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Grain export restrictions during COVID-19 risk food insecurity in many low- and middle-income countries

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Supplementary Information

Safeguard global supply chains to protect food security during the COVID-19 pandemic

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SI-1: Materials and Methods

SI-1.1: Data

We use annual world wheat, rice and maize production as well as domestic consumption data from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service's Production, Supply and Distribution (PSD)¹ database over the time period 1975-2018. For the agricultural year 2019/2020, we use estimates published in the USDA's World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) report². Further, annual forecasts from the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2019-2028 report (OECD-FAO, 2019) are used to project world production, consumption and ending-stock for the agricultural year 2020/2021. Annual nominal world market price for US hard red winter wheat, Thai 5% rice and maize are taken from the Commodity Markets online database "pink sheet" of the World Bank³, and real prices are obtained by deflating with the US All Urban Consumers price index (June 1983=100) provided by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics⁴. Further, for the calculations of historic year-to-year variations in production and stock-to-use, as well as share of export and production, we use country-level data of production, domestic consumption and exports from the PSD database.

For country level commodity supply balances, we require data on country-to-country trade as well as country level production and reserves. First, we identify a list of 195 countries for our analyses given in Supplementary Table 1.

Afghanistan	Ghana	Nicaragua
Albania	Guinea	Netherlands
Netherlands Antilles	Gambia	Norway
Aruba	Guinea-Bissau	Nepal

Supplementary Table 1	List of the 195 countries included in the	"Impaired Supply" analyses.
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¹<u>https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/app/index.html#/app/advQuery</u>, accessed April 2020

² WASDE-599 published 9 April 2020 <u>https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/3t945q76s?</u> <u>locale=en#release-items</u>

³ <u>http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-market</u> accessed April 2020

⁴ <u>https://www.bls.gov</u> accessed April 2020

United Arab Emirates	Equatorial Guinea	New Zealand
Argentina	Greece	Oman
Armenia	Grenada	Pakistan
Antigua and Barbuda	Greenland	Panama
Australia	Guatemala	Peru
Austria	Guyana	Philippines
Azerbaijan	Hong Kong SAR, China	Papua New Guinea
Burundi	Honduras	Poland
Belgium	Croatia	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Benin	Haiti	Portugal
Burkina Faso	Hungary	Paraguay
Bangladesh	Indonesia	Occupied Palestinian Territory
Bulgaria	India	French Polynesia
Bahrain	Ireland	Qatar
Bahamas	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Romania
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Iraq	Russian Federation
Belarus	Iceland	Rwanda
Belize	Israel	Saudi Arabia
Bermuda	Italy	Sudan
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Jamaica	Senegal
Brazil	Jordan	Singapore
Barbados	Japan	Solomon Islands
Brunei Darussalam	Kazakhstan	Sierra Leone
Bhutan	Кепуа	El Salvador
Botswana	Kyrgyzstan	Somalia
Central African Republic	Cambodia	Serbia
Canada	Kiribati	South Sudan

Switzerland	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Sao Tome and Principe
Chile	Republic of Korea	Suriname
China (mainland)	Kuwait	Slovakia
Cote d Ivoire	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Slovenia
Cameroon	Lebanon	Sweden
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Liberia	Swaziland
Congo	Libya	Seychelles
Cook Islands	Saint Lucia	Syrian Arab Republic
Colombia	Sri Lanka	Chad
Comoros	Lesotho	Тодо
Cape Verde	Lithuania	Thailand
Costa Rica	Luxembourg	Tajikistan
Cuba	Latvia	Turkmenistan
Cyprus	Macao SAR, China	Timor-Leste
Czech Republic	Morocco	Tonga
Germany	Republic of Moldova	Trinidad and Tobago
Djibouti	Madagascar Tunisia	
Dominica	Maldives	Turkey
Denmark	Mexico	Tuvalu
Dominican Republic	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Taiwan
Algeria	Mali	United Republic of Tanzania
Ecuador	Malta	Uganda
Egypt	Myanmar	Ukraine
Eritrea	Montenegro	Uruguay
Spain	Mongolia	United States of America
Estonia	Mozambique	Uzbekistan
Ethiopia	Mauritania	Saint Vincent and the

		Grenadines
Finland	Mauritius	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Fiji	Malawi	Vietnam
France	Malaysia	Vanuatu
Faroe Islands	Namibia	Yemen
Gabon	New Caledonia	South Africa
United Kingdom	Niger	Zambia
Georgia	Nigeria	Zimbabwe

For trade data of these countries, we use the bilateral trade matrix data (referred to as "detailed trade matrix" export data) from FAOSTAT, which is the online statistical database of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT)⁵. Additionally, we use country level production data from FAOSTAT⁶ and reserves data from the PSD database⁷. For all of these datasets, we focus on the period 2015 to 2017, because the year 2017 is the latest bilateral trade data available through FAOSTAT. Thus, we compute our baseline conditions for trade, production, and reserves by averaging over this three-year period to smooth out year-to-year fluctuations in the trade and production data.

As for the world-level balances, we also consider three groups of commodities – wheat, rice, and maize – for the supply balances at the country level. The commodities in the wheat group include: *wheat*, *flour of wheat*, *macaroni*, *germ of wheat*, *bread*, *bulgur*, and *pastry*. For the maize group, we include: *maize*, *germ of maize*, *flour of maize*, *maize oil*, and *green maize*. For rice, we include: *paddy rice*, *husked rice*, *milled/husked rice*, *rice milled*, *rice broken*, *rice bran oil*, and *rice flour*. The values for each of the commodities in these groups are aggregated after converting units from metric tons to kilocalories (FAO, 2001). We note that if there are discrepancies in the trade values, harmonization is needed. To do this, we average the exports between countries based on reported exports and reported imports, unless one was reported as zero; in that case, we used the non-zero reported value (Konar et al. 2011; Puma et al. 2015).

⁵ Version date: 10 September 2019, <u>http://www.fao.org/faostat/_</u>accessed May 2020

⁶ Version date: 04 March 2020, <u>http://www.fao.org/faostat/</u> accessed May 2020

⁷ file "psd_grains_pulses.csv", <u>https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/app/index.html#/app/downloads</u> accessed May 2020

We use the end-of-year reserves data from the PSD database for wheat, rice, and maize (referred to as "corn" in this database), also converting to kilocalories. In the PSD database, only aggregated data is available for European Union (EU); we therefore divide reserves among EU countries in proportion to each country's share of EU production (Marchand et al. 2016).

SI-1.2: Supply-Demand Model

We use the global Trade WIth STorage (TWIST) model, which is a dynamic agent based supply-demand model including producer and consumer storage (Schewe et al. 2017). It simulates year-to-year variations on the global grain market driven by supply and demand and changes in stocks. We assume that all produced grains are traded at a single common global market, and we model the annual world market export price of wheat, rice and maize. We calibrated the model for each crop individually and extended it to include exogenous production declines.

SI-1.2.1: Baseline

The baseline price for 2020/2021 is calculated by prescribing both production and consumption between 1975 and 2021. For the period 1975-2019, we use available USDA data and, for the agricultural year 2020/2021, we combine it with the projections published in the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2019-2028 report. We extend the time series to the agricultural year 2020 by first calculating the projected relative change in production and consumption (2020 projection divided by 2019 values) and then multiplying the projected relative change with the values of year 2019/2020 of the USDA data. This computation creates a self-consistent time series for the whole period 1975-2020. The reason we use FAO projections is that USDA only provides estimates of the next agricultural year, which as of April 2020 only include 2019/2020. FAO provide one-decade long projections, which is the reason we use their estimate for 2020/2021.

SI-1.2.2: Export restrictions

From a world-market perspective, export restrictions effectively make part of the total supply unavailable for international trade. In our model, this can be represented by temporarily withholding parts of the producer-side stocks from the world supply function. The size of the export ban is based on the production share of major exporters. We lower the available global producer-side stocks by a fraction of the production from selected countries (Supplementary Table 2). We lower the producer-side stocks by the total share of a specific country; this represents a complete export ban, effective for the whole market year. We assume that the country imposing an export ban is able to satisfy domestic demand. That is, the country does not import any grains while the ban is effective, and the consumer demand of the country is fulfilled by direct domestic consumption. We simulate this by lowering the world demand by the share of total consumption (Supplementary Table 2) for the country imposing an export ban. After trade has taken place and the equilibrium price has been calculated for the given time step, we reduce the producer-side storage by the absolute consumption of the country imposing export restrictions, to account for direct domestic consumption.

In this paper, we consider three major exporters that have historically imposed export restrictions for each commodity. For wheat, the countries are Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan; for rice, they are: Vietnam, Thailand and India; and, for maize, they are Ukraine, Argentina and Brazil. (see Supplementary Table 2 for details about the applied limits to world supply and demand for the export simulations.)

Country	Commodity	World supply	World demand
Kazakhstan	Wheat	-1.9%	-0.9%
Ukraine	Wheat	-3.4%	-1.2%
Russia	Wheat	-9.8%	-5.5%
Russia and Ukraine	Wheat	-13.2%	-6.7%
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan	Wheat	-15.1%	-7.6%
Vietnam	Rice	-5.6%	-4.4%
Thailand	Rice	-4%	-2.4%
India	Rice	-23.3%	-20.4%
Vietnam and Thailand	Rice	-9.6%	-6.8%
Vietnam, Thailand and India	Rice	-32.9%	-27.2%
Ukraine	Maize	-3.2%	-0.5%
Argentina	Maize	-4.5%	-1.2%
Brazil	Maize	-9%	-6%
Ukraine and Argentina	Maize	-7.7%	-1.7%
Ukraine, Argentina and Brazil	Maize	-16.7%	-7.7%

Supplementary Table 2 | Exporters share of world production and domestic consumption. Values for the selected export countries that are applied to the supply-demand model to simulate export bans for

different scenarios. The values are derived from USDA data (see Supplementary Tables 14-16 for further information).

SI-1.2.3: Production decline

We account for production declines by reducing the projected world production in the agricultural year 2020/2021 by a hypothetical, yet plausible amount. The production declines are defined as the 20th or 5th percentile of the year-to-year change in production during 2000-2019 for countries restricting exports and countries affected by the locust infestation, respectively. The change in production is calculated by dividing the production of a given year with the production of the previous year. The 20th percentile is chosen as a representative value of a bad weather event, which happens on average every 5 years. The 5th percentile is assumed to represent an extreme production failure, of the frequency of one in every 20 years. The country level production declines are used to calculate the impaired domestic supply (cf. Sec. SI-1.3) for the production loss scenarios (Supplementary Table 3). In the demand-supply model, we use the aggregated world production declines. These declines are calculated by scaling the domestic production decline by the country's share of total world production in 2018/2019 (Supplementary Table 4).

Country	Commodity	Percentile	Domestic production decline	Domestic share of world production	Corresponding World production decline
Kazakhstan	Wheat	20th	-18.18%	1.91%	-0.35%
Russia	Wheat	20th	-7.68%	9.80%	-0.75%
Ukraine	Wheat	20th	-20.50%	3.43%	-0.70%
Ethiopia	Wheat	5th	-8.74%	0.66%	-0.06%
Iran	Wheat	5th	-10.24%	1.98%	-0.20%
Kenya	Wheat	5th	-49.16%	0.05%	-0.02%
Pakistan	Wheat	5th	-9.76%	3.43%	-0.34%
Saudi Arabia	Wheat	5th	-44.83%	0.07%	-0.03%
Yemen	Wheat	5th	-23.35%	0.02%	0.00%
India	Rice	20th	-1.92%	23.34%	-0.45%
Thailand	Rice	20th	-2.10%	4.08%	-0.09%

Vietnam	Rice	20th	-0.12%	5.48%	-0.01%
Iran	Rice	5th	-18.33%	0.40%	-0.07%
Kenya	Rice	5th	-34.25%	0.02%	-0.01%
Pakistan	Rice	5th	-19.70%	1.46%	-0.29%
Argentina	Maize	20th	-11.90%	4.54%	-0.54%
Brazil	Maize	20th	-13.28%	8.99%	-1.19%
Ukraine	Maize	20th	-8.78%	3.19%	-0.28%
Ethiopia	Maize	5th	-13.01%	0.74%	-0.10%
Iran	Maize	5th	-29.75%	0.11%	-0.03%
Kenya	Maize	5th	-15.21%	0.36%	-0.05%
Pakistan	Maize	5th	-7.17%	0.54%	-0.04%
Saudi Arabia	Maize	5th	-52.81%	0.01%	-0.004%
Somalia	Maize	5th	-48.44%	0.01%	-0.004%
Yemen	Maize	5th	-25.18%	0.004%	-0.001%

Supplementary Table 3 | Production decline in export and locust threatened countries. Size of domestic production decline for the selected exporters (green) with 20th percentile decline and locust threatened countries (yellow) with 5th percentile decline, based on the year-to-year variation in production in the period 2000-2019. The corresponding world production decline of individual countries is calculated by scaling the domestic decline with their world production share. The country's share of total world production is calculated for the production in 2018/2019.

Country selection	Commodity	Aggregated global shock
All exporters	Wheat	-1.80%
All locust threatened	Wheat	-0.65%
Complete combined shock	Wheat	-2.45%
All exporters	Rice	-0.54%
All locust threatened	Rice	-0.37%
Complete combined shock	Rice	-0.91%

All exporters	Maize	-2.01%
All locust threatened	Maize	-0.22%
Complete combined shock	Maize	-2.23%

Supplementary Table 4 | Aggregate world decline: Sum of the world production decline of the 3 selected export countries (green), the locust threatened countries (yellow) and all countries (white) listed in Supplementary Table 3.

SI-1.2.4: Import policies

Changes in import strategies can result from increases in supply and demand. Importing countries attempting to restock or increase their inventories would increase the demand, but strategic or significant stock reductions by certain countries would decrease the demand. We represent major changes in consumer-side buying/selling behavior as changes of the consumer-side "target" inventory level. This changes the steepness of the demand curve and an increase in target inventory level results in a higher equilibrium price if the supply curve remains constant. We assume an 80th percentile increase in the stock-to-use (S/U) ratio with regard to the period 2000-2019. The stock-to-use ratio is calculated as ending stocks divided by the domestic consumption (see Supplementary Table 5 for the adopted values for wheat, rice and maize).

Commodity	Percentile	World S/U increase
Wheat	80th	9.82%
Rice	80th	7.02%
Maize	80th	10.58%


Supplementary Table 5 | Increased world demand: World increase in stock-to-use based on the year-to-year variation for the period 2000-2019.

SI-1.2.5: Simulated wheat, rice and maize world market price


We compute the world market export price for 14 different scenarios for each commodity (wheat, rice, maize). For the scenarios, the impact (export restrictions, production decline and change in import policies) are all applied to the agricultural year 2020/2021, and the simulated price in 2020/2021 is compared to the baseline price in the same year (cf. Sec. SI-1.2.1). We thus calculate the change in price compared to the unperturbed baseline projection, which does not consider any effects related to the

pandemic. Among the 14 scenarios there are two accounting for production declines only, one with increased import only, five with export bans only, and six combined scenarios with at least two impacts (export bans with production decline and/or increased demand). The production decline scenarios consist of 1) a 1-in-20-year production failure in locust threatened countries together with a 1-in-5-year in export countries, Supplementary Table 4 (see Sec. SI-1.2.3) and 2) an extreme world production decline "worst case" corresponding to a 5th percentile (1-in-20-year) decline in world production based on the reported values for 2000-2019 (Sec. SI-2.2.3, Supplementary Table 18). The change in import policy only scenario is based on a 1-in-5-year increase in S/U (Sec. SI-1.2.4, Supplementary Table 5). The export ban only scenarios are based on the values in Supplementary Table 2, and include both, the impact of individual countries and combinations of two or three countries. The combined scenarios consist of export restrictions of two or three countries, together with either production decline or increased S/U or both together, in a total of 6 different combinations.


The change in price for wheat, rice and maize is given in Supplementary Figures 1, 2 and 3, respectively, and the dashed lines indicate the observed price change during the 2007/08 and 2010/11 food price crises, computed from annual real prices (Sec. SI-2.3). Overall, the price increases for all three commodities, but to different degrees. A production decline in isolation is not enough to cause severe changes in price levels (max. 12% increase). The same applies to policy changes where increases in import (increase of target S/U levels) take place. The effects of export bans get increasingly severe when more countries are included, and the cumulative effects can be very high. Also, the impacts are not linear, meaning that the price increases more if two countries impose export bans at the same time than adding up the price increase of t12.4% or 29.1%, respectively, but export bans of Ukraine and Russia at the same time leads to a change of 45.8%. Largest price increases are seen when there are multiple impacts in the same year (purple and blue bars in Supplementary Figures 1-3).



Supplementary Figure 1 | Change in wheat price. Estimated scenario prices compared to the baseline price for 14 different scenarios. The results are grouped in 3 categories. *Orange/red bars*: Simulations with only decrease in production or increase in stock-to-use ratio, first bar: combined world shock (cf. Supplementary Table 4), second bar: a 5th percentile total world production decline (cf. Supplementary Table 18), third: 80th percentile increase of stock-to-use ratio (cf. Supplementary Table 5). *Green bars*: Export restrictions only for individual/multiple countries (see labels in figure for country specifications). *Purple/blue bars*: Multiple combined shock scenarios. The size of the shocks is given below the bars. The dashed lines indicate the price changes during the previous world food price crises (see text for details).



Supplementary Figure 2 | Change in rice price. See caption of Supplementary Figure 1 for further details about the scenarios.



Supplementary Figure 3 | Change in maize price. See caption of Supplementary Figure 1 for further details about the scenarios.

SI-1.2.6: Caveats of simulated prices

The prices are modeled on an annual basis and are average yearly prices. This means that short-term price changes are averaged out and that the most extreme price changes may not be reproduced. Another limitation of the simulated scenario prices is that the export bans are activated for one timestep, i.e., one full year. We limit the amount of supply available for trade at the international market by the production share for the given country/countries; that is, a complete export ban for 12 months. The country's harvest and domestic reserve is not available for trade in the selected timestep. This is in some cases not completely realistic, since many countries impose only partial export restrictions and not complete bans, and it is also common that export bans are only active for a few months at a time. Our simulated price changes should therefore be regarded as upper limits of the possible impact on price changes during one year.

SI-1.3: Impaired Supply

To complement the global level supply-demand analyzes with the TWIST model, we examine the supply balances at the country level for the export-restriction and production-decline scenarios described in Secs.1.2.2 and 1.2.3, respectively. We consider the annual food balance in kilocalories for each country as

$$S = P + I - E + R$$

where S is domestic supply, *P* is production, *I* is imports, *E* is exports, and *R* represents reserves. (Note: To estimate consumption over some time period (here, a 3-year window), we assume that the reserve level remains constant.)

For the scenarios with productions declines and export restrictions, we can then easily estimate the "impaired supply." For a country imposing export restrictions, we set all values in the row corresponding to that country in the export matrix to zero. Thus, partner countries will experience loss of imports from that exporter. In the case of production declines, supply will be directly impacted as described by the mass-balance equation above (import and export remain constant). We consider two indicators for assessing the country level impacts of the different scenarios: 1) the ratio of supply with production losses to initial supply and 2) the ratio of supply with production losses and export restrictions to initial supply.

SI-1.3.1: Domestic reserves and decline of Impaired Supply

The impact of domestic production losses and/or decline in imports due to exterior export bans depends on how import dependent a country is, the share of domestic crop production and the size of the grain reserves. Looking at declines in domestic supply due to production failures only (Supplementary Tables 6-8), a country like Ethiopia, which has a relatively large share of domestic production and low reserves, is especially vulnerable. If Ethiopia would face a 1-in-20-years production decline of 7% (13%) in wheat (maize) they would need to increase their import to compensate and which would increase their dependence on the world market price and trade accessibility. Saudi Arabia would, on the other hand, have sufficient reserves to cover a 1-in-20-year production decline. This is due to the fact that Saudi Arabia import 80%, 100% and 99% of their wheat, rice and maize, respectively. Another example is Kenya, which imports 83%, 81% and 10% of their wheat, rice and maize, respectively, and would only need to increase imports of maize since their reserves only cover 57% of the change in supply due to a 1-in-20-year harvest failure. The value of the resulting change in impaired supply due to production loss for the three major exporters and the locus threatened countries, as well as the ratio of decline in impaired supply to reserves, are given in Supplementary Tables 6 (wheat), 7 (rice) and 8 (maize). The ratio shows which countries have reserves large enough to cover the change in supply. A value of 100% means that the supply deficit and reserves are equal in size, and a value above 100% means that the country's reserve is smaller than the supply deficit. Several of the major export countries would not have reserves large enough to cover the decline due to a 1-in-5-year production failure, but since they export a large share of their production (Supplementary Tables 14-16) they have the possibility to decrease their export in order to ensure that the domestic demand is met.

When export bans are put in place by major exporters (wheat: Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, rice: India, Vietnam and Thailand, maize: Brazil, Argentina and Ukraine) 145, 176 and 155 out of 195 countries experience a negative change in their supply for wheat, rice and maize, respectively. However, most countries are not severely impacted and only 3, 37 and 18 countries would experience a decline of their impaired supply by more than 50 percent in wheat, rice and maize, respectively (Supplementary Table 9). The decline in supply can be compensated by either releasing grains from their domestic reserves or increasing imports. In order to check how many countries would be dependent on international import we look at the size of the domestic reserves and whether they are large enough to cover the decline in supply. Out of the 195 countries included in this analysis 127, 70, and 113 countries have reported values of wheat, rice, and maize reserves, respectively. Out of these, 35%, 34% and 32% of the countries have too little reserves to completely compensate for the decline in supply of wheat, rice and maize, respectively. The majority of these countries are low- and middle-income countries and Africa and Asia account for the largest share (Supplementary Table 9). We use country income classification based on gross national income (GNI) per capita for the 2020 fiscal year, published by the World Bank to categorize the countries⁸ (Supplementary Tables 11-13). Supplementary Tables 11-13 contain country specific values for the change in impaired supply and its ratio to domestic reserves. The countries are grouped into three categories, i) focus countries (selected exporters and locust threatened countries (Sec. SI-3)), ii) countries which experience more than 50% decline in imports due to export bans but have large enough reserves and iii) countries which have too small reserves to buffer a potential shock in supply. In general, the countries which have a weak import dependence (import is < 20% of domestic supply) and experience no domestic harvest failure are more secure if sudden export bans are imposed, since they have enough reserves or domestic production to cover any short-term decline in import. Many countries which have high shares of imports would not have enough reserves to compensate for declines in imports due to export bans (Supplementary Tables 11-13). Ecuador is an exception in the sense that even though they only import 4.3% of their maize supply, they would not be able to buffer a decline in imports by 68.5% because their reserves are extremely small. Also vulnerable to sudden export bans are countries with a small supplier base. For example, Kyrgyzstan imports 27% of its wheat and 99% of these imports come from Russia and Kazakhstan. This means that the country

⁸ World Bank database <u>https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups</u> accessed June 2020. "For the current 2020 fiscal year, low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the <u>World Bank Atlas method</u>, of \$1,025 or less in 2018; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between \$1,026 and \$3,995; upper middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between \$3,996 and \$12,375; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of \$12,376 or more."

would experience an almost complete import stop, and they would not have enough reserves to buffer such a decline in imports.

The sensitivity of a country's food supply to production failures or export bans depends on the country's own production share and its import dependence. If there are periods of extensive export bans, then it is a burden to be dependent on imports since the world market price will increase (Sec. SI-1.2.5) or it might be difficult to import the amount needed at all if a substantial fraction of the world supply is not available for international trade. On the other hand, if a county has a very large share of domestic production and would experience large scale harvest failures, then this would result in an immediate decline in supply, which of course could be mitigated by increased imports. In many case, domestic reserves have the possibility to mitigate sudden decline in supply and can make the country less sensitive to both domestic and international supply shocks.

Country	Change in production due to production decline	Change in Impaired Supply due to P loss (fraction)	Change in Impaired Supply due to P Ioss (kcal)	Reserves (kcal)	Exports (kcal)	Ratio of decline in Impaired Supply to Reserves
Kazakhstan	-18.18%	-23.90%	-1.61E+13	5.97E+12	2.16E+13	269.40%
Russian Federation	-7.68%	-10.23%	-2.58E+13	3.13E+13	8.57E+13	82.45%
Ukraine	-20.50%	-39.78%	-2.25E+13	4.52E+12	5.33E+13	496.77%
Ethiopia	-8.74%	-7.65%	-1.86E+12	1.54E+12	1.38E+10	120.82%
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	-10.24%	-9.54%	-6.67E+12	2.28E+13	9.93E+11	29.29%
Kenya	-49.16%	-8.56%	-5.93E+11	6.06E+11	2.60E+10	97.94%
Pakistan	-9.76%	-9.94%	-1.14E+13	9.37E+12	2.20E+12	121.66%
Saudi Arabia	-44.83%	-8.98%	-1.21E+12	1.03E+13	4.17E+11	11.80%
Yemen	-23.35%	-1.29%	-1.46E+11	1.35E+12	3.63E+09	10.82%

Supplementary Table 6 | Result of impaired supply calculations for wheat with production losses. Applied values of wheat production decline in selected countries (Sec. SI-1.2.3) and the resulting change in impaired supply due to production losses (given in percent and kcal) and domestic reserves. The last column shows the ratio of the decline in supply (due to production losses and export bans) to the domestic reserve. Data Source: FAOSTAT.

Country	production dueImpairedImpairedto productionSupply due to PSupply due tdeclineloss (fraction)loss (kcal)		Supply due to P	Reserves (kcal)	Exports (kcal)	Ratio of decline in Impaired Supply to Reserves
India	-1.92%	-2.06%	-1.11E+13	1.05E+14	3.87E+13	10.57%
Thailand	-2.10%	-3.08%	-2.25E+12	1.40E+13	3.43E+13	16.06%
Viet Nam	-0.12%	-0.13%	-1.73E+11	3.84E+12	1.52E+13	4.50%
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	-18.83%	-12.60%	-1.60E+12	2.06E+12	3.15E+09	77.66%
Kenya	-34.25%	-6.37%	-1.65E+11	3.23E+11	4.76E+08	51.19%
Pakistan	-19.70%	-31.06%	-7.38E+12	3.70E+12	1.37E+13	199.41%

Supplementary Table 7 | Result of impaired supply calculations for rice with production losses. Applied values of rice production decline in selected countries (Sec. SI-1.2.3) and the resulting change in impaired supply due to production losses (given in percent and kcal) and domestic reserves. The last column shows the ratio of the decline in supply (due to production losses and export bans) to the domestic reserve. Data Source: FAOSTAT.

Country	Change in production due to production decline			Reserves (kcal)	Exports (kcal)	Ratio of decline in Impaired Supply to Reserves	
Argentina	-11.90%	-21.92%	-1.97E+13	1.09E+13	7.60E+13	181.87%	
Brazil	-13.28%	-17.42%	-4.65E+13	2.24E+13	8.88E+13	207.96%	
Ukraine	-8.78%	-21.70%	-9.29E+12	4.28E+12	6.32E+13	217.00%	
Ethiopia	-13.01%	-13.01%	-4.67E+12	2.94E+12	3.89E+10	158.63%	
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	-29.75%	-4.63%	-1.50E+12	4.59E+12	3.58E+10	32.78%	
Kenya	-15.21%	-13.76%	-3.15E+12	1.79E+12	2.37E+10	175.57%	

Pakistan	-7.17%	-7.19%	-1.81E+12	3.20E+12	1.99E+11	56.50%
Saudi Arabia	-52.81%	-1.12%	-1.41E+11	2.72E+12	2.42E+11	5.16%
Somalia	-48.44%	-45.43%	-3.74E+11	not reported	1.32E+07	n/a
Yemen	-25.18%	-3.11%	-7.58E+10	9.37E+10	1.02E+10	80.91%

Supplementary Table 8 | **Result of impaired supply calculations for maize with production losses.** Applied values of maize production decline in selected countries (Sec. SI-1.2.3) together with the resulting change in impaired supply (due to production losses (given in percent and kcal) and domestic reserves. The last column shows the ratio of the decline in supply (due to production losses and export bans) to the domestic reserve. Data Source: FAOSTAT.

Commodity	Number of countries	Number of countries with decline in imparied supply due to export bans and P loss	Number of countries with a decline >50%	Number of countries with a decline >33.3%	Number of countries with a decline >25%
Wheat	195	145	3	20	33
Rice	195	175	37	58	68
Maize	195	155	18	30	34

Supplementary Table 9 | Number of countries experiencing a decline in supply. Total number of countries included in the analysis of the FAOSTAT data (see Sec. SI-1.3) and number of countries which experience a decline in impaired supply due to export bans and production losses. Listed is also the number of countries with a decline of more than half, a third and a quarter of their supply. Data source: FAOSTAT.

Commodity	Number of countries		Number of countries with reported value of reserve	Number of countries where decline in impaired supply due to P loss and export ban > reserves	Share of African countries	Share of Asian countries	Share of South American countries	Share of European countries	Share of low-income countries	Share of lower-middle-income countries	Share of upper-middle-income countries	Share of high-income countries
Wheat		195	127	44	45.5%	31.8%	6.8%	15.9%	27.3%	31.8%	20.5%	20.5%
Rice		195	70	24	41.7%	45.8%	0%	12.5%	21%	25%	29.2%	25%
Maize		195	113	36	22.2%	44.4%	16.7%	16.7%	8.3%	25%	30.6%	26.1%

Supplementary Table 10 | Share of countries in different world part and with different income level that experience a decline in supply. Total number of countries included in the analysis of the FAOSTAT data (Sec. SI-1.3), number of countries which have reported values of reserves and the total number of countries which cannot buffer a supply shock due to production losses and export restrictions (Supplementary Tables 11-13). Columns 5 to 8 show the fraction of the countries with low reserves located in Africa, Asia, South America, and Europe. The two last columns indicate the share between high-, upper-middle-, lower-middle- and low-income countries for which the domestic reserves are lower than the decline in impaired supply. Data Source: FAOSTAT and World Bank.

Country	Production Decline	Share of import compared to domestic supply	reserves compared	Imports due to Export Ban	Change in Impaired Supply due to P loss and Export ban (fraction)	Change in Impaired Supply due to P loss and Export Ban (kcal)	Reserves (kcal)	Ratio of decline in Impaired Supply to Reserves	Country Classification based on GNI per capita		
	Focus countries										
Kazakhstan	18.18%	0.6%	8.9%	-95.0%	7.6%	5.09E+12	5.97E+12	n/a	Upper middle income		
Russian Federation	7.68%	0.8%	12.5%	-63.0%	23.2%	5.87E+13	3.13E+13	n/a	Upper middle income		
Ukraine	20.50%	0.3%	8.1%	-15.4%	54.5%	3.08E+13	4.52E+12	n/a	Lower middle income		
Ethiopia	8.74%	12.6%	6.4%	-25.0%	-10.8%	-2.62E+12	1.54E+12	170.0%	Low income		
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	10.24%	8.2%	32.5%	-49.8%	-13.6%	-9.54E+12	2.28E+13	41.9%	Upper middle income		

Kenya	49.16%	83.3%	8.8%	-39.3%	-41.2%	-2.85E+12	6.06E+11	471.2%	Lower middle income
Pakistan	9.76%	0.1%	8.5%	-10.6%	-9.9%	-1.14E+13	9.37E+12	121.7%	Lower middle income
Saudi Arabia	44.83%	80.2%	73.6%	-0.8%	-9.6%	-1.30E+12	1.03E+13	12.6%	Lower middle income
Yemen	23.35%	96.9%	12.3%	-33.7%	-33.2%	-3.74E+12	1.35E+12	277.2%	High income
Afghanistan	0.00%	25.8%	4.7%	-69.2%	-17.8%	-5.36E+12	1.42E+12	377.9%	Low income
United Arab Emirates	0%	118.0%	42.1%	-34.4%	-40.5%	-2.02E+12	2.11E+12	96.0%	High income
Iraq	0%	37.0%	15.6%	-0.2%	-0.1%	-1.93E+10	3.28E+12	0.6%	Upper middle income
Jordan	0%	97.6%	32.6%	-22.1%	-21.5%	-8.62E+11	1.30E+12	66.2%	Upper middle income
Oman	0%	159.0%	21.0%	-32.0%	-50.1%	-8.15E+11	3.36E+11	242.3%	High income
Sudan	0%	73.4%	8.9%	-42.5%	-30.9%	-3.12E+12	8.90E+11	350.7%	Lower middle income
Uganda	0%	98.1%	8.8%	-37.5%	-36.9%	-6.25E+11	1.50E+11	417.0%	Low income
		Cour	ntries with >5	50% decline	e in import b	out large res	erves		
India	0%	2.0%	14.4%	-51.6%	-1.1%	-4.43E+12	6.04E+13	7.3%	Lower middle income
Republic of Moldova	0%	5.7%	43.2%	-88.9%	-5.1%	-1.63E+11	1.38E+12	11.8%	Lower middle income
Belarus	0%	4.1%	22.8%	-94.6%	-3.7%	-4.23E+11	2.51E+12	16.9%	Upper middle income
		Coun	tries where t	he reserve	s < decline i	n impaired s	upply		
Albania	0%	44.2%	17.1%	-52.9%	-22.9%	-5.14E+11	3.76E+11	136.6%	Upper middle income
Armenia	0%	40.4%	4.6%	-97.1%	-38.5%	-9.03E+11	1.06E+11	854.2%	Upper middle income
Azerbaijan	0%	36.6%	7.0%	-98.3%	-35.3%	-4.31E+12	8.38E+11	515.0%	Upper middle income
Burkina Faso	0%	99.5%	2.7%	-10.2%	-10.2%	-8.56E+10	2.23E+10	384.6%	Low income
Bangladesh	0%	76.7%	24.4%	-55.6%	-42.0%	-1.02E+13	5.84E+12	175.1%	Lower middle

									income
Cameroon	0%	97.0%	0.7%	-19.7%	-19.4%	-4.39E+11	1.67E+10	2630.0%	Lower middle income
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0%	91.4%	1.3%	-33.4%	-31.3%	-3.97E+11	1.67E+10	2380.0%	Low income
Cyprus	0%	93.8%	2.2%	-25.0%	-23.2%	-1.27E+11	1.18E+10	1076.6%	High income
Egypt	0%	51.5%	19.7%	-71.8%	-37.2%	-2.66E+13	1.42E+13	187.2%	Lower middle income
Spain	0%	46.7%	4.5%	-11.2%	-5.2%	-2.41E+12	2.06E+12	116.8%	High income
Georgia	0%	74.8%	13.6%	-98.3%	-74.2%	-1.84E+12	3.41E+11	539.0%	Upper middle income
Greece	0%	42.5%	5.4%	-17.5%	-7.4%	-6.63E+11	4.79E+11	138.4%	High income
Haiti	0%	104.0%	7.7%	-11.3%	-11.3%	-1.18E+11	7.68E+10	153.0%	Low income
Indonesia	0%	103.0%	18.4%	-21.7%	-22.2%	-7.17E+12	5.88E+12	122.0%	Lower middle income
Israel	0%	90.5%	22.3%	-32.2%	-29.0%	-1.84E+12	1.41E+12	130.9%	High income
Italy	0%	54.9%	4.9%	-10.0%	-5.4%	-2.52E+12	2.26E+12	111.6%	High income
Kyrgyzstan	0%	27.0%	9.0%	-99.2%	-26.6%	-1.15E+12	3.87E+11	298.0%	Lower middle income
Lebanon	0%	86.1%	13.4%	-76.3%	-65.6%	-2.56E+12	5.24E+11	489.0%	Upper middle income
Libya	0%	78.1%	5.2%	-42.5%	-33.0%	-1.93E+12	3.01E+11	640.0%	Upper middle income
Latvia	0%	48.2%	13.9%	-31.7%	-15.3%	-7.03E+11	6.41E+11	109.7%	High income
Mali	0%	80.2%	3.7%	-11.4%	-9.0%	-1.28E+11	5.23E+10	244.0%	Low income
Mozambique	0%	98.6%	7.7%	-38.1%	-37.9%	-8.65E+11	1.77E+11	489.0%	Low income
Mauritania	0%	93.8%	13.4%	-41.8%	-39.5%	-7.84E+11	2.68E+11	292.1%	Lower middle income
Malawi	0%	94.5%	3.9%	-30.8%	-28.9%	-2.15E+11	2.89E+10	743.9%	Low income
Namibia	0%	69.7%	2.1%	-16.1%	-11.2%	-7.19E+10	1.34E+10	536.6%	Upper middle income
Nigeria	0%	100.0%	4.2%	-26.9%	-26.2%	-4.30E+12	6.68E+11	644.0%	Lower middle income

Nicaragua	0%	109.0%	4.0%	-45.6%	-49.8%	-3.03E+11	2.45E+10	1238.0%	Lower middle income
Panama	0%	108.0%	6.2%	-10.3%	-11.1%	-7.39E+10	4.12E+10	179.3%	High income
Rwanda	0%	78.5%	15.4%	-51.4%	-40.5%	-2.02E+11	7.68E+10	263.0%	Low income
Senegal	0%	101.0%	8.9%	-34.8%	-35.9%	-7.75E+11	1.95E+11	398.0%	Lower middle income
Thailand	0%	108.0%	15.3%	-36.8%	-38.4%	-5.17E+12	1.99E+12	260.0%	Upper middle income
Tajikistan	0%	47.0%	23.7%	-99.9%	-47.1%	-3.66E+12	1.85E+12	197.8%	Low income
Tunisia	0%	54.9%	20.9%	-38.9%	-22.1%	-2.56E+12	2.51E+12	102.3%	Lower middle income
United Republic of Tanzania	0%	84.5%	8.8%	-47.0%	-40.1%	-1.39E+12	3.07E+11	453.0%	Low income
Uzbekistan	0%	22.6%	16.8%	-100.0%	-22.5%	-7.89E+12	5.89E+12	134.0%	Lower middle income
South Africa	0%	50.3%	19.0%	-39.9%	-19.6%	-2.41E+12	2.27E+12	106.0%	Upper middle income

Supplementary Table 11 | Result of impaired supply calculations for wheat with production losses and export ban. Wheat production decline (Sec. SI-1.2.3), share of imports compared to domestic supply calculated from 2015-2018 averages, change in imports due to export bans in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (given in percent and kcal) and domestic reserves 2015-2018 average. The second last column shows the ratios of the decline in supply (due to production losses and export bans) to the domestic reserve. The last column lists the country classification based on GNI per capita done by the World Bank for the current 2020 fiscal year. Data Source: FAOSTAT and World Bank.

Country	Production Decline	Share of import compared to domestic supply	compared to domestic	Change in Imports due to Export Ban	Impaired Supply due to P loss and Export ban	due to P	Reserves (kcal)	decline in Impaired Supply to	Country Classification based on GNI per capita
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				Focus o	ountries				
India	-1.92%	0.0%	19.4%	-2.0%	5.1%	2.76E+13	1.05E+14	n/a	Lower middle income
Thailand	-2.10%	0.4%	19.2%	-3.5%	43.9%	3.21E+13	1.40E+13	n/a	Upper middle income
Viet Nam	-0.12%	0.1%	3.0%	-82.5%	11.6%	1.50E+13	3.84E+12	n/a	Lower middle income
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	-18.83%	32.4%	15.9%	-71.4%	-36.3%	-4.60E+12	2.06E+12	224.0%	Upper middle income
Kenya	-34.25%	81.3%	12.4%	-17.2%	-20.4%	-5.29E+11	3.23E+11	164.0%	Lower middle income
Pakistan	-19.70%	0.1%	15.4%	-9.7%	-31.1%	-7.38E+12	3.70E+12	199.0%	Lower middle income
Saudi Arabia	0%	101.0%	15.9%	-80.2%	-80.5%	-3.88E+12	7.62E+11	510.0%	High income
Ethiopia	0%	49.4%	n/a	-86.7%	-41.4%	-4.72E+11	not reported	n/a	Low income
Somalia	0%	91.2%	n/a	-88.2%	-82.6%	-1.13E+12	not reported	n/a	Low income
Yemen	0%	99.6%	n/a	-79.8%	-79.8%	-1.27E+12	not reported	n/a	Low income
Jordan	0%	100.0%	7.9%	-33.1%	-33.4%	-2.42E+11	5.76E+10	421.0%	Upper middle income
Oman	0%	107.0%	36.0%	-46.0%	-49.1%	-4.42E+11	3.24E+11	136.0%	High income
United Arab Emirates	0%	146.0%	5.4%	-79.0%	-113.4%	-3.22E+12	1.50E+11	2150.0%	High income
Iraq	0%	81.4%	8.5%	-69.2%	-56.3%	-2.31E+12	3.50E+11	659.0%	Upper middle income
		Cou	ntries with >	50% decline	e in import l	out large res	erves		
Bangladesh	0%	1.65%	2.9%	-98.9%	-1.6%	-2.93E+12	5.30E+12	55.3%	Lower middle income
China (mainland)	0%	1.89%	59.1%	-80.7%	-1.5%	-1.05E+13	4.08E+14	2.6%	Upper middle income
Egypt	0%	1.63%	27.7%	-96.5%	-1.6%	-2.52E+11	4.43E+12	5.7%	Lower middle income

Cambodia	0%	0.36%	5.3%	-90.8%	-0.3%	-1.12E+11	1.79E+12	6.2%	Lower middle income
Sri Lanka	0%	8.99%	10.6%	-73.0%	-6.6%	-9.19E+11	1.48E+12	62.1%	Upper middle income
Myanmar	0%	0.07%	4.1%	-96.5%	-0.1%	-5.90E+10	3.62E+12	1.6%	Lower middle income
Nigeria	0%	3.76%	13.8%	-95.3%	-3.6%	-1.08E+12	4.13E+12	26.1%	Lower middle income
Philippines	0%	4.67%	15.7%	-95.9%	-4.5%	-3.05E+12	1.07E+13	28.5%	Lower middle income
United States of America	0%	11.50%	40.5%	-86.0%	-9.9%	-2.37E+12	3.99E+12	59.3%	High income
		Cour	ntries where	the reserve	s < decline i	n impaired	supply		
Burkina Faso	0%	39.9%	5.6%	-75.5%	-30.5%	-7.53E+11	1.40E+11	538.0%	Low income
Switzerland	0%	118.6%	19.9%	-21.4%	-25.6%	-8.11E+10	6.36E+10	127.0%	High income
France	0%	91.9%	7.7%	-23.6%	-21.4%	-4.55E+11	1.61E+11	282.0%	High income
Ghana	0%	43.1%	19.2%	-95.0%	-40.9%	-1.92E+12	9.00E+11	214.0%	Lower middle income
Guinea	0%	15.8%	4.5%	-87.6%	-14.0%	-1.80E+12	5.78E+11	312.0%	Low income
Gambia	0%	60.0%	10.9%	-22.2%	-13.3%	-1.15E+11	9.36E+10	123.0%	Low income
Israel	0%	101.0%	15.5%	-57.9%	-58.0%	-2.80E+11	7.44E+10	376.0%	High income
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0%	4.2%	2.9%	-99.5%	-4.3%	-6.24E+11	4.40E+11	142.0%	Lower middle income
Liberia	0%	39.3%	5.1%	-85.7%	-33.6%	-8.76E+11	1.33E+11	659.0%	Low income
Mauritania	0%	19.8%	5.4%	-57.4%	-11.0%	-1.25E+11	5.88E+10	212.0%	Lower middle income
Malaysia	0%	24.1%	8.8%	-82.7%	-20.1%	-2.59E+12	1.14E+12	227.0%	Upper middle income
Russian Federation	0%	22.6%	8.0%	-52.3%	-12.0%	-4.98E+11	3.35E+11	149.0%	Upper middle income
Senegal	0%	64.0%	11.8%	-79.5%	-51.0%	-3.51E+12	8.15E+11	430.0%	Lower middle

									income
Syrian Arab Republic	0%	99.7%	6.2%	-51.1%	-51.1%	-1.48E+11	1.80E+10	820.0%	Low income
Turkey	0%	25.6%	7.9%	-51.2%	-13.2%	-5.25E+11	3.14E+11	167.0%	Upper middle income
South Africa	0%	110.0%	7.4%	-95.2%	-106.0%	-3.13E+12	2.22E+11	1410.0%	Upper middle income

Supplementary Table 12 | Result of impaired supply calculations for rice with production losses and export ban. Rice production decline (Sec. SI-1.2.3), share of imports compared to domestic supply calculated from 2015-2018 averages, change in imports due to export bans in India, Thailand and Vietnam (given in percent and kcal) and domestic reserves 2015-2018 average. The second last column shows the ratio of the decline in supply (due to production losses and export bans) to the domestic reserve. The last column lists the country classification based on GNI per capita done by the World Bank for the current 2020 fiscal year. Data Source: FAOSTAT and World Bank

Country	Production Decline	Share of import compared to domestic supply	Share of reserves compared to domestic supply	Change in Imports due to Export Ban	Change in Impaired Supply due to P loss and Export ban (fraction)	Change in Impaired Supply due to P loss and Export Ban (kcal)	Reserves (kcal)	Ratio of decline in Impaired Supply to Reserves	Country Classification based on GNI per capita
				Focus c	ountries				
Argentina	-11.9%	0.2%	12.1%	-3.2%	62.5%	5.63E+13	1.09E+13	n/a	Upper middle income
Brazil	-13.3%	2.1%	8.3%	-43.0%	14.9%	3.98E+13	2.24E+13	n/a	Upper middle income
Ukraine	-8.8%	0.4%	10.0%	0.0%	125.8%	5.39E+13	4.28E+12	n/a	Lower middle income
Ethiopia	-13.0%	0.1%	8.2%	-40.0%	-13.0%	-4.68E+12	2.94E+12	159.03%	Low income
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	-29.8%	84.5%	14.3%	-54.5%	-50.7%	-1.65E+13	4.59E+12	358.89%	Upper middle income
Kenya	-15.2%	9.6%	7.8%	-7.7%	-14.5%	-3.31E+12	1.79E+12	185.00%	Lower middle income
Pakistan	-7.2%	0.4%	12.8%	-13.4%	-7.3%	-1.82E+12	3.20E+12	56.90%	Lower middle

									income
Saudi Arabia	-52.8%	99.8%	21.0%	-49.4%	-50.4%	-6.32E+12	2.72E+12	231.81%	High income
Somalia	-48.4%	6.2%	n/a	-0.5%	-45.5%	-3.74E+11	not reported	n/a	Low income
Yemen	-25.2%	88.1%	3.9%	-94.7%	-86.5%	-2.11E+12	9.37E+10	2248.62%	Low income
Jordan	0%	76.4%	1.2%	-79.5%	-60.7%	-2.43E+12	4.75E+10	5111.52%	Upper middle income
Iraq	0%	52.7%	2.0%	-23.5%	-12.4%	-2.83E+11	4.63E+10	610.18%	Upper middle income
Uganda	0%	0.1%	5.8%	0%	0%	0	7.54E+11	n/a	Low income
•		Coun	tries with >5	0% decline	in import b	out large res	erves		
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0%	4.1%	24.0%	-99.1%	-4.1%	-2.15E+11	1.25E+12	17.2%	Lower middle income
China (mainland)	0%	1.2%	69.1%	-76.6%	-0.9%	-9.99E+12	7.61E+14	1.3%	Upper middle income
India	0%	0.3%	5.0%	-94.2%	-0.3%	-3.70E+11	5.96E+12	6.2%	Lower middle income
Kazakhstan	0%	1.1%	12.9%	-58.1%	-0.7%	-2.27E+10	4.50E+11	5.0%	Upper middle income
Paraguay	0%	0.3%	30.9%	-97.5%	-0.3%	-4.11E+10	4.02E+12	1.0%	Upper middle income
South Africa	0%	11.2%	16.8%	-66.6%	-7.4%	-3.78E+12	8.57E+12	44.1%	Upper middle income
		Count	ries where t	he reserves	s < decline i	n impaired s	upply		
Belgium	0%	82.7%	3.9%	-22.2%	-18.3%	-1.41E+12	3.01E+11	468.2%	High income
Bangladesh	0%	24.0%	4.1%	-74.0%	-17.8%	-2.50E+12	5.71E+11	437.9%	Lower middle income
Chile	0%	49.5%	6.2%	-43.6%	-21.6%	-2.29E+12	6.79E+11	337.8%	High income
Costa Rica	0%	96.7%	5.4%	-10.5%	-10.1%	-3.11E+11	1.67E+11	186.0%	Upper middle income
Cuba	0%	61.5%	3.7%	-80.1%	-49.2%	-2.56E+12	1.90E+11	1349.9%	Upper middle income

Dominican Republic	0%	94.6%	11.2%	-56.1%	-53.1%	-2.60E+12	5.48E+11	475.0%	Upper middle income
Algeria	0%	99.2%	10.8%	-86.8%	-86.1%	-1.29E+13	1.62E+12	798.4%	Upper middle income
Ecuador	0%	4.3%	2.1%	-68.5%	-2.9%	-2.05E+11	1.48E+11	138.1%	Upper middle income
Egypt	0%	46.5%	9.8%	-84.6%	-39.3%	-2.40E+13	6.00E+12	399.5%	Lower middle income
Spain	0%	62.6%	4.8%	-52.3%	-32.8%	-1.32E+13	1.93E+12	684.6%	High income
Indonesia	0%	5.5%	2.7%	-84.5%	-4.6%	-5.01E+12	2.97E+12	168.8%	Lower middle income
Israel	0%	82.3%	7.3%	-36.7%	-30.2%	-2.14E+12	5.17E+11	414.5%	High income
Italy	0%	39.6%	7.2%	-30.6%	-12.1%	-5.18E+12	3.10E+12	167.1%	High income
Japan	0%	99.5%	9.4%	-20.2%	-20.1%	-1.08E+13	5.08E+12	212.6%	High income
Republic of Korea	0%	99.4%	19.0%	-41.2%	-41.0%	-1.45E+13	6.64E+12	218.0%	High income
Kuwait	0%	75.7%	4.0%	-59.1%	-44.8%	-5.08E+11	4.39E+10	1158.1%	High income
Lebanon	0%	94.3%	4.5%	-37.2%	-35.0%	-9.13E+11	1.17E+11	780.0%	Upper middle income
Libya	0%	96.7%	5.7%	-47.1%	-45.5%	-1.36E+12	1.70E+11	798.7%	Upper middle income
Lithuania	0%	59.9%	5.2%	-71.3%	-42.7%	-2.29E+11	5.57E+10	411.0%	High income
Morocco	0%	90.6%	5.2%	-68.7%	-62.3%	-5.34E+12	4.44E+11	1202.5%	Lower middle income
Malaysia	0%	98.1%	6.0%	-89.9%	-88.2%	-1.22E+13	8.38E+11	1456.6%	Lower middle income
Netherlands	0%	125.4%	0.6%	-47.5%	-59.5%	-8.76E+12	9.63E+10	9096.7%	High income
Portugal	0%	68.2%	4.0%	-56.1%	-38.3%	-3.77E+12	3.91E+11	965.7%	High income
Senegal	0%	33.4%	7.1%	-67.9%	-22.7%	-5.98E+11	1.84E+11	325.2%	Lower middle income
Syrian Arab Republic	0%	55.8%	8.2%	-27.8%	-15.5%	-2.50E+11	1.31E+11	191.5%	Low income
Tunisia	0%	103.8%	4.0%	-78.7%	-81.7%	-3.51E+12	1.73E+11	2023.4%	Lower middle income

Taiwan	0%	94.4%	18.5%	-44.1%	-41.6%	-6.69E+12	2.96E+12	226.0%	High income
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0%	48.5%	2.9%	-21.5%	-10.4%	-1.27E+12	3.51E+11	362.6%	Upper middle income
Vietnam	0%	55.1%	7.3%	-92.3%	-50.8%	-2.57E+13	3.74E+12	686.5%	Lower middle income

Supplementary Table 13 | Result of impaired supply calculations for maize with production losses and export ban. Maize production decline (Sec. SI-1.2.3), share of imports compared to domestic supply calculated from 2015-2018 averages, change in imports due to export bans in Argentina, Brazil and Ukraine (given in percent and kcal) and domestic reserves 2015-2018 average. The second last column shows the ratio of the decline in supply (due to production losses and export bans) to the domestic reserve. The last column lists the country classification based on GNI per capita done by the World Bank for the current 2020 fiscal year. Data Source: FAOSTAT and World Bank

SI-1.3.2: Example of major medium-income exporters

Several of the world's largest exporters are medium income countries according to the World Bank country classification based on GNI per capita⁹ (Supplementary Tables 14-16). Argentina and Ukraine are two examples of such countries. Both countries are important exporters playing a central role for the stability of the world food system. For instance, in the agricultural year 2018/19 Argentine was the 6th largest wheat exporter and 3rd largest maize exporter, and Ukraine was the 5th largest wheat exporter and 4th largest maize exporter (Supplementary Tables 14 and 16). Both countries, have relatively small reserves compared to their domestic consumption (production + imports - exports). Ukraine's wheat reserve is 8%, 10% of their domestic consumption (Supplementary Tables 11 and 13). As shown in Sec. SI-1.3.1, the reserves of both countries would not be sufficient to buffer a 1-in-5-year production decline, if trade (both import and exports) is kept constant. Therefore, export bans might be an intriguing option to secure domestic food security. However, since both countries are large exporters, complete export restrictions would strongly overcompensate the decline in supply (impaired supply) they are facing due to production losses. To show this, we compute the ratio of impaired supply from production failure plus reserves to exports,

⁹ <u>https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups</u> accessed June 2020

$r = \frac{|\text{impaired supply due to produciton loss + reserves}|}{exports}$.

Using the values given in Supplementary Tables 6 and 8, we obtain r=0.34 for wheat in Ukraine, and r=0.08 and r=0.11 for maize in Ukraine and Argentina, respectively. Thus, in the case of maize, it would be sufficient for both countries to reduce export only by a few percent, while Ukraine would need to reduce their wheat export by roughly one third, in order to ensure domestic food security. For that, mild forms of export restrictions (e.g., restriction in export volumes) or an adjustment of tariffs would be sufficient. In contrast, complete export restrictions would probably harm producers in Ukraine and Argentine by stripping them of sales opportunities and would have the potential to create severe food shortages for import dependent low-income countries as discussed in the main text.

SI-2: Supporting data

All production, domestic consumption, export and ending stock data used in this subsection are published by the United States Department of Agriculture and are available from USDA's PSD online database¹⁰. The figures and content of the tables are all produced using data from 1960-2019. Annual nominal world market price for US hard red winter wheat, Thai 5% rice and Maize are published by the World Bank and are taken from the Commodity Markets online database "pink sheet"¹¹.

SI-2.1: Major producers and export countries

Production of main staple grain crops are dominated by a few major producing breadbasket regions/countries. In 2018/2019 the production of the top 5 producers accounted for 67%, 73% and 75% for the total world production for wheat, rice and maize, respectively. However, when it comes to international trade and the importance of individual countries, the largest producer is not necessarily the largest exporter. When identifying the most important countries with respect to global supply of staple crops, we instead consider the countries which are major exporters. For example, China was in 2018 the world's largest rice producer, accounting for almost 30% of the total production. But China exported only 1.8% of their domestic harvest, which accounted for 6.3% of international rice exports. Thailand on the other hand, produces only 4% of all rice but their share of world total rice export is 17.5% and Thailand was in 2018/2019 the second largest exporter of rice. The top 5 exporters account for 72%, 73% and 90% of all exported wheat, rice and maize, respectively (Supplementary Tables 14-16).

¹⁰ <u>https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/app/index.html#/app/advQuery</u> accessed April 2020

¹¹ <u>http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-market</u> accessed April 2020

Largest producers:

- Wheat: EU, China, India, Russia, USA. These countries make up 67% of world production and 49% of world exports.
- **Rice:** China, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Vietnam. These countries make up 73% of world production and 44% of world exports.
- Maize: US, China, Brazil, EU and Argentina. These countries make up 73% of world production and 44% of world exports.

Largest exporters:

- Wheat: Russia, US, Canada, EU, Ukraine. These countries make up 43% of world production and 72% of world exports.
- **Rice:** India, Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan and US. These countries make up 36% of world production and 73% of world exports.
- Maize: US, Brazil, Argentina and Ukraine. These countries make up 55% of world production and 90% of world exports.

Country	Country Classification	Production 2018/2019 (1000 MT)	Export 2018/2019 (1000 MT)	Share of total consumption	Share of total production	Export share of dom. production	Share of total export
European Union	High income	136863	23310	16.78%	18.71%	17.03%	13.29%
China	Upper middle income	131430	1006	17.02%	17.97%	0.77%	0.57%
India	Lower middle income	99870	494	13.02%	13.65%	0.49%	0.28%
Russia	Upper middle income	71685	35838	5.52%	9.80%	49.99%	20.44%
United States	High income	51306	26069	4.09%	7.01%	50.81%	14.86%
Canada	High income	32201	24476	1.22%	4.40%	76.01%	13.96%
Pakistan	Lower middle income	25100	1649	3.45%	3.43%	6.57%	0.94%
Ukraine	Lower middle income	25057	16019	1.20%	3.43%	63.93%	9.13%

Argentina	Upper middle income	19500	12680	0.82%	2.67%	65.03%	7.23%
Turkey	Upper middle income	19000	6215	2.56%	2.60%	32.71%	3.54%
Australia	High income	17298	9835	1.25%	2.36%	56.86%	5.61%
Iran	Upper middle income	14500	320	2.19%	1.98%	2.21%	0.18%
Kazakhstan	Upper middle income	13947	8780	0.90%	1.91 %	62.95%	5.01%
World	n/a	731460	175372	100.00%	100.00%	23.98%	100.00%

Supplementary Table 14 | Worlds largest wheat producers. Wheat production and export (per trade year) for the 13 largest wheat producing countries/regions and their market shares in 2018/2019. The shaded boxes indicate the 5 countries which are the largest exporters, and together make up 72% of all wheat exports. The first column lists the current 2020 fiscal year, country classification based on GNI per capita done by the World Bank. Data source: USDA PSD online and the World Bank.

Country	Country Classification	Production 2018/2019 (1000 MT)	Export 2018/2019 (1000 MT)	Share of total consumption	Share of total production	Export share of dom. production	Share of total export
China	Upper middle income	148490	2720	29.36%	29.74%	1.83%	6.29%
India	Lower middle income	116480	9790	20.40%	23.33%	8.40%	22.62%
Indonesia	Lower middle income	36700	2	7.84%	7.35%	0.01%	0.00%
Bangladesh	Lower middle income	34909	4	7.28%	6.99%	0.01%	0.01%
Vietnam	Lower middle income	27767	6581	4.42%	5.56%	23.70%	15.21%
Thailand	Upper middle income	20340	7562	2.43%	4.07%	37.18%	17.48%
Burma	Lower middle income	13175	2500	2.14%	2.64%	18.98%	5.78%
Philippines	Lower middle income	11732	0	2.90%	2.35%	0.00%	0.00%

Japan	High income	7657	60	1.75%	1.53%	0.78%	0.14%
Pakistan	Lower middle income	7300	4600	0.68%	1.46%	63.01%	10.63%
Brazil	Upper middle income	7140	953	1.54%	1.43%	13.35%	2.20%
United States	High income	7107	3135	0.94%	1.42%	44.11%	7.24%
World	n/a	499372	43273	100.00%	100.00%	8.67%	100.00%

Supplementary Table 15 | Worlds largest rice producers. Rice production and export (per trade year) for the 12 largest rice producing countries and their market share in 2018/2019. The shaded boxes indicate the 5 countries which are the largest exporters, and together make up 73% of all rice exports. The first column lists the current 2020 fiscal year, country classification based on GNI per capita done by the World Bank. Data source: USDA PSD online and the World Bank.

Country	Country Classification	Production 2018/2019 (1000 MT)	Export 2018/2019 (1000 MT)	Share of total consumption	Share of total production	Export share of dom. production	Share of total export
United States	High income	364262	49194	27.56%	32.43%	13.51%	28.61%
China	Upper middle income	257330	19	24.32%	22.91%	0.01%	0.01%
Brazil	Upper middle income	101000	38807	5.95%	8.99%	38.42%	22.57%
European Union	High income	64440	3629	7.81%	5.74%	5.63%	2.11%
Argentina	Upper middle income	51000	32879	1.22%	4.54%	64.47%	19.12%
Ukraine	Lower middle income	35805	30321	0.51%	3.19%	84.68%	17.64%
India	Lower middle income	27715	482	2.53%	2.47%	1.74%	0.28%
Mexico	Upper middle income	27600	718	3.91%	2.46%	2.60%	0.42%
Canada	High income	13885	1719	1.35%	1.24%	12.38%	1.00%

Indonesia	Lower middle income	12000	2	1.15%	1.07%	0.02%	0.00%
South Africa	Upper middle income	11824	1183	1.07%	1.05%	10.01%	0.69%
Russia	Upper middle income	11415	2770	0.75%	1.02%	24.27%	1.61%
World	n/a	1123332	171918	100.00%	100.00%	15.30%	100.00%


Supplementary Table 16 | Worlds largest maize producers. Maize production and export (per trade year) for the 12 largest maize producing countries/regions and their market share in 2018/2019. The shaded boxes indicate the 5 countries which are the largest exporters, and together make up 90% of all maize exports. The first column lists the current 2020 fiscal year, country classification based on GNI per capita done by the World Bank. Data source: USDA PSD online and the World Bank.

SI-2.2: Historic USDA data


SI-2.2.1: Stocks

Global beginning stocks of grains are at a very high level, record high for rice, but also historically high for wheat and maize. The stocks have been increasing since 2007-2008, which may be due to changes in stockholding strategies because of the previous food crises. In 2007/08, when the food crisis occurred, it happened at a time when stocks were at record low values and there had also been production problems in the years leading up to the crisis. Today, the world is in a different situation and the share of stock to consumption (stock-to-use, S/U) is also at a historically high level for wheat and rice with values of 39% and 37% respectively. Maize stock-to-use is at 27% and has been declining since 2016 when it reached 33% but is still at a relatively high level for a historic point of view. The stock-to-use levels in 2019/20 are 86%, 95% and 68% higher than they were in 2007/08 for wheat, rice and maize, respectively. The year-to-year change in stock-to-use is reported in Supplementary Table 17 for four different time periods and the 95th and 80th percentile corresponds to a 1-in-20 and 1-in-5-year increase in stock-to-use.





Supplementary Figure 4 | World grain stock. Beginning stocks from wheat, rice and maize from 1960-2019. The current world stock is historically high for rice, wheat and maize. Data source: USDA PSD online.




Supplementary Figure 5 | World stock-to-use ratio. Derived values of S/U for wheat, rice and maize for 1960-2019, where S/U = Ending stock divided by domestic consumption. Data source: USDA PSD online.

Commodity	95th percentile	80th percentile	min	max	mean	STD	
1961-2019							
Corn	27.6%	16.3%	-38.0%	54.3%	1.3%	18.0%	
Rice, Milled	19.1%	9.9%	-21.8%	46.4%	3.5%	11.2%	
Wheat	22.2%	10.7%	-29.6%	45.9%	1.2%	14.6%	
		1980-	2019	L			
Corn	27.5%	17.1%	-38.0%	54.3%	1.5%	18.2%	
Rice, Milled	13.4%	7.1%	-21.8%	24.1%	1.8%	8.7%	
Wheat	18.0%	10.6%	-20.4%	27.7%	1.4%	10.8%	
		2000-	2019	1			
Corn	27.5%	10.6%	-20.3%	37.4%	0.2%	15.9%	
Rice, Milled	8.6%	7.1%	-21.8%	13.3%	0.6%	9.6%	
Wheat	17.9%	9.8%	-18.9%	27.7%	1.0%	11.5%	
_		2004-	2019	Į	Į		
Corn	29.6%	18.0%	-15.9%	37.4%	4.2%	15.2%	
Rice, Milled	9.6%	7.3%	-8.3%	13.3%	4.1%	4.9%	
Wheat	20.0%	10.5%	-13.3%	27.7%	3.8%	10.5%	

Supplementary Table 17 | Change in stock-to-use ratio. The change in S/U is calculated by comparing a given year's value with the values of the previous year. The 95th and 80th percentile is reported for four different time periods. Data source: USDA PSD online.

SI-2.2.3: Production

World production of the main staple crops have been increasing over the last 60 years and the increase in maize has been larger in the last 20 years compared to wheat and rice (Supplementary Figure 6). The year-to-year variation in production is given in Supplementary Table 18 for four different time periods and the 95th, 90th and 80th percentile changes in production correspond to a 1-in-20, 1-in-10 and 1-in-5-year decline in production, respectively. The production variation is larger for wheat and maize than for rice. The worst global decline in rice production during the last 15 years was only 2.1%, while it was 5.5% and 4.2% for wheat and maize, respectively. However, a 1-in-20-year world production decline only corresponds to a 1.4%-5.5% decrease in total production base on data over the last 20 years. This is much smaller compared to domestic production declines, which vary much more (Supplementary Table 3). For example, a 1-in-20-year production failure in Kenya would result in a decline of 15%-49% for wheat, rice and maize. The total world production averages out local harvest failures and can hide the fact that production losses can be severe in the certain regions. This is one reason why food insecurity can arise even though there is enough food globally to cover the world food demand. The food needs to be available and affordable for countries to mitigate regional declines in food production that may arise due to e.g. worse-than-normal weather, or changes in trade policies.



Supplementary Figure 6 | World production of wheat, rice and maize. Data source: USDA PSD online.

Commodity	5th percentile	10th percentile	20th percentile	min	max	mean	STD
	1961-2019						
Corn	-9.49%	-4.42%	-2.49%	-20.81%	31.57%	3.28%	8.27%
Rice, Milled	-3.10%	-2.28%	-0.42%	-5.33%	8.97%	2.09%	3.19%
Wheat	-6.37%	-5.53%	-3.37%	-8.81%	17.50%	2.24%	6.70%
	1980-2019						

			r				
Corn	-11.16%	-5.41%	-3.32%	-20.81%	31.57%	2.83%	7.09%
Rice, Milled	-2.12%	-0.67%	0.14%	-5.33%	7.73%	1.69%	3.62%
Wheat	-5.53%	-4.90%	-2.86%	-7.70%	12.79%	1.65%	5.89%
	2000-2019						
Corn	-4.04%	-2.86%	-1.46%	-4.23%	14.25%	3.22%	9.17%
Rice, Milled	-2.56%	-2.14%	-0.71%	-5.33%	4.25%	1.00%	2.40%
Wheat	-5.45%	-4.25%	-2.68%	-5.48%	12.79%	1.45%	5.10%
	2004-2019						
Corn	-4.08%	-3.18%	-1.25%	-4.23%	14.25%	3.81%	6.16%
Rice, Milled	-1.38%	-0.88%	0.24%	-2.10%	4.25%	1.49%	1.89%
Wheat	-5.46%	-4.79%	-3.58%	-5.48%	12.79%	2.16%	5.69%

Supplementary Table 18 | Change in world production. The change is calculated by comparing a given year's value with the values of the previous year. The 5th, 10th and 20th percentile is reported for four different time periods Data source: USDA PSD online.


SI-2.3: Historic World Price of wheat, rice and maize

The world market price for food and grains has varied substantially under certain periods of time. Especially during the oil crisis in the 1970s and the world food crisis in 2007/08 and 2010/11 (Supplementary Table 19). These effects are seen both in nominal and real prices (Supplementary Figure 7 and 8). The nominal prices are taken from the Commodity Markets online database "pink sheet" of the World Bank¹² and real prices are obtained by deflating with the US All Urban Consumers price index (June 1983=100) provided by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics¹³. During the last 5 years the real world market price has been quite stable without large fluctuations, but between 2006 and 2008 the price increased with 59%, 72% and 100% in wheat, rice and maize respectively. Large price changes in export price increases the cost of food imports and can also transmit to domestic prices making food very expensive. This is especially harmful for people that spends a large fraction of their income on food.


¹² <u>http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-market</u> accessed April 2020

¹³ <u>https://www.bls.gov</u> accessed April 2020

Large price drops can also have negative impacts, as e.g., smallholders in low-income countries might not be able to sell their food at a reasonable price and suffer economically.



Supplementary Figure 7 | Annual nominal world market price. Historic prices for wheat HRW, rice Thai 5% and maize for 1960-2019. Data source: "pink sheet" of the World Bank.




Supplementary Figure 8 | Annual real world market price. Historic prices for wheat HRW, rice and Maize for 1960-2019, deflated by the CPI normalized to June 1983=100. Data source: World Bank "pink sheet" and CPI from US Bureau of Labor Statistics.

food crisis	Wheat HRW	Maize	Rice Thai 5%
2007/08	58.96%	71.45%	99.69%
2010/11	37.12%	52.09%	7.67%

Supplementary Table 19 | Extreme change in annual world price. Price increase during the two recent food crisis 2007/08 (price in 2008 compared to 2006) and 2010/11 (price in 2011 compared to 2010) in real price, deflated by CPI normalized to June 1983=100.

The International Grain Council provides daily values of the change in export prices expressed in grain indices¹⁴. From 1 Jan 2020 to 29 May 2020 the index went up 15% for rice, while it decreased by 3.1% and 9.3% for wheat and maize, respectively, for the same time period (see Supplementary Figure 9). The early price increase in rice prices may be partly due to the temporary ban of rice by Vietnam. The decrease in maize prices may be partly due to lowered demand of biofuel, since the oil price deceased during the COVID-19 pandemic and even turned negative in US¹⁵.



pplementary Figure 9 | Food price indices. Grain and Oilseeds index (GOI) and sub-indices for wheat,

¹⁴ https://www.igc.int/en/markets/marketinfo-goi.aspx accessed June 2020


¹⁵ https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-20/negative-prices-for-oil-here-s-what-that-means-quicktake

rice and maize reported on a daily basis between October 2019 and June 2020. Normalized to January 2000 = 100 Data source: IGC.


SI-3: Locust infestation

Some parts of the world are currently facing the worst locust upsurge in decades. It started in 2018 when cyclones created wet and favorable conditions in the southern Arabian Peninsula. This allowed for locust eggs to hatch and a few new generations of locusts occurred, which was unknown at the time and was therefore not under controlled¹⁶. In 2019, the locusts spread to the Horn of Africa, Southwestern Asia and the Indo-Pakistan border. Widespread spring breeding took place, increasing the number of locusts and swarms began forming. In early 2020, Kenya and Ethiopia were particularly threatened by swarms of locusts and destruction of crops. In East Africa, widespread rainfall in March created good breeding conditions for desert locusts, which exacerbated the situation (FAO, 2020a). Since locusts are a huge threat to crop production, we explore the impact of a 1-in-20-year production decline in the countries classified as Serious or Dangerous in the 8th May 2020 update (FAO, 2020a). These countries are Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran and Pakistan (Supplementary Figure 10). The countries classified Threatened in 8th of May were India, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, South Sudan, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Uganda. Since then, the situation has deteriorated, especially in South Asia and India in particular, which is now facing an infestation of swarms. In the northern states (Supplementary Figure 11), it is the first time since 1962 that any desert locusts threaten their land and crops (FAO, 2020b).

¹⁶ <u>http://www.fao.org/ag/locusts/en/info/2094/index.html</u>



Supplementary Figure 10 | Locust risk map. FAO Locust Watch map update 8 May. Reprinted from FAO¹⁷.



Supplementary Figure 11 | Locust risk map: FAO Locust Watch risk map updated 4 June. Reprinted from FAO¹⁸.

¹⁷ <u>http://www.fao.org/ag/locusts/common/ecg/75/en/200507globalE.jpg</u>

¹⁸ http://www.fao.org/ag/locusts/common/ecg/75/en/200604forecastE.jpg

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