid., 98). Thirdly, there are “perlocutionary acts”, which, then, are acts that “produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons” (ibid., 101).

Habermas starts from this differentiation, prioritizing illocutionary acts, which are related in his theory to the practice of understanding and accepting speech acts (Habermas 1984, 11; see also Warnke 1995, 121). The success of an illocutionary act — in Habermas’s theory, a situation where the hearer understands and accepts the speech act offer — typically makes the perlocutionary effects of speech-acts possible. However, Habermas (1992b) recognizes also the possibility of “latently strategic speech acts” wherein the speaker hides his true intentions from the hearers. In this case, the “un-manifested perlocutionary effects can only be achieved [...] under the condition that the speaker feigns the intention of pursuing his illocutionary goals without reserve and leaves the hearer in the dark about his actual violation of the presuppositions of action oriented toward reaching understanding” (Habermas 1992b, 82, emphasis original). Given that the perlocutionary effect is only possible when we assume that the speech act is oriented to understanding, Habermas can argue that this kind of language use is a derivative or “parasitic” mode, just as the manifestly strategic actions are (ibid., 82–84).

To elucidate Habermas’s idea, let us move on to these “presuppositions of action oriented toward reaching understanding”. In Habermas’s theory, understanding and acceptance of speech acts is based on the practice of raising and redeeming — implicitly or explicitly — “validity claims”. The rules of this practice,
Habermas argues, are universal and implicitly mastered by all adult speakers much in the same way as they master linguistic rules and are able to produce sentences (Habermas 1979, 26). Habermas, though, is not interested in sentences but in utterances in pragmatic contexts. Habermas identifies three kinds of validity claims: claims related to truth, authenticity or sincerity and normative rightness (Habermas, 1984, 15–16, 99–100; see also Forester 1993, 27). The fact that speakers are able to raise and redeem these three kinds of validity claims means also that the speakers know how to relate to the world in three corresponding aspects: they know how to relate to the objective world, the subjective world, and the social world (Habermas 1984, 98–100).

The raising of these three different validity claims means that the speaker is at least implicitly claiming that what he says is true, that he means what he says, and what he says fits its normative context or that the normative context is itself legitimate (Habermas 1984, 99). In the communicative use of utterances, which is also for Habermas the “normal” mode of using language (see e.g. Habermas 1998b), these three claims are raised simultaneously (Habermas 1987a, 120–121). However, it is still typical that only one of them is raised explicitly, and the other ones remain a part of the implicit background of the communicative situation (ibid.).

In his early works, Habermas mentions yet another validity claim that precedes these three aforementioned claims: a claim to comprehensibility (see e.g. Habermas 1979, 28). Only comprehensible utterances contain the possibility of further vindication of the three other validity claims. This claim is not connected to the differentiation of world-relations. On this point, Habermas states that the validity of comprehensibility claims “can be fulfilled immanently to language”, referring especially to the grammatical correctness of sentences that are uttered (ibid.). However, this claim can also be associated with the contextual conditions of an utterance (Habermas 1984, 22). Hence, it is not surprising that in the field of planning theory, Forester has emphasized the role of the comprehensibility claim, for instance, in such situations where planners’ talk is not comprehensible for the lay-people. That might be the case even though their sentences would be grammatically well-formed (see e.g. Forester 1989, 143–148). For instance, it is not always clear to local residents or other lay-people what planners are talking about when they employ expert terminology; the phenomena to which planners may try to reference in their talk might not even exist for lay-persons. However, through language use, planners can also bring things into being; they can, for instance, frame problems and shape attention (Forester 1989; 1993). As already mentioned, Habermas does not develop this line of thought any further as he analyzes comprehensibility claims; however, the issues that Forester raises in relation to comprehensibility claims are connected to some of Habermas’s assessments on authenticity, and more broadly, on aesthetic communication and identity formation. These assessments are discussed in section 2.6.1.

To return to Habermas’s assessment of the three first validity claims, he maintains that in our everyday linguistic interactions, we typically do not problematize the validity of the claims raised by speakers, because of the fact that we can rely on the shared lifeworld background. Yet, we also expect that the speakers are willing and able to vindicate their validity claims if they become challenged. Because of this implicit warranty that speakers offer in validity claims for their hearers, Habermas calls illocutionary force a “binding” and “bonding” force (see e.g. Habermas 1984, 302; 1987a, 77). When validity claims become challenged, the implicit presupposition is that we are willing to rise above the everyday communicative situations and become engaged in an argumentative process that Habermas calls discourse. In discourses, where the participants contest and vindicate claims, the participants are relieved from all the imperatives
of action, unlike in the everyday contexts of communicative action. Furthermore, the participants of discourses must presuppose that there are no other motives involved in the process than the one of reaching understanding, and that the only force influencing the processes is “the force of the better argument” (Habermas 1984, 25).

Even though Habermas’s theory has been known for – and criticized for – either assuming consensus as a point of departure (shared background context of the lifeworld) or as the goal of communication, the possibility of this goal being founded on the universal practice of raising and redeeming validity claims, it ought to be noted that his theory could just as well be approached from the viewpoint of contesting claims and challenging pre-established consensuses. Despite the fact that in Habermas’s model, the reproduction of our social interaction is dependent on the practice of “implicit yes-saying”, that is, the practice of accepting the validity claims, we can also say “no” to these claims at any time (White and Farr 2012). While there are different interpretations of the meaning and status of such no-saying, this possibility puts into question the view of Habermas’s theory as a large “consensus machine”, a view upheld by many critics of Habermas (White and Farr 2012; see also Chambers 1995).

2.5.2 Discourse ethics and procedural conception of justice

Habermas maintains, contrary to many modern moral theorists’ views, that questions concerning normative validity, just as questions concerning truth, can be assessed rationally and cognitively (Habermas 1984, 18). Factual and normative questions are in this sense analogous, even though they are by no means identical. This has of course been important news for planning theorists, who have been struggling with the goal of maintaining the idea of planning as a rational and legitimate activity ever since the public and the critics have recognized that planning is not a technical, instrumental, and value-free activity but a deeply value-laden practice (see e.g. Forester 1993, 6–9, 38–40). After the recognition of increasing value-pluralism in societies, the foundations of rational planning have begun to shake and the legitimacy of planning has increasingly been called into question. Although postmodern philosophical and social theories have provided valuable criticism of the social consequences of technical-instrumental rationality, they have not helped planning theorists to defend the project of planning in a pluralist world, but rather severed the challenge of pluralism faced by planning (cf. Healey 1992). Habermas’s philosophy, however, has proven useful in the project of rescuing the notion of rational planning even if planning is a value-laden discipline and even if it faces the challenge of plurality of values. His post-traditional but still rational and anti-relativist approach to normativity has provided grounds, for instance, for Forester (1993) to argue that through the communicative form of planning we are “able to assess objectively (openly and intersubjectively) questions of value and legitimacy apart from only solipsistic or decisionistic perspectives” (p. 40).

Given that the issue of normative validity is central to the coordination of collective action, and consequently to planning, it is not surprising that Habermas’s discourse ethics – a theory assessing discursive contestation and redemption of normative validity claims – has been of interest to communicative planning theorists. Discourse ethics, just like the theory of communicative action that it complements, is based on the method of rational reconstruction. In the case of discourse ethics, Habermas utilizes a reconstructive method to introduce a set of normative principles that the implicit presuppositions of rational speakers yield. Habermas, however, is not the only philosopher to be credited for the project of
discourse ethics. Karl-Otto Apel worked with this project already in the 1960s, and later co-developed discourse ethics with Habermas, although in some issues the views of Apel and Habermas have also differed over the years (Kettner 2006).

The focus of Habermasian discourse ethics is on “practical discourses”, within which the participants test the “generalizability” of norms. The requirement of generalizability in Habermas’s theory originates especially from Kant’s practical or moral philosophy. Nonetheless, whereas Kant thought that the reasoning subjects can test the generalizability of a norm alone, through thought experiments, Habermas, by contrast, requires that the generalizability be tested in discourses where all those affected by a norm can take part. Habermas includes this requirement in the “Discourse Principle” on which testing of moral norms leans:

Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse. (Habermas 1990, 66, emphasis original)

Habermas speaks not only of generalizability of norms but also of “generalizable interests”, that is, interests that valid norms are supposed to satisfy. While participants are free to introduce personal or sectional interests in practical discourses, the validity of the interests as a basis for the regulation of collective action can only be revealed through discursive testing of the generalizability of these interests. Given the requirement of open and public nature of discourses, Habermasian generalizable interests can also be argued to be “public” interests, the concept of the public interest having been traditionally one central cornerstone for the legitimacy of public administration and planning (Mattila 2016). Although Habermasian generalizability can be argued to be an extremely demanding criterion for an interest to count as a “public interest”, Sager (2012, 31) notes that Habermasian generalizable interests have largely replaced the concept of the “public interest” in the theories of communicative planning. For Sager, the reason for the popularity of the Habermasian formulation of the “public interest” is the following:

Habermasian dialogue does not require acknowledgement of community or society as entities with interests of their own that are separate from individual interests. The demand for inclusive dialogue upholds the requirement that the judgment of each individual is to count when sorting out the best arguments and thus in the articulation of the public interest. (Sager 2012, 31)

Therefore, the Habermasian concept of generalizable interest provides a suitable point of reference for planning in the context of pluralist societies at least for the reason that the Habermasian approach to the generalizability of interests does not require from the outset that we assume the existence of a homogenous “public” for whom we plan. It is not perhaps surprising that the critics of the Habermasian approach have not been fully convinced that this is a sufficient solution to the problem of encountering pluralism in an appropriate manner, an issue that will be further discussed in the next section. However, for the time being, let us consider yet some other often presented criticisms of the Habermasian discourse ethics, criticisms that also lead us towards the challenge of pluralism.

Perhaps most often, the criticisms of Habermas’s discourse ethics have concerned the notion of the “ideal speech situation” included in the theory of discourse ethics. This notion refers to a contrafactual situation that fulfills conditions such as “freedom of access, equal rights to participate, truthfulness on the part of participants” and “absence of coercion” (Habermas 1993, 56). Habermas emphasizes that these stringent conditions cannot be fully met in actual discourses but that they still belong to the “unavoidable
presuppositions” of argumentation (ibid.). In philosophical terms, the ideal speech situation can be argued to be a “regulative ideal” that includes an anticipatory-utopian dimension even if this ideal can never be realized.

There has been much controversy over the status of such ideals or presuppositions especially in the context of planning. While some critics of Habermasian planning have concluded that ideals that can never come true are useless or even harmful for planning practice (see e.g. Hillier 2003; Purcell 2008), Habermas and the communicative planning theorists following him have clarified that the function of idealizations, such as the ideal speech situation, is not primarily to provide a utopian vision of undistorted communication, but to serve as yardsticks for measuring the rationality of existing institutions and decisions (Forester 1993, 3, 56; Healey 2003, 106, 113; see also Blaug 1999, 12). For instance, as Forester puts it, in light of Habermasian ideals, we can critically explore “the actual social and political conditions” that set the framework for testing and contesting the validity our claims (Forester 1993, 3, 56; see also 1989).

Along with its alleged utopianism, communicative planning has been reproached for being deontological or procedural “through and through” (Campbell and Marshall 2002, 180). It has been argued that for Habermasians, outcomes are taken to be reasonable and just as long as they result from fair processes (Fainstein 2005, 125). However, the critics contend that it is highly unclear whether there is a connection between fair processes and good and just cities (Campbell 2006; Fainstein 2000, 457; 2005; 2009; 2014). In the eyes of the critics, Habermas’s theory seems to recognize only processes, principles, and norms but not their consequences.

Habermas’s procedural and deontological orientation cannot be denied. He follows in the footsteps of Kant, a deontologist par excellence, and develops his idea of generalizable interests in opposition to the utilitarian tradition, the most famous example of consequentialist approach in moral thought. As Habermas (1987a) argues, utilitarianism is only able to provide a “generalizing compromise among fundamentally particular interests”, not “an interest outfitted with the authority of the general interest, that is, with the claim to be recognized by everyone involved as a shared interest” (p. 93). Habermas’s theory, then, is leveled against the model based on aggregation of individual interests but – as already noted – not with the consequence that we would need to presuppose a public or a community as a subject that has interests on its own (Sager 2012, 31; see also Habermas 1993; 1996).

The anti-utilitarian orientation in Habermas has served well communicative planning theorists, who typically condemn the technical model of planning, which typically builds on the utilitarian approach (Harris 2002, 26). Utilitarianism has been taken to lead to an expert-centered view of planning where the balancing of private utility and public interest is left to planning authorities, even though one of the key tenets behind utilitarianism has been that individual subjects know best what is in their own interests (Campbell and Marshall 2002, 175). Furthermore, utilitarianism has been observed to have provided justifications for instance for the extensive use of cost-benefit analyses and other such methods that have given administration and political decision-making opportunities for promotion of “technocracy” through illegitimate derivation of value-choices from facts (Fischer 1990; see also Forester 1993).

Yet, notwithstanding the notably bad reputation of utilitarianism in planning literature, there are still many planning and urban theorists who defend consequentialist positions in general against Habermasian communicative and deontological approaches (Campbell and Marshall 2002). The concern for the neglect
of consequences is surely warranted in the context of planning, where planning processes come and go, but the results of planning are often long-lasting.

Although it is true that fair and just planning processes do not yet guarantee the overall good quality of planning, it could be asked whether the Habermasian approaches are thoroughly procedural, as the critics claim (cf. Campbell and Marshall 2002, 180). Habermas is not an “anti-consequentialist” in the same way as is Kant (Talbott 2013, 1035). By contrast, one of the goals of Habermas’s philosophical project is to reflect constructively on Hegel’s critique of Kant, a critique based on Kant’s unwillingness to recognize the practical consequences resulting from moral judgments (Benhabib 1992, 35; Hannan 2016, 27).

Thereby, Habermas’s (1990, 65) formulation of the “Principle for Universalization” – another of the two central principles he introduces in his discourse ethics – includes considerations concerning the consequences of a norm. This principle lays out the condition that every valid norm has to fulfill:

All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation). (Habermas 1990, 65, emphasis original)

Procedural and deontological orientation in Habermas’s theory means, then, only that “there is no substantive consequentialist standard” for judgments (Talbott 2013, 1035); it does not mean that any consequence would do. This being the case, Habermas’s theory has been characterized as representing an “indeterminate form of consequentialism” (Hannan 2016, 28). Hence, the Habermasian theory perhaps cannot be charged with being thoroughly procedural. However, a subsequent question – one that is not discussed further in this study – would be whether this consequentialist twist in Habermas’s theory makes his theory philosophically more robust. It may, by contrast, expose Habermas’s theory “to the kinds of arguments that deontological rights theorists have always successfully brought against utilitarians”, as Seyla Benhabib (1992, 35) has formulated her criticism leveled against discourse ethics.

The procedural orientation in communicative planning theory has been criticized not only because it seems to lead to the negligence of the outcomes of communicative processes, but moreover, because the procedural and deontological bias seems to have implied a view that “reasoning takes place in a vacuum” and that particular social and cultural contexts of reasoning can be bracketed out when we communicate or reflect theoretically on planning communication (Campbell 2006, 98). Many critics have argued that the deontological nature of the theory makes it incapable to do justice to the pluralism of the contexts within which we reason and plan (Yiftachel 1998; Yiftachel and Huxley 2000), as well as to the differences between subjects taking part in reasoning and planning, subjects who are contextually embedded individuals (see e.g. Hillier 2002, 39). Then, are there reasons to argue so?

2.6 Pluralism as a challenge for Habermasian planning theory

The recognition of the increasing pluralism of values and diversity of ways of life was one of the central points of departure for communicative planning theorists, who believed that even though we live differently, it is still possible to “make sense together” (Forester 1989; 1993) and shape together the places that we share (Healey 1997). Viewed against this background, it is surprising that a notable share of
criticisms that the communicative planning theory has recently encountered has been based on its alleged inability to do justice to pluralism and to the differences in subjective and collective identities.

This inability has been typically argued to be due to the Habermasian grounds of the theory. Over the years, many theorists have wished to replace the Habermasian theory with the Foucauldian approach. For the critics of Habermasian planning, Foucault’s philosophy seems to serve the project of recognizing and celebrating pluralism and heterogeneity inherent in contemporary societies better than Habermas’s theory (Richardson 1996; Yiftachel 1998; Hillier 2002; Huxley 2002; Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2002; see also Harris 2002, 30). The Habermasian approach, with its reliance on the ideal of consensus, has been associated with the project of elimination of difference, or “normalization”, to put it in Foucauldian terms (Villa 1992; see also Hillier 2002, 50–51; Huxley 2002; Bond 2011). More precisely, the Habermasian project has been argued to bring about normalization given that it establishes a culture of “self-surveillance of the civically virtuous citizen (who has internalized the hegemonic conception of the public good)” and celebrates the idea of a “communicatively rational agent (who has internalized the hegemonic conception of what constitutes ‘the better argument’)”, as Dana Villa (1992, 715) has phrased it. Habermas himself, of course, has nothing like normalization in his mind, but he, by contrast, emphasizes that the subjects engaging in argumentative processes are completely free to introduce and challenge any kinds of themes and arguments they wish (see e.g. Dahlberg 2005, 122).

In recent years, the critique concerning the inability of the communicative planning theory to deal with pluralism has been backed up not only with Foucauldian insights but also increasingly with political theories of “agonistic pluralism”, based especially on the works of Chantal Mouffe (see e.g. 2005; 2013; 2018) and Jacques Rancière (see e.g. 2010). However, before delving into contemporary debates, it is fair to note that the theorists of communicative planning have themselves struggled right from the beginning of their project with the potential discrepancies between the Habermasian approach and the goal of respecting pluralism and difference.

The proponents of CPT such as Patsy Healey and John Forester have expressed concerns about the usefulness of Habermasian theory for planning under the conditions of pluralism. Forester, for example, discusses the theme of pluralism and difference in his relatively recent book Dealing with Differences (2009b), but without references to Habermas. The book is admittedly geared more towards practice than theory, so the reader probably would not even expect such references. However, the absence of Habermasian approach is briefly explained in a footnote where Forester suspects that Habermas’s theory is not likely to be relevant for the topic, given that he does not seem recognize the role that communication plays in the formation of identities (Forester 2009b, 31, n. 14). That might have been the case in some of Habermas’s early works, but it is not the whole truth about Habermasian project’s relation to identity questions.

Healey, in turn, reported already in her pathbreaking article, Planning through Debate, in the beginning of 1990s that she is not willing to follow Habermas’s universalizing project all the way through, but her aim is to direct attention especially to an anthropological and phenomenological understanding of the plurality of local contexts of meaning (Healey 1992, 152; see also 1997). Healey does not elaborate on her veering from Habermas in any thorough manner, but she provides some clues as to what could be the main reasons for her partial departure from Habermas’s thoughts. On the one hand, we might infer that this dissolution is due to a mismatch between Habermas’s philosophical approach and her own anthropologically oriented
approach (cf. Hillier and Metzger 2015, 5–6; Healey 2015, 440), but on the other hand, she has also made references to the feminist-philosopher Iris Marion Young’s work when reporting her discomfort with Habermas (Healey 1997).

Young’s criticisms of Habermas are related to a broader discourse between feminist philosophers and Habermas, a discourse that could shed light on Healey’s departure from Habermas (Mattila 2016). Although Healey has not directly positioned herself in the feminist tradition, the parallels between the views of Healey and of feminist critics of Habermas might not be merely accidental, since the project of communicative and collaborative planning – occupied with the progressive goal of including marginalized voices and respecting difference as it is – has been argued to be influenced by and indebted to feminist theory (Yiftachel and Huxley 2000; 908; Huxley 2002, 137; see also Fainstein 2000, 456).

The debate between the feminists and Habermas are in many ways echoed in the contemporary debates between the proponents of agonistic pluralism and communicative planning, although the proponents of agonism are more radical than for instance Young in their attacks on the Habermasian theory as they call into question the centrality of the notion of rational deliberation altogether. Yet, many of the criticisms that agonists have put forward have been responded to by Habermas when he has engaged in the debates, for instance, with feminist scholars (see e.g. Habermas 1996; 1998a).

2.6.1 Various modes of discourse

Iris Marion Young, who has clearly inspired Healey to distance herself from Habermas (see Healey 1997), situates herself in the tradition of critical theory and embraces the model of deliberative democracy, just as does Habermas (Young 2000). However, she is also one of the well-known critics of Habermas’s deliberative democracy (see e.g. Young 1990; 1996; 2000). One of the disagreements between Young and Habermas has concerned Habermas’s seeming prioritization of argumentative speech (Young 2000, 36). As Young maintains, under the conditions of “heterogeneity of human life” and the “complexity of social structures and interaction”, prioritization of argumentative modes of speech always excludes some needs and interests. Most often, it is the interests of disenfranchised groups that cannot be voiced in the dominating argumentative framework (ibid., 37–39, 56). Young’s source of inspiration for this argument is Jean-François Lyotard, who has argued that there is always a plurality of incommensurable language-games, none of which should be prioritized over the others (ibid., 37–38). For Lyotard, then, the implications of the Wittgensteinian notion of a language game are different than they are for Habermas. For Lyotard, any prioritization of one language game over others leaves voiceless those who represent the non-hegemonious language games, thus silencing their sufferings (Lyotard 1988).

In her criticism of Habermas’s prioritization of argumentative speech, Young points in particular at Habermas’s differentiation between illocutionary and perlocutionary force of speech acts, a differentiation that also serves for him the purpose of differentiating between communicative, understanding-oriented action and strategic persuasion, the latter being associated with rhetorical modes of language use (Young 2000, 65–66; see also Bohman 1988"). Young wishes to defend the position of the rhetorical use of language against Habermas’s prioritization of understanding-oriented rational speech. For Young (2000, 65), “rhetorical” refers to, for instance, the inclusion of emotions, utilization of metaphors and other figures of
speech, multimodal communication (visualizations, etc.), and reference to the particular cultural context of the audience.

Healey (1992; 1997), like Young, emphasizes the uses of rhetorical speech, experiential expression, narratives, and references to local contexts of meaning. Innes and Booher, as well, emphasize such modes of communication that engage people emotionally and evoke “playful imagination” (see e.g. Innes and Booher 1999). Although known as a representative of the “argumentative turn” in planning (see Fischer and Forester (eds.) 1993), Forester also makes in fact plenty of room for such seemingly non-argumentative modes of communication as storytelling, gestures and body language, and drawing up of architectural designs (see e.g. Forester 1989). Hence, while the opponents of Habermasian planning theory reproach Habermas for undermining the progressive role of aesthetic-affective modes of communicating, this criticism cannot be leveled against Habermasian planning theorists.

Furthermore, even though it is true that Habermas himself often seems to be hostile to aesthetic-affective modes of communication (see Dahlberg 2005, 116, n.22), these modes of communication can still be argued to be compatible with his overall scheme (Dahlberg 2005; Johnson 2006; Sorial 2011). For instance, it is not difficult to accommodate aesthetic-affective modes of communication to reflexivity, impartiality, and rational contestation of validity claims, features that are central for Habermas’s project (Dahlberg 2005). Reflexivity, for instance, can well include intuition and imagination. Impartiality, in turn, requires that we learn to understand other people’s experiences, their emotions included. Validity claims, finally, may well be – and indeed typically are – defended or contested with passion and commitment (Dahlberg 2005, 116–117). However, the critics are right in arguing that Habermas does certainly not prioritize such forms of communication that build only on the aesthetic-affective function of language; his model seems to prioritize the balance between aesthetic-expressive, informative, and regulative functions of language (cf. Habermas 1998b).

Habermas’s prioritization of argumentative modes of communication has been challenged also by the theory of agonistic pluralism recently. Chantal Mouffe, in particular, has reproached Habermas for insisting on the ideal of rationally motivated consensus that arises from “an exchange of arguments constrained by logical rules”, whereas agonism emphasizes the variety of voices and modes of persuasion (Mouffe 2013, 11). Mouffe goes back to Hannah Arendt, who introduced the old Greek term *agon* to modern political thought already in the 1970s, describing the public space as a space where the speakers compete for attention and persuade others with argumentative and non-argumentative modes of expressions alike (Arendt 1992). Arendt, however, was not an agonist in the contemporary meaning of the term, since she also held that people speaking and acting in the public space should strive for consensus to be able to generate power (Arendt 1998). Contemporary theorists of agonism do not share Arendt’s views in this respect (Mouffe 2007, 4; 2013, 10; cf. Hillier 2002, 27–28). Instead, her views on this issue have greatly influenced Habermas’s conception of deliberation in the public sphere (see Habermas 1980; 1983; 1996).

Contemporary agonists such as Mouffe go, then, much further in their criticisms of Habermas than for instance Young, given that Mouffe rejects the concept of deliberative democracy altogether. Mouffe’s view is that the rationalist orientation of liberal political theory, in general, renders this theory incapable of recognizing the inherent antagonism in the realm of the political, hence her aim to move radically away from the conception of deliberative democracy within which both Habermas and Young move (Thomassen 2008, 24–26). For Mouffe (2013, 7), the question is not how to bring about consensus amidst antagonism,
but how to turn antagonism into agonism – a non-hostile struggle with adversaries, a struggle wherein dissent is a legitimate outcome. When it comes to the modes of expression that are relevant in agonistic political discussion, Mouffe (2013, 55) defends the position of “passions” and “affects”, which, according to her, are pushed to the private sphere in Habermas’s theory. Mouffe (2007; 2013), then, continues by emphasizing the politically progressive potential that artistic modes of communication – for instance art in public urban spaces – have in presenting alternatives to the existing political order. This progressive potential is due to art’s unique capacity to incorporate passions and affects.

Habermas, by contrast, does not trust that art as such could be the antidote to repressive features of contemporary societies. Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear how he conceives the political role of art and aesthetics. His assessments of aesthetics are fragmented and heterogeneous. In some of his works, art has a role to play in communicative rationality and this role is related to “authentic expression of subjectivity” (Ingram 1991, 67–68). These expressions of subjectivity, if they take a rational form, might enrich discourses carried out in the public sphere as they help us to explore our identities and authentic needs (cf. Johnson 2006, 162–163; Boucher 2011). In light of this conception, art and aesthetics could be connected to emancipatory aspects of rationality. If this is the correct interpretation of Habermas’s relation to aesthetics, then Mouffe’s claim concerning the expulsion of the passions and affects from the Habermasian public sphere is not warranted.

However, Habermas also criticizes heavily those post-modernist philosophers who locate the sources of repression in modern rationality and thus end up searching for radical alternatives to reason from the realm of aesthetics (Habermas 1981; 1987b; Ingram 1991). Yet, in this case, it could be argued that the target of Habermas’s criticism is not aesthetics or artistic expressivity as such but unleashed aestheticization that forces out other aspects of communicative reasoning. Just as Habermas emphasizes the balance between different modes of communication at the level of individual communicative interactions, he also searches for the conditions of a balanced rationalization of societies, rationalization where “distinct spheres of rational comportment – such as those operant within science, economics, politics, law, morality and aesthetics – communicate with one another in a just or non-hegemonic manner” (Ingram 1996, 270, emphasis removed).

Habermas also explores the problem of aesthetics and art by focusing on the history of artistic practices. These explorations, as well, bring to the fore the multifaceted nature of art. In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas (1991, 36–43; see also 1992a) finds politically progressive aspects in art, as he traces the origins of the political public sphere back to the literary public sphere of the 18th century. The literary public set the stage for rational-critical discussion of works of art as “objects of common concern”, a stage where the pure humanness could set aside people’s economic interests and the like (Duvenage 2005, 4; see also 2003). The literary public sphere, in this respect, appears in Habermas’s early work as a prefiguration of the political public sphere (Habermas 1992a, 422–424; Duvenage 2005). Nonetheless, Habermas recognizes also the darker side of art and aesthetics already in The Structural Transformation, as he describes how the rational-critical debate in the public sphere was gradually replaced by uncritical consumption of cultural products, and how this contributed – alongside the blurring of the lines between the state and civil society – to the decline of the public sphere.

Here, Habermas’s reasoning has similar tones to those of the philosophy of the first-generation critical theorists. Adorno had in particular warned about the debilitating potential of the “culture industry” and
other kinds of strategies of aesthetic manipulation already in the first half of the 20th century (see e.g. Adorno 2008). Given the inheritance of the first generation of critical theorists, it is perhaps not surprising that Habermas is not generally willing to afford art and aesthetic expressivity a direct role in action-coordination (cf. White 1988, 32–33). As Habermas (1982) argues, “symbolic forms like dance, music, painting, etc. […] do not as a rule take over functions of co-ordinating action” (p. 270). Furthermore, in his assessments of literary works of art and poetic expressivity, Habermas emphasizes, following Austin, that in these kinds of cases we are moving in the field of fiction, and removed from the real-life context of action (Habermas 1998b). This, in turn, means that the utterances in these contexts “bracket off” illocutionary and binding forces (ibid.). However, Habermas does not conjoin artistic modes of expression to strategic action either, so the position of aesthetics remains highly ambiguous in his theory (White and Farr 2012, 43).

Mouffe (2013, 85), of course, is aware of the warnings of Adorno and his colleagues concerning the threats of artistic and aesthetic persuasion and manipulation just as is Habermas. For Mouffe, as with Adorno, it is not aesthetics of beauty, however, but the aesthetics of the sublime that we must examine if we wish to tap the emancipatory potential of artistic expression (Mouffe 2007, 4). Both notions – the one of the beautiful and the one of the sublime – harken back to Kant’s *Critique of Judgement* (Kant 1952), the cornerstone of modern aesthetics. Whereas for Kant, the aesthetics of the beautiful was about potential consensus, though one that could only be based on a potentially shareable feeling and not on arguments in the way that Habermasian consensus needs to be, the sublime was about interrupted harmony or “disagreement” between the human cognitive capacities. In discussing the sublime and its political potential, Mouffe refers to Lyotard, for whom the Kantian theory of the sublime grounds the agonistic notion of “the differend”, the notion referring to incommensurabilities and collisions between different kinds of language games (Lyotard 1988, xi). For Mouffe, “the differend”, then, corresponds to the moment of revelation of “the hegemonic nature of every consensus and the ineradicability of antagonism” (Mouffe 2007, 4).

Mouffe points out that in so far as both Habermas and Arendt draw on Kant’s aesthetics, it is Kant’s notion of the beautiful – and the idea of consensus-orientation underlying it – that they rely on, whereas neither one of them recognizes the political potential of the notion of the sublime (Mouffe 2007, 4). Although Mouffe does not specify this claim, not at least when it comes to Habermas’s relation to the notions of the beautiful and the sublime, there might be a kernel of truth in her claim at least if we shift the attention from the concrete art works and aesthetic expressions to the nature of the aesthetic mode of reason in general. Habermas is surely not among those philosophers who follow the so-called aesthetic turn in political thought and build their moral or political philosophies on the aesthetic modes of reason (cf. Kompridis 2014). Yet, via Arendt, Kant’s aesthetics and the notion of the beautiful – with the prospect of consensus underlying it – seems to have influenced Habermas’s thinking, as he has developed his notion of rationally motivated consensus (Habermas 1980). In elaborating his relation to Arendt’s philosophy, Habermas (1980, 130–131) gives credit to Arendt’s appropriation of Kant’s aesthetic judgment in the realm of political thought. Arendt builds her political theory on the idea of “enlarged mentality” or “enlarged thinking”, that is, the ability to think from the standpoint of everyone else, the ability that Kant associates with aesthetic judgments. Habermas, then, draws a parallel between Arendt’s reading of Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* and G.H. Mead’s reading of Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason*. These two readings, as they “converge in the project of ethics of communication”, connecting “practical reason to the idea of a universal discourse”, appear as important sources of inspiration for Habermas’s projects of communicative rationality and discourse ethics (Habermas 1980, 130–131).
To sum up, one cannot straightforwardly argue that the difference between agonistic and Habermasian theories is that agonistic theories acknowledge the variety of aesthetic aspects of politics and communication, whereas Habermasian theory does not. Habermas has often been criticized for dismissing the aesthetic aspects of politics and communication, and it is true that these aspects have not been at the center of his project. Nonetheless, he has devoted a considerable amount of attention to these aspects over the years (see e.g. Johnson 2006). Moreover, the difference between agonistic dissensus-oriented theories and Habermasian consensus-oriented theory does not seem to be that Habermasian theories rely on the aesthetics of the beautiful whereas agonistic dissensus-oriented approaches rest on the aesthetics of the sublime. On one hand, Habermas offers a nuanced account also of the dissonant aspects in aesthetics (Ingram 1991), and on the other hand, there are agonists who recognize a progressive potential in the aesthetics of the beautiful. Even Chantal Mouffe seems to do so in her recent writings where she distances herself from the aesthetics of the sublime on the grounds that the modes of resistance based on the aesthetics of the sublime do often lead into an impasse in practice (Mouffe 2013, 104). And even more importantly, Jacques Rancière – another central theorist of agonistic politics along with Mouffe – has provided subtle analyses of the inherent heterogeneity, and hence the politically progressive potential of the Kantian notion of the beautiful (see e.g. Rancière 2010, 2014). Respectively, he has criticized Lyotardian positions which are based on the aesthetics of the sublime (Rancière 2005, 22; see also 2010, 198). Seen against the background of philosophical aesthetics, Habermasian consensus-oriented and agonistic dissensus-oriented approaches are perhaps not that far away from each other than the recent planning theoretical debates suggest.

2.6.2 Discourse ethics, plurality of identities, and contextual embeddedness of the reasoning subjects

In addition to the plurality of forms of communication and self-expression, the critics of Habermas – Mouffe among them – have challenged Habermas’s philosophy of the subject. In particular, they have questioned the ability of Habermas’s theory to do justice to the plurality of identities and the contextual embeddedness of reasoning subjects. This strand of criticism has existed already for several decades, and the feminist critics of Habermas have had a major role in fueling this discourse ever since the 1980s. Healey has been perhaps the first Habermasian planning theorist to engage in this discussion, partly defending Habermas and partly rejecting Habermas’s allegedly universalizing ideas concerning the reasoning subjects (Mattila 2016).

Healey (1992; 1997) generally appreciates Habermas’s philosophy for the reason that it does not aim at stripping subjects of their particular and contextual identities, but Habermas in contrast portrays subjects’ identities as something that are formed in the situated processes of communication. Habermas’s source of inspiration in this is G. H. Mead, according to whom “the self” is always constituted in relation to language and culture, and formed “through our embeddedness in communicative interactions with others” (Johnson 2006, 50; see also Benhabib 1992, 71). Healey’s appreciation of Habermas’s idea of the self is here in line with the views of many feminist commentators of Habermas (see e.g. Cooke 1999, 187; Meehan 2000). However, Habermas’s rigid conception of practical discourse has given many critics reasons to argue that Habermas ultimately fails in the project of respecting the embeddedness of the selves and the plurality of identities that this embeddedness implies in the broader scale (see e.g. Young 1990; Meehan 2000; see also
Hillier 2002, 39). This seems to be also the view of Healey (1997), for whom the notion of the situated and contextually embedded subject is a central part of the project of collaborative shaping of places.

The problem for many feminist commentators of Habermas has been that in Habermas’s discourse ethics, subjects who test argumentatively the generalizability of interests are eventually supposed to abstract from their cultural contexts, adopting a perspective of “generalized other” – a concept which originates from G. H. Mead – so as to arrive at impartial judgement. For Habermas, this kind of perspective taking is an essential part of modern “post-conventional” moral reasoning, a type of reasoning that assumes a reflective attitude to the conventional norms of a particular moral community (Habermas 1990, 160–163). Habermas’s prioritization of the position of generalized other over concrete and situated others has been a disappointment for many feminist philosophers, Young (1990, 106) being one of them. For feminists, the perspective of concrete others has represented women’s moral reasoning, a form of reasoning that has been traditionally associated with care for and responsibility of concrete others (Benhabib 1992, 158–159; see also Dean 1995). In this respect, communicative and collaborative planning theories can be associated with the feminist tradition, given that they typically promote ethics of concrete encounters with concrete others and the ethics of caring for places and for local communities’ needs (cf. Fainstein 2000, 456).

However, it ought to be noted that in Habermas’s theory, taking the perspective of generalized other does not mean that all the subjects are abstracted of all their particularity; what it means is that the participants of moral discourses leave their own particular perspectives behind them and aim at an “insight into the socially and culturally constituted point of view from which alone the arguments of the others can be understood to be reasonable or not” (Wright 2004, 64). Successful perspective taking would, then, result in a “descriptively thick understanding of the needs, concerns and interests of every other participant” (ibid.).

Moreover, it ought to be remembered that the concrete perspectives of moral subjects are present in Habermas’s theory of discourses also in the sense that persons who enter into practical discourses are free to introduce into these discourses views, reasons, opinions, and interests emerging from their own particular perspectives, even though they are supposed to make their final judgments from the perspective of the generalized other. In this, Habermas’s theory differs considerably from the view presented by John Rawls, with whom Habermas has often been associated both in the fields of political philosophy (see e.g. Mouffe 2005) and planning theory (see e.g. Campbell and Marshall 2002; Campbell 2006). Mouffe, for instance, argues that both Rawls and Habermas, the key representatives of contemporary deontological moral theory and liberal political philosophy, end up highlighting the contrafactual ideal of a subject that eventually leaves behind all his or her particularities, coinciding with the “universal rational self” (Mouffe 2005, 86–88). However, it should be clear from the discussion above that Habermas does not call for the unfolding of the “universal rational self” given that, first, Habermas seeks to depart from the traditional subject-centered concept of rationality, highlighting instead the intersubjective nature of moral reasoning (Thomassen 2008, 25), and secondly, Habermas does not require the subjects to leave behind their particularities in the same way that Rawls does.

Rawls (1971) builds his theory of justice on the concepts of the “veil of ignorance” and “original position”, which refer to a hypothetical and contrafactual situation wherein subjects temporarily bracket out their particularities, such as their positions in society, their capacities, their interests, their preferences, and the like in order to arrive at basic principles of justice from an impartial point of view. Conversely, Habermas (1998a), who views the subjects entering into moral discourses as contextually embedded persons,
distances himself from Rawls by charging him with imposing “a common perspective on the parties in the original position through informational constraints” and of neutralizing “the multiplicity of particular interpretive perspectives from the outset” (p. 57).

Finally, it could be asked whether the standpoints of generalizable and concrete others need to be viewed as competing standpoints. As for instance Seyla Benhabib (1992, 10) has argued, these standpoints are not mutually incompatible, but they form a continuum of “universal respect for all as moral persons at one end” and “the care, solidarity and solicitation [...] at the other”. Both perspectives are needed in our moral lives. Habermas would probably admit that in most everyday situations calling for an ethical response, formal reasoning and reflection from the perspective of generalized other are not required, but adequate responses may well be based on the recognition of the concreteness of the others and care for the others. Habermas, however, is more interested in situations where our conventional responses and conventional norms appear no longer as appropriate and where an impartial standpoint is required. Although we do not probably face these kinds of situations on a daily basis, they are not rare in our post-traditional societies either.

Nonetheless, even if the concept of the generalized other could be justified in the realm of moral thought, the question still remains as to whether this concept is useful in the field of planning. There are planning theorists who criticize Habermasian universalizing moral thought, not so much because it would have shortcomings as a moral theory, but because it does not seem to be applicable to planning that is an “art of situated ethical judgment”, rather than a project of justifying universal moral norms (Campbell 2006; see also Campbell and Marshall 2006). It makes sense to claim that most of the time planning work is about conventional judgements and encounters with concrete and situated stakeholders, whose particular values and identities ought to be recognized by planners. In this sense, Healey’s (1997) formulation of collaborative planning, a formulation where situated subjects care for their places, is well founded.

However, there is surely more to planning than local and situated judgments based on the recognition of concrete others in concrete local communities. Even such a critic of the Habermasian planning approach as Susan Fainstein (2009) has argued that if we wish to be able to plan just cities, we also need to make a “deontological reference to norms transcending the particular” (p. 3). For instance, decisions that might appear as just at the local level and from particular local perspectives might not always be just in a broader scale (Fainstein 2009). Furthermore, it is not necessarily the deprived communities that benefit if we give up on the requirement of impartiality in favor of the local and the particular (ibid.). Healey in fact recognizes this well already in her path-breaking work, Collaborative Planning (1997), even though she engages seriously with problems related to trans-scalar planning only in her more recent works and without the help of Habermas.

To sum up, there does not seem to be any particular reason why Healey’s collaborative planning theory – or any other version of CPT – should distance itself from Habermas’s theory and limit its scope merely to situated ethical judgments guided by local ways of valuing. Furthermore, there are additional reasons why CPT should promote not only the ethics of encountering particular normative contexts of particular communities, but also Habermasian post-conventional and impartial moral reasoning. In particular, one of the most central reasons is that the aim of critical planning theory – as we have seen – is not only to provide theories for local everyday planning practice but also to bring about transformation at the institutional level and at the level of planning systems. This means that those who wish to bring about transformation should be willing and able to question any existing ethical ideals if necessary. In this project,
Habermasian conceptions of justice and impartial moral reasoning might still be useful, even though these conceptions perhaps would not be needed in most everyday planning situations (cf. Hillier 2003, 40).

2.6.3 Pluralism as a point of departure for Habermas’s discourse theory of politics

Institutional issues are central for Habermas’s most recent major work, Between Facts and Norms, where Habermas finally clarifies what are the bearings of his theories of communicative action and discourse ethics to the theory of democratic politics. In this work, Habermas uses the reconstructive method to chart the underlying normativity of democratic political action, ending up with a “discourse theory of politics” that is at the same time a “discourse theory of law”. The central point of departure in Between Facts and Norms is the recognition of the condition of pluralism that characterizes contemporary societies. One way to interpret the title of his book is, then, to view the social complexity and pluralism as unavoidable “facts” to which the “norms” or Habermasian abstract ideals of communication need to be accommodated (Bohman 1994, 898–899).

The recognition of pluralism bears on Habermas’s theory of politics at many different points and in many different ways. Habermas begins Between Facts and Norms by assessing the theme of plurality of discourses. Whereas some of his earlier works may have suggested that it is specifically practical discourses that are politically relevant, he now broadens this view considerably (Bohman 1994, 906). In Between Facts and Norms, the public sphere is viewed as being home not only to practical discourses, that is, discourses concerning justice and morality and ones that hold a prospect for rational consensus but also to “ethical discourses”, that is, discourses where at issue are values and ideas about the good life that can be assessed rationally and argumentatively, but only within a certain cultural context (Habermas 1996, 60–61). These questions, then, do not hold a prospect of universal agreement.

Habermas elaborates on his differentiation between moral and ethical questions in the following way, focusing, in particular, on the difference in the perspectives that the respective questions call for:

When we approach a problem as a moral question, we ask which regulation lies in the equal interest of all (or what is “equally good for all”). However, when dealing with ethical questions, we weigh alternatives from the perspective of individuals or collectives that are seeking to confirm their identity and that want to know which life they should lead in light of who they are and want to be (or what “is good for me/us on the whole and in the long run”). (Habermas 1998c, 386)

Hence, there is room for disagreement or dissensus over the ideas of the “good life” in Habermas’s theory (Habermas 1996, 60–61; see also Hillier 2003, 40). Moreover, Habermas reserves a role also for pragmatic discourses wherein means for given ends are searched for, or compromises are made to balance “interests that cannot be generalized” (Habermas 1996, 155).

In Between Facts and Norms, the differentiation between moral and ethical discourses lays the groundwork for Habermas’s multifaceted analysis of politics under the condition of pluralism and difference. Most importantly, this differentiation is reflected in his complex idea of co-originality of public and private autonomy – the concept that neither one of these two poles is more fundamental than the other but that public and private autonomy are interdependent and mutually presuppose each other. Habermas (1996)
sets out to discuss this interdependence between public and private autonomy by presenting two traditional alternatives in political theory, liberalism that highlights private autonomy and civic republicanism that highlights public autonomy. Habermas’s characterization of liberalism is based on the work of philosophers, such as John Locke, who emphasized the rule of law and the protection of individual freedom and rights (Habermas 1996, 454; Rehg 1996, 178). With this emphasis, the proponents of liberalism have wished to guarantee that individuals are able to pursue their own goals and realize their own ideas concerning the “good life”. Civic republicanism, in turn, highlights political will formation and the search for a shared vision of common good, rather than private interests. Aristotle and later Rousseau, then, appear as classical representatives of republicanism (Habermas 1996, 454; Rehg 1996, 178).

Viewed against the goal of respecting difference and the pluralism of identities, both of these models appear as problematic. As already discussed, liberalism which highlights the private rights of subjects often ends up erasing the particularity and the contextual embeddedness of subjects. Liberalist orientation does not support the view that individuals bring their private and particularistic concerns into public discourse (Sorial 2011). Republicanism, highlighting the role of the shared ethos of a political community, tends to establish an idea of a political meta-subject, a view that would also be suppressive of individual identities in the context of contemporary pluralist societies (cf. Sager 2012, 31).

Habermas’s discourse theory of politics – or discourse theory of law, a theory viewing the citizens simultaneously as addressees and the authors of law – aims at reconciling these two models by incorporating the best qualities of each of the two models, while avoiding their weaknesses (Habermas 1996; see also Baynes 2002, 17). The discourse theory rejects the liberal notion of politics as an aggregation of interests in favor of the idea that the views held by people evolve in deliberative processes (Habermas 1996). This view has been shared by the theorists of communicative planning. However, the proponents of CPT would perhaps have more difficulties in accepting the way in which the discourse theory turns down the republican idea of a collectively acting citizenry, replacing this concept with “the institutionalization of a corresponding practice of self-governance by citizens” (ibid., 289). With this move, Habermas can avoid the concept of a community pursuing a shared idea of good, and rely instead on the less homogenizing idea of “free and equal consociates under law” (Baynes 2002, 23).

In Between Facts and Norms, the necessary and unavoidable link between private and public autonomy is reflected also in the idea of co-originality and mutual interdependence of rule of law and democracy. This very attempt to reconcile rule of law and democracy has been highly problematic for the proponents of agonism. Chantal Mouffe (2005), in particular, considers this attempt to solve the democratic paradox between rule of law and democracy to be violent, since this paradox is, for her, fundamentally irresolvable. As Mouffe (2005, 4) argues, if we wish to defend the fragile liberal-democratic institutions, we need to recognize the irresolvable tension between the differing logics of democracy and rule of law, and not to explain it away. While the disagreement between Habermas and agonists can probably not be solved in a once and for all manner, some more light can still be shed on the relationship of Habermas’s “discourse theory of democracy” or “discourse theory of law” to pluralism, difference, and dissensus. The remainder of this chapter examines the way in which Habermas, in an attempt to encounter pluralism, shifts his attention from a micro-scale exploration of individual discourses to a macro-scale view of the public sphere as a vast network of different kinds of intersecting discourses – a shift that challenges the views of Habermasian planning theorists, views emphasizing the role of communicative interactions in the micro-scale context of planning.
2.7 Communicative planning and the question concerning the proper scale and place of deliberative democracy

Although *Between Facts and Norms* clarifies considerably the political implications of Habermas’s philosophical project and provides answers to many questions that were left open in Habermas’s previous works, it has attracted very little attention from the proponents of CPT. The main reason for the unpopularity of this work is probably that the views of public participation that it promotes differ considerably from the ideas that his earlier works have implied, and also from the concepts promoted by theorists of communicative planning. Most importantly, instead of beginning from face-to-face communicative interactions and single discourses as he did in *The Theory of Communicative Action*, in *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas provides a bird’s-eye perspective to deliberative democracy and views the public sphere as a space where the public appears as “subjectless” and communication as an “anonymous” flow of reasons stemming from different types of discourses (Habermas, 1996). In so doing, Habermas sets out to address pluralist and “decentered” societies in a significantly different manner than the proponents of CPT, who typically begin from the micro-scale perspectives and aim to do justice to pluralism by encountering the otherness of the participants of planning discourses through daily face-to-face interactions.

2.7.1 Macro-perspective to society and the two-track model of democracy

Although Habermas (1996, 170) still maintains that politics needs to be based on face-to-face communicative and deliberative practices, he now holds that it would be a practical impossibility to organize decision-making in a way that all the citizens could directly participate in such a practice. In *Between Facts and Norms*, he lays out a two-track model of democracy, a model that has been inspired by Nancy Fraser’s (1992) differentiation between “weak” and “strong” publics. He argues that the “general public sphere” is not an adequate forum for the purposes of decision-making, an argument that echoes the view of the public sphere presented already in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. One of the reasons with which Habermas backs up this view is that as an “unconstrained”, unstructured and open forum, it is “vulnerable to the repressive and the exclusionary effects of unequally distributed social power” (Habermas 1996, 307). However, precisely because of its unstructured nature, it is ideally suited for the purposes of the identification of problems and interpretation of needs (Baynes 1995, 217). Moreover, it is a suitable arena for non-argumentative modes of communication (Sorial 2011) – modes of communication that are defended, for instance, by Young (1990; 2000) and Healey (1997), who seems to be following the thoughts of Young.

Given that there is now space also for the modes of communication that stem from intimate spheres of life (Sorial 2011, 38–40), the boundaries between the public and private spheres appear now as more fluid than in Habermas’s former works. In fact, Habermas has come a long way from the strict separation between the private and public spheres that was dominant in *The Structural Transformation*, given that he now seems to admit, following Benhabib and Fraser, that the boundaries between public and private can only be drawn in discourses and by the subjects taking part in discourses (Habermas 1996, 314).
Whereas the identification of problems takes place in the general public spheres, Habermas argues that actions that are needed to solve the problems should be decided upon by formal bodies of decision-making in the “procedurally regulated” public spheres such as parliaments (Habermas 1996, 306–308). Formally organized public spheres, nevertheless, should be informed of the public opinions that emerge from general public spheres (Habermas 1996).

Habermas’s two-track model is at this point very abstract, and Habermas has been often criticized for not being specific enough as to how exactly the exchange between formal and informal public spheres should work (Baynes 1995, 217–218; Scheuerman 1999, 168). Furthermore, Habermas’s model surely does not satisfy for instance the theorists of agonistic politics, given that in this model, the formal publics eventually have the power to make binding decisions – in this case, decisions concerning binding law, in particular. While this model can be regarded as exclusive and progenitive of “hegemonies”, it is still based on the view that decisions made by formal publics are “fallible” and challengeable, and that it is crucial that even after decisions have been taken, the multiplicity of voices is preserved in the general public sphere and that the minorities can continue to convince the majority of their viewpoints and opinions (Habermas 1996, 306–315, 474–477; 1998c, 397; Bohman 1994, 919). Habermas is even ready to tolerate civil disobedience as one way of challenging those legal norms that do not appear as justifiable, although the critics surely do not see this move as a step toward agonistic positions but merely as a desperate attempt to save at least some of the radicality of his theory of democracy (Thomassen 2007; 2008; White and Farr 2012).

Nonetheless, for instance Jean Hillier (2003, 41) – perhaps the best-known proponent of agonistic planning theory – still finds reasons to oppose Habermas’s “legalistic project” in general, as it seems to replace politics with binding rules and regulations. This is clearly not what Habermas aims to do, but, undoubtedly, Habermas’s legalistic turn calls for further explanations. In Between Facts and Norms, law becomes a focal point for Habermas because of the observation that the coordinating and integrative power of informal normative structures has weakened considerably in the contemporary pluralist societies (Habermas 1996; see also Bohman 1994; March 2012, 34). Pluralism and the waning of traditions has had the consequence that communicative action has assumed a central role in action coordination and integration in contemporary societies. However, eventually it seems clear that under these conditions, communicative action becomes unable alone to “bear the burden of social integration falling to it” (Habermas 1996, 37). In addition to that, the problem of course is that the spheres of strategic interaction are continuously expanding and crowding out communicative rationality (Habermas 1996, 26). Hence, as Habermas (1996) summarizes it, in contemporary societies, law is necessary to “compensate for the cognitive indeterminacy, motivational insecurity, and limited coordinating power of moral norms” (p. 326).

Habermas now views law as situated in between facts and norms, because firstly, in its facticity it stabilizes our actions and makes them predictable. In other words, we can generally expect people to obey the law, given that state authorities can back up law coercively, that is, by sanctioning those who do not follow the law. Secondly, law is an institution that makes a claim to its normative validity. This means that to be binding, law has to be legitimate as well. This dual character of law brings us back to Habermas’s differentiation between the system and the lifeworld. The dual character suggests for Habermas that law can mediate between the system and the lifeworld. It is not a media in the same way as money and power, but more like “a hinge between system and lifeworld” and a “transformer” that “guarantees that the socially integrating network of communication stretched across society as a whole holds together” (Habermas 1996, 56).
In *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas relies on the concept of “communicative power”, the concept referring to Arendt’s concept of the public sphere, where power can be generated only through consensual action (Habermas 1996, 149–150). Communicative power is a form of power that is transformed through law into administrative power. As Habermas argues, it is only through law that this transformation becomes possible under the conditions of plurality and complexity – a fact that has been generally hard to accept for the proponents of radical democracy (Bohman 1994, 899). For Habermas, it is the processes of law-making, then, that should be grounded in discursive democracy, in particular, and in this specific context, if anywhere, we should be able to expect people to leave behind their roles as private people and assume the role of a citizen and a member of “a legal community” (Habermas 1996, 32).

This idea has consequences for Habermas’s standing towards communicative or participatory forms of administration and political decision-making. What Habermas seems to be saying, is that the media-steered political-administrative and economic subsystems should not be primarily democratized from the inside, but that democratization should be based on the steering of these subsystems via the medium of law (Baynes 1995, 217; see also Forbath 1998, 276–277). Of course, this has given rise to the question as to whether Habermas’s project is a project of radical democracy anymore (Benthhabib 1997; Scheuerman 1999). Many critics have argued that Habermas ultimately remains captive to the systems-theoretical view, putting too much emphasis on the relative autonomy of the economic and political-administrative subsystems (Forbath 1998; Scheuerman 1999). Nonetheless, Habermas’s aim in *Between Facts and Norms* is not to resort to systems theory but to find a balanced position between the following two positions: first, normative theories, such as Rawls’s theory, that do not seem plausible, however, in the face of the empirical complexity and the pluralist nature of societies, and second, systems theories that recognize the complexity but typically fail to deal adequately with the normative structures of societies (Scheuerman 1999, 168). With a view to this kind of overall balance, the expulsion of weak publics from the formal arenas of decision-making can now be argued to not be that much about ensuring the relative autonomy of political-administrative sub-systems but more about protecting the “revolutionary” nature of informal public spheres from the “bureaucratic rationality and various anti-radical influences” (Grodnick 2005, 399).

To sum up, it seems that in light of the two-track model, Habermas cannot be taken to be an unreserved proponent of communicative or participatory planning. Habermas’s view seems to acknowledge that under the condition of growing complexity of societies, citizens “cannot be expected to make knowledgeable and judicious decisions regarding complex problems” (Grodnick 2005, 395). Furthermore, it is not only that in this model citizens do not participate directly in political decision-making, but that the administration also needs to be granted a relatively autonomous position. Following the Habermasian path, it might be argued that communicative planning should not be practiced primarily inside bureaucracies but it should be focused on the discourses concerning the form and shape of planning systems and the general framework within which the public and private actors relevant to urban and regional development operate (cf. March 2012). This concept is of course compatible with communicative planning theorists’ ambitious aims to bring about institutional change, but it is incompatible with their attempts to bring about change through the direct involvement of stakeholders in political and administrative decision-making.

My view is that the adoption of the Habermasian macro-perspective would help the proponents of CPT to respond to the charges of their biased focus on “local events” and “the behavior of individuals” at the expense of structural constraints that restrict the potential of micro-practices to bring about progressive
change (cf. Fischler 2000, 360; Huxley and Yiftachel 2000). Inside the systemic context of action, communicative planners will always face the question as to what would motivate the actors to engage in understanding-oriented action when they can just as well resort to strategic action and strategic rationality. However, when we shift our attention to “anonymous consociates of law” who author the law, the likelihood of understanding-oriented communication at least increases, even if power and strategic action are surely empirically present in law-making processes as well. In this case, the place for deliberative democracy would be especially at the level of laying out the systemic framework for planning, not primarily in everyday planning practices.

2.7.2 Micro-perspective and the question concerning the internal democratization of administration

Although there are reasons to argue that Habermas’s *Between Facts and Norms* is not highly supportive of communicative and participatory forms of administration, there might also be another side to this work—a side that lends support to the notion of more concrete citizen participation. Although the task of solving complex technical problems suggests a relatively high degree of autonomy for administration, this autonomy needs to be compromised when the administration has to take a stand on normative questions (Grodnick 2005). The issue of normativity does not arise in the case of traditional model of separation of powers, a model that forms a point of departure for Habermas’s (1996, 186–193) analysis. According to this model, legislative tasks are reserved for the organized, formal bodies such as parliament, whereas courts of law take care of the application of law, and, finally, administrative bodies are responsible for the implementation of law (Habermas 1996, 186–193). This division of tasks implies that the success of legislative bodies is measured in terms of legitimacy, whereas the success of administrative bodies is assessed in terms of efficiency. Nonetheless, in modern, complex societies it is typical, as Habermas (1996) notes, that the branches of government cannot limit their functions so strictly; administrative bodies often need to take up tasks that “require the weighing of collective goods, the choice between competing goals, and the normative evaluation of individual cases” (p. 440).

In planning and administrative literature, these tasks are typically described in terms of administrative discretion (Kelly 2004). In the field of planning, discretion is needed because planning is a situated activity dealing with highly particular cases. Furthermore, administrative discretion cannot be avoided in planning given that planning is a future-oriented field, and this, in turn, means that legislatures cannot anticipate all those problems that will arise or change their form as time goes by (cf. Habermas 1996, 431). Habermas well recognizes the need for discretionary leeway in many forms of administration, planning included, and he now also argues that because of the normative dimension of discretionary power, administrative decision-making needs to be equipped with some kinds of “legitimation filters” and that administration should, after all, be subject to some kind of democratization from within (ibid., 440).

However, Habermas (1996) leaves it unspecified what this would mean in practice. He ponders “whether the participation of clients, the use of ombudspersons, quasi-juridical procedures, hearings, and the like, are appropriate for such a democratization, or whether other arrangements must be found [...]” (pp. 440–441). Most of the proponents of communicative planning would probably choose some “other arrangements”. After all, communicative planning theorists have typically been highly critical of such designs of participation that are based on public hearings or quasi-juridical processes, designs that easily end up encouraging individuals and groups to take interest-based positions rather than to orientate
themselves towards mutual understanding (Forester 2006, 21; Innes and Booher 2004; see also Kelly 2004). Nonetheless, this observation should not be taken to imply that CPT should turn its back to the legal and institutional contexts of planning; this observation should be taken to suggest that rather than trying to institutionalize communicative practices in the systemic contexts of planning via law, we should rather communicate binding legal norms at a more abstract level where it would be easier to orientate towards generalizable interests. As I would like to argue, local deliberations should not replace planning systems and planning legislation as a means to bring about more just planning processes or just cities. However, in the field of planning, some amount of discretion is required, and from this, it follows that micro-level communicative practices are needed as well.

Hence, the question remains what would be the “other arrangements” that are necessary if we wish to enhance communicative rationality in micro-scale planning contexts. All that Habermas (1996) has to say about these alternative arrangements in *Between Facts and Norms* is that they call for both “institutional imagination” and “cautious experimentation” (p. 41). The theorists of communicative planning have responded to this call and worked on novel institutional designs as well as on experimental arrangements of participation all through the years, leaning more or less on Habermas’s groundwork on deliberative democracy.

2.7.3 Future prospects: cyberspace, fragmentation of the public, and the integrative potential of rational deliberation

Seen from the point of view of Habermasian theory, a particularly interesting platform for experimenting with citizen participation in planning and for the creation of linkages between macro-scale deliberation and micro-scale participation in practice has been the internet. Even though neither Habermas nor the first generation of communicative planning theorists has been very active in exploring the potential of internet-based participation, the popularity of “e-participation” – as one part of “e-planning” – has grown immensely within the theory and practice of communicative or participatory planning recently. Internet-based participation goes beyond traditional ways in which the public has participated in public decision making, but it is not entirely clear yet what are the implications of e-participation for the traditional fora of political and governmental decision making.

Internet-based participation perhaps should not be characterised in itself as a specific form of participation or a model for organising communicative practices. The strength of the internet is rather that it seems to be able to host a myriad of different types of communicative processes. As such, the internet has been taken to have points of convergence with the Habermasian concept of the informal public sphere described in *Between Facts and Norms*. Given this, it is not surprising that the advent of the internet has been claimed to have triggered a revival of the Habermasian public sphere (Papacharissi 2008; Geiger 2009) or to have notably expanded the public sphere (Dahlgren 2005; Stromer-Galley and Wichowski 2011). E-participation in the field of planning provides some evidence of such revival: various types of fora have emerged to host discussions on planning-related themes, some of the fora having their origins in civil society, while others being designed and managed by public planning organisations, but still providing an open channel for various kinds of views and initiatives coming from the public.
Especially during the breakthrough of the internet-based discussion fora in the 1990s and early 2000s, many scholars argued that there are several reasons why the internet can be expected to foster Habermasian rational-deliberative, non-coercive discourses. To start with, internet is not a medium in a traditional meaning of the term, but a relatively decentralised, “rhizomatic”, non-hierarchical and global infrastructure capable of hosting numerous different media (Gimmler 2001; Heng and de Moor 2003; Dahlberg 2007b; Rasmussen 2014). As such, it should be able to resist relatively well commodification or colonization by any single government or company (Gimmler 2001). This, however, is not to say that governments and corporations would not have made attempts to gain control over cyberspace in reality (ibid.); on the contrary, they have, and they have even been quite successful in this at times.

Furthermore, internet provides a two-way communication channel that can be expected to encourage citizens to form, express and justify their opinions, instead of passively receiving judgements or views provided by media such as newspapers (Gimmler 2001; Dahlberg 2007a; Stromer-Galley and Wichowski 2011). Internet also fosters efficient use of information. For instance, governmental and administrative documents can be made available – and are typically also expected to be made available – for the public via internet. From this it follows that the public is increasingly able to scrutinize formal decision-making processes and form opinions through horizontal deliberation between citizens, being in this way often able to influence the formal decision-making processes (Gimmler 2001; Dahlberg 2007a).

Moreover, internet-based discussions are typically open to everyone and to all kinds of arguments, though discussion fora typically have some kinds of rules and moderation practices supporting the critical-rational nature of discussion (Dahlberg 2001; Heng and de Moor 2003). Internet also carries a potential of being an egalitarian space where the force of arguments matters more than the position of a speaker, given that internet-based fora typically enable speakers to present their arguments without revealing their backgrounds, their positions in society, or their identities (Dahlberg 2001; Geiger 2009; Heng and de Moor 2003).

However, by now it has become clear that the expectations that the scholars have had towards the critical-rational potential of internet-based discussions have been too optimistic in many respects (Stromer-Galley and Wichowski 2011). Especially the flexibilities in the presentation of self – even though having the advantages mentioned above – have made internet-based deliberation fora vulnerable to assaults targeted not only to certain views presented in discussions but also to the participants’ trust on the rational potential of online deliberation. A much-discussed case in point has been “trolling”, a concept referring to an activity wherein “trolls” first create trust by a false representation of self and then present controversial, confusing and disruptive claims with an intention to undermine the rational character of discussion altogether (Dahlberg 2001; see also Stromer-Galley and Wichowski 2011).

The problem of deception of identity is surely present also in the material-world discussions, although it is more severe in the context of cyberspace. Habermas touches upon this theme in The Theory of Communicative Action, where he discusses validity claims related to truthfulness or sincerity of a speaker. These claims are raised on the basis of speaker’s own experience, his or her subjective world, to which the speaker has “privileged access” (Habermas 1984, 15–16). Habermas well recognises that in many situations, speakers have an interest to conceal their experiences and intentions, and to resort to strategic action where such claims are not raised at all, but “simulated” at most (ibid., 21). In the context of internet-based discussions, in particular, the opportunities for bypassing authenticity claims are easily available.

51
Even though false presentation of self poses a problem for discursive testing of validity claims, communication is more than argumentative discourses; it can also be viewed in the context of action with which it is interwoven, just as Forester (1990), in particular, has emphasised. We can assess the expressions of self, for instance, by observing what kinds of consequences they have and whether they are consistent with the speaker’s behaviour (cf. Habermas 1984, 15). Yet, the question related to discussions in cyberspace is now whether communication and action form a continuum there in a same way as they do in face-to-face communication in the physical and material world, or does the virtual character of the cyberspace cut off some important dimensions of the pragmatic context of language use? Does the language-use in the internet-based fora have “binding” and “bonding” force in the same way that Habermas argues it to have in the face-to-face communication (cf. Habermas 1984, 302; 1987a, 77)? Does the context of cyberspace support the motivation of the citizens to enter into deliberative processes and foster their commitment to the results of such deliberations?

Empirical research on internet-based deliberation suggests no clear answers to these questions, but researchers have indicated that it is not easy to develop and sustain meaningful commitment to discussions in the internet-based fora, and that this is at least partly due to the fact that participants cannot be taken to be present in the cyberspace as contextually embedded and embodied subjects in the same way that they are present in face-to-face communication contexts (Dahlberg 2001). Even though the absence of “the constraints of materiality and physicality” has typically taken to be a strength as regards the potential of internet-based fora to advance Habermasian ideals of non-coercive deliberation (Geiger 2009), this very absence might also be its weakness. Participants in the internet-based deliberations have been observed not to reveal their selves to the same extent as they do in face-to-face communications, and also typically not to be committed to “listening respectfully” to other people’s experiences and needs (Dahlberg 2001; see also Stromer-Galley and Wichowski 2011).

Given all this, it is interesting that Habermas himself has turned from face-to-face communication-based theory to a theory of subjectless flow of reasons in Between Facts and Norms. Although Habermas’s theory might be an apt description of the reality of contemporary decentered societies – and perhaps also of communication in the internet-based deliberation fora that have been emerging after the publication of Habermas’s book – it has encountered criticism as a normative theory, as already discussed. One of the reasons for the criticism has been that it is difficult to see how the commitment of the citizens to deliberative processes could be sustained and supported if the citizens are no longer supposed to be engaged holistically in concrete and localised argumentative processes, as they still seemed to be in the theory of discourse ethics (Munro 2007). Regarding the question as to how to support the moral motivation of citizens, their willingness to reveal their true selves and to listen to others, traditional small-scale face-to-face participatory processes might have more “civilizing force” than the detached and fragmentary participation in the anonymous flows of communication portrayed by Habermas in Between Facts and Norms (ibid.).

Although Habermas has called for anonymous and subjectless flow of reasons in the public sphere, he has not been supportive of internet-based deliberation fora, the fact which has perhaps been a surprise for Habermasian proponents of internet-based deliberation (Geiger 2009). In one of the very few texts where he briefly discusses the role of the internet, he is notably skeptical of the potential of the internet to revitalize the public sphere (Habermas 2006). He states that while the internet has been useful mainly for
questioning censorship practiced by authoritarian regimes, in liberal democracies, the frailty of internet-based political discussion is that it furthers the fragmentation of the public into “isolated issue publics” (ibid.). Fragmentation of the public sphere has been a concern also for the empirical research on the internet-based discussions. Even though the internet provides a platform where one can encounter more social diversity than, say, in one’s own neighborhood or workplace, research has shown that people discussing in the web fora are often active in groups where the other speakers share their values and interests (Dahlberg 2001; Stromer-Galley and Wichowski 2011).

The proponents of agonistic pluralism have been, on one hand, welcoming the fragmentation of the online public, because they view the internet as a site of struggle and conflict, but on the other hand, their approval of fragmentation has not been unqualified, given that fragmentation often tends to be related to interest-group pluralism and individualist participation rather than to agonistic pluralism (Dahlberg 2007a; 2007b). Be that as it may, the proponents of agonistic online discussions, as they are defending marginalized discourses against hegemonic discourses, have pointed out that internet has proven to be a fertile ground for marginalized voices to be heard (ibid.). In this project of defending marginalized groups, they have drawn for instance on the concept of “counterpublics”, introduced originally by Nancy Fraser (1992) in her critique of Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere (Dahlberg 2007a; 2007b).

However, there is no reason why counterpublics could not be accommodated into Habermas’s revised version of the public sphere theory, too. In Between Facts and Norms Habermas credits Fraser for bringing to the fore the contestatory nature of the interaction in public sphere, accommodating then Fraser’s views into his own theory of informal public sphere. Disagreements in the public sphere – both in general sense and in the specific case of internet-based fora – should be more than welcome to Habermasians, too, because Habermas’s theory is not only about consensus-orientation, but also about communicative freedom, a form of freedom that means in one key respect, that there is a freedom to contest claims and challenge pre-established understandings. As such, Habermasian rational-critical deliberation should not only be described in terms of consensus; it can just as well be described as “an unending process of contestation” (Markell 1997, 378), or as a process “where the clash of opposing forces can move participants forward” (Chambers 1995, 172).

Where Habermasian internet public sphere theorists’ views differ from those of the proponents of agonistic pluralism, is that Habermasians expect some amount of convergence from the discourses in the public sphere, as they view the public sphere as the sphere of public opinion formation (cf. Geiger 2009). In contrast to that, the proponents of agonistic pluralism emphasise divergence. Agonists’ emphasis admittedly reflects the reality of internet-based discussions, and also the reality of contemporary politics in many western liberal democracies. Agonists such as Mouffe (2018) have welcomed even populist strategies, which seem to benefit from the fragmentation of the online public, even though it should be noted that Mouffe defends populism only in a procedural sense, while firmly denouncing the contents of right-wing populist movements. Mouffe’s sympathies towards the strategy of populists to lean on affects, sharpen division lines and create frontiers have encountered criticism, however, for instance on the grounds that in those states or countries that are already sharply divided, Mouffean strategy could eradicate the possibility of discussion altogether, and strengthen antagonisms instead of agonism (Longo 2018). That is of course not what her theory purports to do.
Nonetheless, in regard to the question concerning the internet and the fragmentation of the public, some Habermasian proponents of internet-based deliberation have suggested that the problem of internet-based deliberation might not be in the end fragmentation, but integration (Geiger 2009). This is because the mechanisms through which the “trending” opinions are retrieved are often based on algorithms rather than on discussion today (ibid.). This is a technocratic version of such an aggregative model against which Habermas’s deliberative theory is leveled. The observation that “public opinions” are generated in one way or another, no matter how much diversity there is in our opinions, could then be taken to imply the argument that rather than to leave the processes of public opinion formation to technocratic forces, we as scholars and as citizens should be concerned with potential convergencies in opinions, too, and make efforts to develop the institutional design of discursive public opinion formation in macro-scale – with or without modern information technology.

3 Concluding remarks

This study of the Habermasian roots of the CPT has aimed at providing replies to various criticisms encountered by Habermasian CPT, and at establishing a more nuanced and multifaceted picture of Habermas’s philosophical project than the one implied by the recent decades’ discourses in planning theory. At the same time, the aim has been to establish a more versatile picture of CPT, the representatives of which have diverged greatly in their uses of Habermasian theory. In an attempt to bring to the fore the variegated aspects of Habermas’s philosophy and Habermasian-inspired CPT, the monograph began with the differentiation between the explanatory-diagnostic and anticipatory-utopian dimension in Habermas’s thought (cf. Benhabib 1986). Thus far, the critics of CPT have emphasized especially the anticipatory-utopian dimensions underlying Habermas’s theory. Some proponents of communicative planning, as well, seem to have disregarded the views that Habermas has presented of the frustration of emancipatory potential of communicative reason in late-capitalist states. These views, however, have still considerable explanatory potential when it comes to the challenge of analyzing the actual distortions involved in communicative practices aiming to influence the steering of contemporary societies. This becomes clear from many of the works by John Forester and Tore Sager.

Moreover, the study has re-examined the much-discussed anticipatory-utopian dimensions of Habermas’s work. The aim has been to shed light on the theoretical background and the philosophical nature of the much-criticized counterfactual ideals provided by Habermas’s philosophy. These ideals underpin Habermas’s theories of communicative action and discourse ethics in particular. The key representatives of the CPT have differing relations to these ideals. As John Forester has argued, the aim of CPT was never to directly introduce these ideals to real planning discourses, but rather to employ these ideals as yardsticks with which to measure the degree of rationality in our real planning practices and also to estimate the capacity of our planning system to deliver rational solutions in the long term. Nonetheless, the mere evaluation of the past decisions would not alone take planning towards a more progressive or emancipatory direction; the Habermasian “regulative ideal” of rationally motivated consensus has undoubtedly served also as an anticipatory-utopian ideal for most of the theorists of communicative planning. This is the case with Patsy Healey, Judith Innes and Tore Sager, even though Healey and Innes have later distanced themselves from this ideal, and based their institutional designs supportive of consensus-building on other sources than Habermasian ones. Forester has never explicitly abandoned Habermasian ideals, but he has innovatively moved from Habermasian ideals to the use of the theory of
communicative action – and especially its roots in Austinian speech act theory – for the analysis of everyday planning practice, including the power-relations shaping this practice.

The contemporary debates over communicative planning have largely revolved around the theme of pluralism, and the implications of pluralism on the democratic processes. The monograph at hand has aimed to indicate that pluralism has been a point of departure for CPT and that also Habermas has devoted a considerable amount of attention to the theme of pluralism already in his project of discourse ethics, where he conjoins universalism to the “thick” conception of reasoning moral subjects. Furthermore, and even more importantly, diversity and pluralism are a central starting point for Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy and public sphere in his latest major work Between Facts and Norms.

The question that still forms a division line between Habermasian theory and its main opponents – the proponents of agonistic pluralism in politics and planning – is whether there are rational grounds from which convergence in our views concerning normative questions could arise. For Habermas, this question is ultimately tied to the fate of human species: “If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination has to be established through communication – and in certain central spheres through communication aimed at reaching agreement – then the reproduction of the species also requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality that is inherent in communicative action”, Habermas (1984, 397) writes in his Theory of Communicative Action (emphasis in the original text).

Most of the questions in the field of planning are less dramatic than the question of the survival of human species, but some of the questions – such as those related to the role of planning vis-a-vis climate change – are becoming increasingly pressing and demand for resolution. Given that the political realities in many western liberal democracies at the moment are fragmented to the extent that coordination of collective action is often at the verge of being paralyzed, it might be the time to reconsider the potential of Habermasian approaches in political theory and planning. While the agonistic project of promoting diversity and alternatives is of merit even when seen through the Habermasian lens, the question is whether and how we should proceed from the recognition of diversity, pluralism and disagreement – a question that has been largely left unanswered in the theories of agonistic politics and planning.

Some agonists such as Chantal Mouffe have moved closer to Habermasian positions in recent years, though. Mouffe has clarified, for instance, that she as well thinks that dissensus or disagreement cannot alone characterize all our political actions, but some kinds of consensuses are needed at least pertaining to “the institutions that are constitutive of liberal democracy” (Mouffe 2013, 8). Institutional level is, of course, in the focus of Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy as well, as this study has aimed to indicate. However, given that agonistic theory does not put trust in the concept of rational deliberation, it remains unclear how these consensuses should be formed in the agonistic view. Proponents of agonistic pluralism do not provide constructive models for that.

Unlike the theory of agonistic pluralism, Habermasian theory – with its reliance on rationality – is able to provide constructive elements. Traditionally, planners have expected of planning theory both frameworks for critical analysis of the existing conditions of planning and constructive visions with which do develop the practice. Habermasian theory still fulfills these two-folded expectations better than its alternatives. Furthermore, Habermasian approach – in its explanatory and diagnostic dimension – is relevant for
planning theory even in the case that we would no longer expect planning theory to have a constructive and future-oriented role. Surely there are theorists who would be willing to give up the constructive dimension of planning theory altogether. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether we could speak about planning theory at all in the case that we strip of the constructive theoretical elements and settle with criticism only.

References


